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PREFACE 
This bulletin reports economic analyses of the effects of important 
variables affecting the viability of rice-soybean farming operations in the 
Texas Upper Gulf Coast region. The study attempts to recognize many 
factors that affect production decisions and, consequently, is heavily 
laden with descriptions of the required assumptions. To fully capture the 
benefit of such in-depth assumptions, analyses are reported across a 
wide range of topics relevant to rice-soybean producers in the Texas 
Upper Gulf Coast region. Appropriate interpretation of the results for 
any specific topic area requires understanding the study's methodology 
and the assumptions made for the base situation analyzed. All results 
discussed for specific topics should be considered relative to results 
presented for the base situation. 
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A representative rice-soybean 
farm in the Texas Upper Gulf Coast 
was analyzed for 1984-88 using a 
computerized simulation model 
that accounts for annual produc-
tion, farm policy, marketing, and 
income tax aspects of an individual 
farm. Uncertainty in harvested 
yields and prices received is ex-
plicitly accounted for in the model. 
An econometric model of the U.S. 
rice industry (including export 
components) is used to project an-
nual prices for rice and a somewhat 
similar but more integrated mac-
roeconomic econometric model is 
used to project annual soybean 
prices as well as annual interest 
and inflation rates. The purpose of 
this study is to analyze common 
crop rotations and tenure arrange-
ments used by Texas Upper Gulf 
Coast rice and soybean producers. 
In particular, the effects of various 
production management strate-
gies, technology levels, financial 
lending credit policies, mac-
roeconomic scenarios, and alterna-
tive provisions of the government 
agricultural program are examined 
in some detail. The study results 
should be useful to agricultural 
producers, researchers, policy 
makers, lenders, and landowners, 
among others. 
Throughout the study, emphasis 
was directed towards highlighting 
differences in the effect on a farm's 
economic viability among combi-
nations of two principal crop rota-
tions (soybeans-rice (SR) and soy-
beans-soybeans-rice (SSR)) and 
two prevalent land tenure share 
rental arrangements for rice (1/7 
and 1/2, with a large component of 
the variable expenses shared in the 
latter case by the landowner). All 
soybean acreage was leased on a 
1/7 share basis. In the base farm 
situation analyzed, the 2,310 acre 
(A) representative farm was wholly 
leased on a share basis (except for a 
10 A homestead). The primary 
standards used to evaluate results 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
of the analyses included the proba-
bility of survival, the probability of 
success, and the after-tax net pres-
ent value of earnings over the 5-
year planning horizon. In several 
analyses, the four combinations of 
crop rotations and rice rental ar-
rangements were ranked for differ-
ent producer risk preferences, us-
ing stochastic dominance decision 
criteria. 
The analyses constituting this 
study included a base situation and 
numerous sensitivity analyses, 
each of which includes one or more 
modifications to the assumptions 
made for the base situation. Read-
ers should interpret the results of 
the sensitivity analyses by compar-
ing them to the base results, rather 
than by looking at absolute values 
for each scenario. 
In the base scenario, probabili-
ties of survival (i.e., the farm main-
tains debt/equity ratios acceptable 
to its creditors) during 1984-88 
ranged from 50 to 82 percent, the 
highest probability being associ-
ated with the SSR 1/7 strategy. 
Probabilities of success (i.e., posi-
tive net present value of annual 
earnings discounted at a pre-tax 
rate of 11 percent) ranged from 12 
to 52 percent, the highest probabili-
ty being associated with the SSR 1/7 
strategy. Expected net present 
value of annual earnings was nega-
tive for all strategies, the highest 
expected earnings being $- 23,183 
for the SSR 1/7 strategy. The SSR 1/7 
strategy was preferred to the other 
strategies (SR 1/7, SR 1/2, and SSR 
1/2) for most categories of risk pref-
erences. 
Results of the sensitivity anal-
yses, based on the assumptions 
made about the farming operation, 
are as follows: 
1. Production and Management 
• 10 percent Higher/Lower 
Non-Water Variable Produc-
tion Costs 
- Increasing costs reduced 
probability of survival by 12 
to 28 percent for the farm 
strategies. 
- Decreasing costs increased 
probability of survival by 12 
to 32 percent. 
- 1/7 crop share strategies 
were most affected since the 
tenant bears the majority of 
the non-land expenses. 
• Water costs (1/7 share strate-
gies only- landowners pay 
for water under 1/2 share) 
- Reducing water costs by 
over $30/ A enhanced the 
survivability of the farm and 
also made the SR rotations 
more preferable. 
- Increasing the annual infla-
tion rate in water costs from 
4. 5 to 7. 5 had little effect 
over the 5-year planning 
horizon. 
- Increasing water costs to 
$100/A in 1984, coupled 
with a 7 percent annual in-
flation rate on water costs, 
reduced the probability of 
survival for the 1/7 share ar-
rangements and enhanced 
the appeal of the SR 1/2 
strategy. 
• Management Practices 
- Eliminating ratoon rice acre-
age improved the average 
annual cash farm income for 
the 1/7 share arrangements; 
beyond that, little overall 
impact was evident. 
- Reducing labor availability 
from full-time labor by 100 
hours per month (neces-
sitating additional part-time 
labor) reduced after-tax 
earnings but had no mate-
rial effect on probabilities of 
survival and success. 
- Reducing the occurrence of 
red rice in the SR rotation 
from 2.5 to 1.5 percent re-
sulted in SR becoming the 
preferred rotation. This re-
sult suggests red rice control \ 
is important when field in· 
festations are of significant 
magnitude. 
• Land Tenure Arrangements 
- Part-owner and full-owner 
operations had a 100 percent 
probability of survival. 
Probabilities of success in-
creased for both ownership 
situations under the 1/2 
share arrangement. Howev-
er, average after-tax net 
present value of earnings 
and annual net cash farm 
income figures were lower 
for both types of ownership 
tenure arrangements for 
most strategies (in particular 
for the 1/7 strategies). Pref-
erence for strategies was not 
as distinct as for the tenant 
farm situation. 
- Cash rents of $30/A were 
identified as approximately 
comparable to the base crop 
share arrangements with 
some differences according 
to individuals' risk prefer-
ences. Twenty dollar per 
acre cash rents were pre-
ferred to the 117 and 112 crop 
share arrangements and 
$40/ A rents were generally 
inferior to the share ar-
rangements. There was 
some evidence that cash 
rental arrangements tended 
to be a greater risk. 
- Reducing landowners' 
share of the crop (from 50 to 
45 percent and from 1/7 to 
1110 on rice and from 117 to 
1110 on soybeans) signifi-
cantly increased tenants' 
probability of survival, par-
ticularly for the 45 percent 
share strategies. Probabili-
ties of success were posi-
tively affected in greater 
magnitudes. 
- Evaluation of the alternative 
crop rotation-share arrange-
ment strategies from the 
landowner's perspective 
(annual returns equal net 
share rent) revealed higher 
returns were associated 
with the 112 share arrange-
ment. Given the 112 share 
arrangement, both land-
owners and tenants pre-
ferred the SR rotation. For 
the 117 share arrangement, 
the landowner preferred the 
SR rotation and the tenant 
preferred the SSR rotation. 
• Technology/Management 
- Neither an accumulated 
gradual increase in ratoon 
rice yields of 450 lb/ A by 
1988 nor improvement in ra-
toon rice quality had much 
impact on overall results. 
Ratoon rice accounted for 
only about 8 percent of SSR 
gross revenues and 6 per-
cent of SR gross revenues, 
thereby contributing to its 
relatively small influence on 
the farm's viability. 
- Examination of the effects of 
widespread adoption of 
Lemont (a new rice variety) 
throughout the southern 
rice producing region indi-
cated an estimated nominal 
rough rice cash price decline 
of $0.35/cwt (because of bur-
geoning supplies), but also 
identified the offsetting pro-
tection afforded by the 
target price/loan rate provi-
sions of the current govern-
ment agricultural program 
for rice. Assuming this price 
protection through the gov-
ernment program remains 
available from 1984-88, Le-
mont is indicated to have 
enhanced the survivability 
of above-average managed 
operations by as much as 30 
percentage points. 
- Irrigating soybeans appears 
to be economical, assuming 
higher average and slightly 
less variable yields. 
2. Yields and Prices 
• Average Yields 
- Increasing average soybean 
yields by 10 percent raised 
annual cash farm income by 
$14,000 or more for all strat-
egies, the greatest gain be-
ing associated with the SSR 
rotations and the 117 share 
arrangements. Decreasing 
average soybean yields by 
10 percent caused almost 
opposite results in both 
monetary returns and with 
respect to impact on results 
for the respective share ar-
rangements-the 1/2 share 
strategies were hurt rela-
tively more, implying a 
good soybean yield is 
needed to assist in meeting 
general overhead costs. 
- Changes in rice yields affect-
ed results more than 
changes in soybean yields. 
Increasing average rice 
yields by 10 percent favored 
the SR rotations and signifi-
cantly increased net present 
value of earnings (in excess 
of $164,000 for all cropping 
strategies), probability of 
survival (8 percent or more), 
and probability of success 
(14 percent or more). In 
marked contrast, decreasing 
average rice yields by 10 per-
cent (approximating Liberty 
County average yields) 
favored the SSR rotations, 
with significant declines oc-
curring in all evaluation 
measures. These results 
suggest county average 
yields are insufficient to as-
sure a viable farm operation 
(probabilities of survival 
were 60 percent or less for 
the four respective cropping 
strategies). 
• Average Prices 
Changes in average prices 
for both rice and soybeans 
caused results similar to 
those for different average 
yields. The impact of 
changes in rice prices was 
partially offset by deficiency 
payments. 
- With respect to increasing 
versus decreasing either rice 
or soybean average yields 
and prices, absolute 
changes in the analysis 
criteria tend to be greater for 
decreasing scenarios as op-
posed to those involving in-
creases. These results, at 
least in part, are attributable 
to the progressive income 
tax rate structure which dis-
proportionately mitigates 
the gains associated with in-
creases in prices and yields. 
- Regression results demon-
strated that income from 
each strategy was an impor-
tant factor influencing the 
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base results. When income 
was equivalent across strat-
egies, the SSR rotation had 
more risk than the SR rota-
tion. Similarl)j holding in-
come constant, the 1/2 share 
strategies had the least risk, 
followed by the 1/7 share 
and cash rent strategies. An 
estimated off-farm income 
of $90,000 to $122,000 was 
necessary to ensure a 98 per-
cent probability of survival. 
• Variability of Yields and Prices 
- Increasing the variability of 
rice and soybean yields gen-
erally caused probabilities of 
survival to decline. Increas-
ing rice yield variability 
more adversely affected 
probabilities of success and 
net present value of earn-
ings than did increasing 
soybean yield variability. SR 
rotations were more ad-
versely affected than SSR ro-
tations by increasing rice 
yield variability, with the 
SSR 1/2 strategy least af-
fected. 
- Decreasing the variability of 
rice yields tended to in-
crease both expected re-
turns and probabilities of 
survival, with the greatest 
benefit accruing to 1/7 share 
strategies. 
- Decreasing the variability of 
soybean yields was less 
favorable than decreasing 
rice yield variability. The dif-
ference in results appears to 
be associated with the pro-
tection against downside 
variability afforded to soy-
beans with crop insurance 
and the loss of upside varia-
bility (i.e., high yields) 
when overall variance de-
creased. 
- Alternatively increasing and 
decreasing the variability of 
both rice and soybean prices 
suggests, with the current 
government program, in-
creased price variability is 
beneficial to producers (due 
to the implicit price floors 
created by soybean and rice 
nonrecourse loan pro-
grams). 
• Types of Yield and Price 
Distributions 
- The assumption of indepen-
dence between and within 
prices and yields had differ-
ent effects on the strategies. 
Those strategies most de-
pendent on one crop (SSR 
1/2 and SR 1/7) were hurt by 
the independence assump-
tion because of the weaker 
influence of positive correla-
tion between crop yields 
versus the negative correla-
tion between prices and 
yields. When returns from 
crop enterprise were more 
balanced, the positive crop 
yield correlation was domi-
nant, resulting in an im-
provement in results when 
independence was im-
posed. 
- The assumption of indepen-
dent normal distributions 
greatly improved results for 
all four strategies. The re-
sults imply choice of a dis-
tribution may be one of the 
most critical assumptions 
made in simulation anal-
yses. 
3. Finance, Interest, and Inflation 
• Beginning Equity and Finan-
cial Lenders' Credit Policy 
- Financial lenders' credit pol-
icy was critical only to inter-
mediate debt holders (i.e., 
40 to 60 percent beginning 
equity). 
- Returns to tenants tended to 
be more variable than re-
turns to part-owners. 
- A maximum permitted le-
verage ratio of 1.0 was re-
strictive, in that producers' 
probabilities of survival 
were reduced by up to 66 
percentage points. Con-
versel)j a 4.0 maximum per-
mitted leverage ratio in-
creased producers' proba-
bilities of survival but also 
increased lenders' risk ex-
posure (i.e., non-surviving 
producers tended to have 
larger debts when declared 
bankrupt). 
• Interest Rates 
- Lower rates (2 percentage 
points) on new loans during 
1984-88 had modest effects 
on the farm operation. 
- Probabilities of success anr' 
average net present value c 
earnings were affected in 
greater amounts when inter-
est rates for both new and 
existing loans were lowered 
by 2 percentage points. 
• Inflation Rates 
- A 2 percent increase in the 
annual inflation rate nega-
tively affected all strategies, 
especially those with a 1/7 
share arrangement (land-
owners paid their share of 
the higher costs under a 1/2 
share arrangement). SR ro-
tation strategies were affect-
ed more than SSR strategies. 
• 1978-81 Macroeconomic Poli-
cy 
- Repeating 1978-81 condi-
tions of high inflation, low 
real interest rates, and high 
export demand positively 
affected all evaluation stan-
dards for all strategies, par-
ticularly the 1/2 share ar-
rangement. 
4. Government Farm Program 
• No Participation in Govern-
ment Program 
- Survivability declined be-
low 20 percent for all strate-
gies. Probability of success 
was 0 percent for the SR 
rotations. Other evaluation 
standards were adversely 
affected, indicating govern-
ment program benefits are 
essential to the viability of 
rice-soybean farms similar 
to the representative farm 
operation. 
• Strict Payment Limitation 
- Assuming the representa-
tive farm could only receive 
a maximum of $50,000 (in-
stead of the $100,000 as-
sumed in the base situation) 
significantly affected the 1/7 
share strategies and the SR 
rotations. Results imply the 
proposed lowering of pay-
ment limitation could drasti-
cally affect viability of rice-
soybean farms as well as en-
courage some shift in boH· 
rotations and tenure ar 
rangements. 
• Increasing Long-Grain Rice 
Premium 
- Increasing the price differ-
ential for long grain rice by 
$0.53/cwt while maintaining 
the possibility of a $3. 90/cwt 
maximum deficiency pay-
ment, increased returns for 
all strategies, especially SR 
rotations. Results indicate 
that whenever long grain 
rice stocks are in short sup-
ply and/or demand for long 
grain rice is high relative to 
medium and short grain 
rice, Texas long grain rice 
producers benefit. 
• Eliminating Target Prices 
- Eliminating the govern-
ment' s target price program 
for rice farmers had a signifi-
cantly negative impact on 
the representative farm, 
lowering probabilities of 
survival by 12 to 20 percent-
age points. 
• Eliminating Set-Aside 
Farmers utilizing the 1/2 
share strategies benefitted 
and those using the 117 
share strategies lost when 
set-aside provisions of the 
government program were 
eliminated. These results 
are tied to assumptions re-
garding rice supply re-
sponse to such an action, 
the related decline in market 
price, and reaching the max-
imum payment limitation. If 
a producer seldom reached 
the payment limitation, he 
fared relatively well. 
• Reducing Target Price and 
Loan Rate 
- Reducing loan rates by 10 
percent (i.e., $0.80/cwt) be-
ginning in 1986, while main-
taining the possibility for a 
deficiency payment of up to 
$3. 90/cwt (i.e., target price 
also reduced by $0.8/cwt), 
had a moderate impact on 
most analysis variables. 
Probability of survival de-
clined by as much as 8 per-
centage points. Results indi-
cate this policy would not be 
as detrimental as some of 
the other policy changes 
considered in this study. 
• Allotment Program 
- Requiring all rice producers 
to reduce their historical rice 
acreage to about 65 percent 
of their base acreage, begin-
ning in 1986, reduced pro-
duction and increased 
prices slightly; but the effect 
on the representative farm 
was largely negative, de-
creasing probabilities of sur-
vival by 24 to 34 percentage 
points. 
• Free Market 
- Assuming a return to the 
free market for rice (no gov-
ernment program provi-
sions), beginning in 1986, 
adversely affected the repre-
sentative farm during the 
remaining 3 years of the 
planning horizon. The SSR 
117 strategy remained pre-
dominant but generated a 
mere 42 percent probability 
of survival, down from 82 
percent under the base 
scenario. 
Several conclusions and recom-
mendations can be assimilated 
from the results: 
• For Farm Managers 
- 1/7 share arrangements on 
rice are generally preferable 
to 1/2 share arrangements. 
- Cash rents of less than $30/ A 
are preferred to the 112 or 117 
share arrangements. 
- SSR rotations appear to be 
preferred to SR rotations, 
assuming government pay-
ment limitations are restrict-
ing, red rice is less of a prob-
lem in the SSR rotation, a 1/7 
share arrangement is in ef-
fect, and soybeans are as 
profitable as assumed in the 
base situation. 
- Variable cost containment 
can be effective in enhanc-
ing the viability of a farm 
operation-cutting costs by 
as little as 10 percent, while 
maintaining yields, can be 
of significant benefit. 
- New technologies, such as 
Lemont and possibly irri-
gated soybeans, appear to 
be economical, providing a 
competitive edge that 
would be needed to survive 
in the short run. 
- Given the current produc-
tion technology, ratoon rice 
appears to be of marginal 
benefit in the Texas Upper 
Gulf Coast. 
- Off-farm income is an im-
portant source of funds to 
tenant farmers, especially 
those with a 112 share ar-
rangement. 
- Increasing debt should be 
avoided unless the farm 
manager holds little or no 
debt. 
- Participation in the govern-
ment farm program could 
benefit farmers in 1984-85. 
Participation in future pro-
grams depends on the pro-
gram adopted in the 1985 
farm bill. 
• For Policy Makers 
- Financial assistance pro-
grams should be targeted 
only to those in need and to 
those who will benefit. 
Farmers in a low debt posi-
tion will probably survive 
with or without a financial 
assistance program, while 
those in a high debt position 
will probably not survive 
unless a large amount of 
debt is retired. 
- All proposed changes in the 
government program for 
rice had negative impacts on 
the representative farm 
manager in the short run 
relative to provisions of the 
current government pro-
gram. There are tradeoffs in 
macroeconomic benefits 
(i.e., savings to taxpayers) 
and micro-level costs (i.e., 
insolvent producers). This 
study did not examine the 
impact on local communities 
of producers going out of 
business, nor did it cover the 
longer-term effects of al-
tering the current program. 
• For Agricultural Lenders 
- Credit policies of a max-
imum 1.0 leverage ratio are 
restrictive, in that produc-
ers' probabilities of survival 
are low relative to a permit-
ted leverage ratio of 2.0. 
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Conversely, allowing up to a 
4.0 leverage ratio, while in-
creasing the probability of 
survival for producers, also 
significantly increased the 
risk exposure of creditors. 
- Agricultural lenders in the 
Upper Gulf Coast region 
should evaluate each opera-
tion on an individual basis-
some operations are profit-
able while others are tenta-
tive. 
• Landowners 
- Landowners should be con-
cerned regarding the crop 
mix planted on their acre-
age-their annual earnings 
are affected by the yield and 
price uncertainty associated 
with the respective crops. 
- Landowners with a 1/2 share 
arrangement should be con-
cerned with variable cost 
containment because they 
participate in a share of 
many such expenses. 
- Landowners who currently 
have "good" tenants should 
consider granting rent con-
cessions to assure their ten-
ants' viability. 
• For Researchers 
- Short run versus long run 
and micro versus macro im-
pacts of new technologies 
which increase yields need 
to be considered, especially 
when there is a lack of effec-
tive economic demand for 
the commodity. Such con-
siderations should be evalu-
ated when determining the 
commitment level and direc-
tion of research resources. 
- Evaluation of yield enhanc-
ing technology should con-
sider the variance, skew-
ness, and other characteris-
tics of the distribution as 
well as the average yield. 
- More information is needed 
regarding the correlation of 
yields among different crops 
in different rotations. 
- Users of simulation models 
are encouraged to perform 
an array of sensitivity anal-
yses to verify and validate 
their modelling procedures 
before accepting and pub-
lishing the results. 
The Impact of Tenure Arrangements 
and Crop Rotations on Upper 
Gulf Coast Rice Farms 
INTRODUCTION 
The Upper Gulf Coast region of 
Texas has traditionally been a major 
rice-producing region. Located be-
tween Houston and the Louisiana 
state line, the region benefits from 
levelland, a long growing season, 
close proximity to seaports, and a 
clay subsoil that is ideally suited for 
holding irrigation flood waters. 
These conditions make the area 
well suited for rice production. 
Regional rice acreage, although 
generally increasing, varied great-
ly before World War II. A large 
increase in Texas rice acreage (from 
347,000 to 642,000 acres (A)) oc-
curred between 1941 and 1954. Na-
tional rice acreage also approxi-
mately doubled during the same 
period. This tremendous increase 
in acreage was in response to high 
prices for rice during and im-
mediately after the war. Additional 
production from the increased 
acreage resulted in declining rice 
prices, causing rice farmers to ap-
peal to the federal government for 
assistance. In response, produc-
tion controls and marketing quotas 
were imposed in 1955, remaining 
in effect through 1973 (Holder and 
Grant 1979). Government farm 
programs had a stabilizing effect on 
both rice acreage and price 
throughout the period (Grant et al. 
1984). Stable prices, combined with 
moderately fluctuating yields, re-
sulted in rice being a relatively low 
risk crop. 
Since 1973, however, the situa-
tion for rice in the Upper Gulf 
Coast region has changed dramati-
cally. Following sharp increases in 
ice prices during late 1972 and 
173, marketing quotas were sus-
pended for the 197 4 and 1975 
crops. A target price program was 
initiated in 1976 and the rice loan 
rate was reduced, placing empha-
sis on deficiency payments as a 
means of income support to pro-
ducers (Grant et al. 1984). Export 
demand for rice has increased 
since the early 1970's but has be-
come more volatile. This combina-
tion of a change in government 
policy and fluctuating export de-
mand has resulted in higher U.S. 
rice price volatility. The rice indus-
try is now faced with a high level of 
price risk heretofore unknown to 
this generation of U.S. rice produc-
ers. 
Texas rice producers traditional-
ly use more energy inputs than 
producers in other states because 
of several factors. Surface water for 
irrigation is generally lifted from 
lower depths in Texas than in Loui-
siana and California. Groundwater 
wells are, on the average, deeper in 
Texas than in states such as Arkan-
sas and Mississippi, thereby re-
quiring greater lift. These factors 
make water more expensive in Tex-
as than in other rice-producing 
states (Mullins et al. 1981). The 
combination of clayey soils and 
humid climate limits the number of 
field days available for land prepa-
ration and harvest, requiring larger 
equipment and higher per acre fuel 
costs (Gerlaw 1983). Surveys have 
shown that more fertilizer and 
chemicals are used in Texas than in 
other rice-producing states (Mul-
lins et al. 1981). The large increase 
in energy costs during the 1970's 
has contributed to Texas rice pro-
ducers having higher production 
costs than rice producers in other 
states. 
li'aditionally, rice acreage in the 
Upper Gulf Coast region of Texas 
has been rotated with 1 or more 
years of pasture to maintain high 
productivity (Griffin et al. 1984). 
Higher costs and greater risk in 
prices caused producers to search 
for profitable crops that could be 
grown in rotation with rice. Crop 
diversification also reduces the 
farmer's production and market-
ing risks, since they are less depen-
dent on a particular crop. The fac-
tors that make the region ideal for 
the production of rice, however, 
make it hostile to alternative crops. 
The hot humid climate, combined 
with poor drainage, severely limits 
the number of rotation crops that 
can be grown (Smith 1983). Soy-
beans are generally considered the 
best rotation crop for the region 
(Stansel 1983). Common rice-
soybean rotations in the Upper 
Gulf Coast region include (1) rice 
followed by 1 year of soybeans, 
(2) rice followed by 2 years of soy-
beans, and (3) rice followed by 3 
years of soybeans. 
Soybean production expanded 
from 8,200 to 240,500 A in the Up-
per Gulf Coast area between 1970 
and 1980. This increase was 
primarily because of: (1) high soy-
bean prices, (2) improvements in 
soybean varieties, and (3) lower 
profit margins for rice production. 
Despite improvements in varieties, 
however, soybean yields remain 
highly variable from year to year, 
requiring producers to assume a 
high level of production risk. Fed-
eral crop insurance is available as 
protection against downside yield 
risk, but the program has been in 
operation for only a few years. 
Price risk is present in soybean 
production because of a low gov-
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ernment loan rate and fluctuating 
export demand. 
One method available for re-
ducing production and marketing 
risk is crop-share land-lease ar-
rangements. Crop-share arrange-
ments allow the land rent to fluc-
tuate in proportion to the per acre 
revenues received from the farm-
ing operation. This is beneficial in 
adverse years, when the producer 
is hard-pressed to cover all cash 
operating costs. In good years, 
however, more of the gross reve-
nues go to the landowner, resulting 
in smaller profits for the tenant 
than would occur under a cash rent 
tenure arrangement. 
Liberty County crop rotations 
and crop-share arrangements are 
representative of the Upper Gulf 
Coast region (Stansel 1983). The 
location of Liberty County relative 
to the rest of the Upper Gulf Coast 
area and to Texas is illustrated in 
Figure 1. In 1981, farmers har-
vested 70,000 A of soybeans and 
37,100 A of rice, comprising over 90 
8 
percent of total harvested crop 
acreage in Liberty County. On an 
acreage basis, Liberty County was 
the number one soybean-
producing county and the number 
eight rice-producing county in Tex-
as for 1981 (TDA-USDA 1982). 
Crop-share arrangements repre-
sented over 53 percent of the 1982 
rice acreage farmed in Liberty 
County. Several different types of 
crop-share arrangements were 
used in 1982, ranging from 1/10 to 
1/2 of the crop being received by 
the landowner (Griffin et al. 1984). 
The proportion of the crop going to 
the landowner was related to the 
amount of variable production 
costs (e.g., water, fertilizer) paid by 
the landowner. 
Continued viability of Texas Up-
per Gulf Coast rice-soybean farm-
ing operations is threatened by 
price and yield risks and low profit 
margins for rice and soybeans. Un-
fortunately for producers, many 
factors must be evaluated to iden-
tify a production strategy that 
achieves their personal goals. A 
detailed examination of the com-
monly used crop rotations and ar 
rangements would provide usefu 
information to farm managers, as 
well as those associated with agri-
culture in the Upper Gulf Coast 
region. This bulletin presents re-
search analyzing the joint impact of 
some of these factors on the viabili-
ty of a representative rice-soybean 
farming operation in Liberty 
County. 
Objectives and Methodology 
The objective of this study is to 
identify the impact of alternative 
tenure arrangements and crop ro-
tations, as well as several addition-
al important factors, on the con-
tinued viability of rice-soybean 
farms in the Upper Gulf Coast re-
gion of Texas. For purposes of sim-
plicity, only two major crop rota-
tions and two predominant crop-
share arrangements are examined1 
in the base scenario. The specific 
study objectives are: 
(1) To identify the particular crop 
rotation(s) and tenure arrange-
ment(s) preferred, given a base set 
of assumptions for a representative 
farm. Producers' survivability, 
economic success, and ending 
equity position serve as principal 
criteria for evaluation of the re-
sults; and 
(2) To identify and discuss im-
pacts of alternative production and 
management strategies and tech-
nologies, alternative government 
macroeconomic and farm policies, 
and financial institutions' credit 
criteria on the continued viability 
of rice-soybean farming operations 
in the Upper Gulf Coast region of 
Texas. 
Four crop rotation-tenure ar-
rangement strategies were simulat-
ed over a 5-year period, 1984-88, 
using RICESIM, an updated and 
expanded version of the FLIPSIM 
V (firm level income tax and farm 
1Examination of only two crop-share 
arrangements and two rotations does 
not limit the applicability of results to 
other arrangements and (or) rotations. 
Many of the results could probably be 
extrapolated to similar types of farm.. 
ing situations in the Upper Gulf Coas 
area. 
policy simulator) simulation model 
developed by Richardson and 
ixon (1985). The optimal 
trategies in each scenario were 
determined by examining the 
probability of farm survival under . 
each strategy, the ending equity 
position for each strategy, and the 
net present value (NPV) of the 
farming operation as an invest-
ment. Following an analysis of the 
base scenario, several additional 
analyses were conducted to ex-
amine sensitivity of the results to 
initial assumptions made in the 
base scenario. 
Literature Review 
Many studies have been con-
ducted to identify optimal crop ro-
tations. In these studies, it is gener-
ally assumed that producers at-
tempt to maximize net returns, or 
minimize production and market-
ing risks, subject to a minimum 
acceptable net return. The model-
ling approaches commonly used in 
these analyses include whole farm 
budgeting Gohnson 1979), linear 
programming (Heady 1954), non-
linearprogramming (Freund 1956), 
and MOTAD (Hazell1971). In gen-
eral, these approaches identify ro-
tations that meet or exceed .Produc-
ers' economic goals and objectives 
for a single year, ignoring long-
term effects of pursuing particular 
rotations. 
In contrast, many agronomists 
conduct studies to identify rota-
tions satisfying a number of long-
term objectives. In these studies, 
rotations that maximize per acre 
yields, minimize insect infesta-
tions, improve soil tilth, etc. are 
identified (Crop and Soils Magazine 
1981). A recent study by Hoskin 
(1981) examined 16 different rota-
tions commonly used in the 
Saginaw Valley of Michigan. Crop 
prices and yields were stochastical-
ly2 generated using beta probabili-
ty distributions, after which the 
rotations were ranked using sto-
2"Stochastic" indicates prices and 
yields are random or not known with 
certainty until the analysis is com-
plete. This approach is the opposite of 
a deterministic approach, where vari-
ables are assumed to be known with 
certainty for the entire time period. 
chastic dominance3 decision 
criteria. 
Hamill and Lin (1982) evaluated 
three different rice-soybean rota-
tions in the Mississippi Delta, us-
ing simple production budgets. 
The NPV of the income stream pro-
duced over a 12-year period was 
calculated for (1) a 1 year rice - 1 
year soybean rotation, (2) a 1 year 
rice - 2 years soybean rotation, and 
(3) a 2 years rice - 2 years soybean 
rotation. Future prices and yields 
for both crops were deterministic 
in nature and were held constant 
throughout the study period. 
Hamill and Lin (1982) concluded 
the 1 year rice - 1 year soybean 
rotation offered the greatest poten-
tial return to farmers in the Delta 
area. They cautioned, however, 
this rotation might increase the in-
cidence of red rice, thereby lower-
ing rice quality. 
In contrast to the many studies 
on crop rotations, few studies have 
identified optimal tenure arrange-
ments for farm managers. Most 
studies of crop-share arrange-
ments, for example, have focused 
on efficiency of share arrange-
ments in motivating tenants to pro-
duce at profit-maximizing levels 
(Cheung 1969; Sutinen 1975). Most 
studies of tenure arrangements 
have ignored the influence of crop 
rotations on results. Pederson 
(1984) did evaluate optimal tenure 
arrangements and crop rotations 
for farm managers in North Dako-
ta. He found that farm managers 
would prefer fully price-flexible 
and price-and-yield-flexible tenure 
arrangements. A simplistic ac-
counting approach (i.e., price 
times yield minus costs) was used 
in the analysis, thus ignoring ef-
fects of taxes, government farm 
policy, firm financial situation, and 
other factors. 
A study by Richardson and 
Bailey (1982) examined the debt 
servicing capacity of Upper Gulf 
Coast rice and soybean producers. 
A typical farm was defined and 
FLIPSIM V was used to determin-
istically simulate operation of the 
farm from 1982-91. The results in-
3The stochastic dominance approach is 
detailed in Appendix A. 
dicated tenant farmers at all levels 
of managerial ability probably 
would not generate sufficient after-
tax income to meet their financial 
obligations over the next 10 years. 
A 1 year rice - 2 years soybean 
rotation was assumed in this study. 
Richardson and Bailey (1982) as-
sumed a crop-share arrangement 
where 1/10 of the crop went to the 
landowner for both soybeans and 
rice, with the landowner providing 
only the land. Both the determin-
istic approach and the limited 
scenarios examined were limita-
tions of the study. 
Simulation Model 
and General Assumptions 
The rice simulation model 
(RICESIM) was used to analyze a 
representative Liberty County rice 
farm under various scenarios. 
Simulation modelling is one of 
many techniques that has been 
used extensively in recent years for 
analysis of questions vital to firm 
level agriculture (Baum and 
Schertz 1983; Dent and Blackie 
1979), as well as in other similar 
applications (Emshoff and Sisson 
1970; Law and Kelton 1982). Mi-
croeconomic simulation models 
are the only type of model that 
generates probabilities of survival 
and pertinent financial data. Use of 
RICESIM is, therefore, appropriate 
given the study objectives. 
The computer model is a firm 
level, recursive, Monte Carlo simu-
lation model that simulates annual 
production, farm policy, market-
ing, management, and income tax 
aspects of a farm over a chosen 
planning horizon. The model re-
cursively simulates the farming op-
eration by using the current year's 
ending financial position as a be-
ginning financial position for the 
next year. The Monte Carlo aspect 
of the model comes from repeating 
(iterating) simulations of farm op-
erations over the planning horizon 
many times, 4 using pseudo-
random crop prices and yields 
drawn from a multivariate empiri-
4In this study, 50 iterations were used. 
The initial results were also examined 
using 100 iterations. No notable dif-
ference was observed between the 
two solutions. 
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cal probability distribution for 
these variables. 5 
Many general and specific as-
sumptions concerning producer 
and firm behavior are typically 
made in a RICESIM analysis. The 
use of assumptions allows re-
searchers to include significant fac-
tors in the analysis, while keeping 
the model size manageable. 6 In this 
section, a detailed description of 
the study assumptions is pre-
sented. Although lengthy, the sec-
tion provides the foundation for 
the study results and therefore 
merits careful consideration. The 
accuracy and applicability of the 
results in addressing individual 
farm problems depend largely on 
how closely the study farm depicts 
an actual situation. Following the 
base analysis, impacts of many of 
the major assumptions are evaluat-
ed using sensitivity analyses. 
General Model Assumptions 
One criteria useful in evaluating 
the firm level impact of alternative 
production, financial, or govern-
ment policy strategies is the proba-
bility of survival. The probability of 
survival, as used in this study, is 
the probability that the farm mana-
ger will maintain the farm's inter-
mediate and long-term equity 
ratios7 at greater than minimum 
levels established by local financial 
institutions. In RICESIM, the farm 
manager must have a positive cash 
balance at the end of each produc-
5Probability is a measure of the chance 
that an uncertain event will occur. A 
probability distribution is a repre-
sentation of all possible values of a 
random variable and the associated 
probabilities of occurrence. When a 
random number generated from one 
probability distribution is allowed to 
be influenced by random numbers 
generated from other distributions 
with which the first distribution is 
correlated, it is said to be multivariate. 
Such representation is needed in 
RICESIM to delineate the interrelated 
behavior of rice and soybean prices 
and yields. The prices and yields are 
pseudo-random because the seeds for 
the random number generator are pre-
set by the researchers, thereby al-
lowing many scenarios to be ex-
amined using the same set of random 
variables. 
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tion year. The farm manager is 
forced to liquidate farm assets if: 
(a) a negative cash balance exists at 
the end of a production year, (b) 
loans have been secured against 
crops held for marketing in the 
next year, and (c) no additional 
refinancing of equity is available 
(based on lenders' credit policies). 
When refinancing a cash deficit, 
the model first attempts to finance 
the debt using long-term equity. 8 
Because long-term interest rates 
are less than intermediate-term 
rates, refinancing using long-term 
debt assures a lower interest cost to 
the farm manager, thereby improv-
ing chances for survival. If the 
long-term equity ratio is at the min-
imum permitted level, the model 
will next attempt to refinance using 
intermediate term debt. Refinanc-
ing capabilities are terminated if 
the intermediate and long-term 
equity ratios reach a pre-set mini-
mum level, assuming the financial 
institution approves loan refinanc-
ing for the farm strictly on the basis 
of financial ratios. In reality, bank-
ers evaluate several factors before 
approving or denying a loan re-
quest. Officers of the Federal 
Credit System, for example, gener-
ally examine five factors when 
evaluating a loan request. These 
factors include: (1) the person re-
questing the loan, (2) purpose of 
the loan, (3) repayment capacity, 
(4) collateral taken as security, and 
(5) financial position and progress 
6Readers are cautioned to recognize the 
strengths and limitations of mathe-
matical models in social science re-
search applications. Mathematical 
models, such as RICESIM, have been 
developed to represent reality, to a 
degree. Because reality is complex and 
often not quantifyable, models are in 
fact representing a simplified version 
of reality. As such, the true value of 
analysis by modelling is "to help de-
velop insights into system behavior 
which in turn can be used to guide the 
development of effective plans and 
decisions" (Geoffrion 1976). Absolute 
results are not as useful as directonal 
and/or magnitudal changes between 
two sets of results. In this light, the 
base results of this study should not be 
overly interpreted as favorable or det-
rimental to the future of the Texas rice 
industry. Rather, comparison of the 
(Federal Intermediate Credit Bank 
of Houston 1968). If a financial ratio 
is used as the sole criteria for ac-
ceptance or rejection of a loan, th 
result will be a bias against farm 
managers with other favorable fac-
tors. 
The NPV for the farming opera-
tion is a second criteria useful in 
analyzing results and is calculated 
at the end of each iteration of the 
model. It represents the present 
value of ending net worth for the 
farm, plus yearly family withdraw-
als discounted to the present, 
minus beginning net worth and 
discounted annual off-farm in-
come. A positive NPV value is de-
noted as an economic success since 
after-tax farm income, coupled 
with after-tax capital gains on as-
sets, generated a return greater 
than after-tax return available from 
off-farm investments. 
The per acre pattern of monthly 
labor demands for each crop re-
mains constant over time, assum-
ing no technological change occurs 
during the study period in per acre 
labor efficiency. Real equipment re-
pair costs for all machinery remain 
constant, as does equipment effi-
ciency. Equipment is assumed to 
have a known economic life. Each 
equipment piece is replaced when 
it has reached the end of its 
economic life, providing the pur-
chase does not cause total debt to 
exceed the insolvency level. If re-
placement will cause insolvency, 
sensitivity analyses' results to those of 
the base analysis allows for inferences 
to be made regarding specific produc-
tion management strategies, impacts 
of alternative government policies, 
and financial institutions' credit 
criteria, etc. 
7The equity ratio is a financial ratio 
obtained by dividing total equity by 
total farm assets. The equity ratio is 
equal to the debt ratio (total debt di-
vided by total assets) divided by the 
leverage ratio (total debt divided by 
total equity) (Pensqn and Lins 1980). 
8Because long-term interest rates are 
less than intermediate-term rates, re-
financing using long-term debt as-
sures a lower interest cost to the farm 
manager, thereby improving chances 
for survival. 
the equipment purchase is post-
poned until the following year. 
Personal income taxes and social 
Jecurity taxes are calculated as-
suming the farmer is married, fil-
ing a joint income tax return, and _ 
itemizing personal deductions. 
The regular income tax liability is 
computed using either income av-
eraging (if qualified) or the stan-
dard rate schedules. The model 
selects the tax strategy that results 
in the lower income tax liability, 
based on 1984 tax laws. All invest-
ment tax credit allowances are de-
ducted from the regular tax liability 
with the result being compared to 
the income tax liability under the 
alternative minimum tax. The farm 
manager pays the excess of the 
alternative minimum tax over the 
regular income tax liability after 
credits. Income tax schedules for 
1984 are included in the model, as 
well as a procedure to develop tax 
rate schedules for 1985 and beyond 
based on changes in the consumer 
price index. 
Specific Study Assumptions 
Data used and results generated 
for the base strategies are in Ap-
pendix B. The simulation analysis 
was conducted for the 5-year 
period 1984-88. This period was 
chosen because expected prices, 
yields, interest, and inflation rates 
could be predicted with some de-
gree of confidence. 
The farm size used in the study 
was 2,310 A. This size of operation 
was the same as that analyzed pre-
viously by Richardson and Bailey 
(1982). Only 8 percent of the 1982 
Liberty County farms were larger 
than 1,000 A, but these few farms 
represented almost 73 percent of 
total harvested acreage. More im-
portantly, 38 percent of the farms 
having irrigated acreage in the 
county were larger than 2,000 A. 
The average size of Liberty County 
farms with more than 2,000 A was 
almost 2,600 A (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1984). The represen-
tative farm chosen is larger than the 
average Liberty County farm but is 
representative of the farms control-
ling most of the county's acreage. 
It was assumed the farm acreage 
consisted of leased land, with only 
10 A owned and used as the farm-
stead. Wholly-leased farms repre-
sent about one-half of all operating 
rice farms in the Upper Gulf Coast 
region (Mullins et al. 1981). Previ-
ous studies have suggested whol-
ly-leased farms are most vulner-
able to insolvency under current 
farm policy (Grant et al. 1984). 
About 5 percent (116 A) of the farm 
acreage was in buildings, roads, 
canals, etc., reducing tillable acre-
age to 2,194 A. The farmstead con-
tained a home for the farmer, a 
smaller home for one full-time em-
ployee, and a 60- by 120-foot equip-
ment shed. 
The crop rotations examined 
have historically been two of the 
most common in Liberty County 
(Boldt and Kennedy 1982), namely 
(1) 2 years of soybeans followed by 
1 year of rice (SSR), and (2) 1 year of 
soybeans followed by 1 year of rice 
(SR). The principal advantages of 
the SSR rotation are the lower inci-
dence of red rice (Eastin 1983), 
higher expected rice yields, lower 
demand for inputs (particularly 
water and labor), and lower short-
term demand for financing. The 
principal advantage of the SR rota-
tion is the greater acreage of rice, 
the more profitable of the two 
crops. 
The two crop-share land rental 
arrangements analyzed were 
(1) 112 of the crop to the landowner 
for rice acreage and 1/7 of the crop 
to the landowner for soybean acre-
age, and (2) 1/7 of the crop to the 
landowner for both rice and soy-
bean acreage. The 112 share ar-
rangement is the most common for 
Texas rice acreage (Mullins et al. 
1981; Griffin et al. 1984). The 117 
share arrangement is the typical 
tenure arrangement in Liberty 
County for land in soybean pro-
duction and is also common for rice 
production (Boldt 1983). 
Under a 112 share arrangement, 
the landowner provides land, wa-
ter, and seed, and pays 112 of the 
fertilizer costs, chemical costs, 
chemical application costs, drying 
costs, and sales commissions. In 
return, the landowner receives 1/2 
of the harvested crop or equivalent 
revenue. Under the 117 share ar-
rangement, the landowner pro-
vides only land and pays 1/7 of the 
drying, hauling, and sales commis-
sion costs, receiving in return 1/7 of 
the harvested crop or equivalent 
revenue (McQuhae 1983). 
Finance and Tax 
In the base analysis, the 10 A 
farmstead was being purchased by 
the producer, with an initial pur-
chase price of $133,600. The begin-
ning (1984) market value of the 
farmstead was $167,000. Land was 
initially worth $1,200/ A, an aver-
age price for cropland in the area 
(Yates 1983). Buildings were valued 
at $155,000, of which $105,000 were 
depreciable. The buildings were 
depreciated over a 30-year period 
with a 10 percent salvage value. 
Market value of the buildings de-
clined by 22 percent per year. The 
initial debt-to-asset ratio on long-
term debt was 0.40, a typical debt 
level for a wholly-leased farm in 
Liberty County (Jeffrey 1983). 
Beginning market value of farm 
machinery was just over $565,000, 
with equipment purchases repre-
senting the sole source of inter-
mediate-term debt. The initial 
debt-to-asset ratio for inter-
mediate-term debt was an average 
position for a tenant farmer in Lib-
erty County (Jeffrey 1983). New 
equipment purchases could be 
made with a 30 percent downpay-
ment and financing available over a 
5-year period. 
Minimum equity levels were set 
in the model, assuming additional 
financing could not be obtained 
below these levels. These equity 
ratios were 0.33 for both long-term 
and intermediate-term credit. 9 This 
figure represents the minimum 
credit level allowed by Liberty 
County banks and is extended only 
to farmers with an otherwise excel-
lent financial record (Jeffrey 1983). 
The producer was 45 years old 
and married, with three children 
living at home. He was assumed to 
be an above-average manager. 
Twenty percent of the net farm 
~his ratio implies 1 out of every 3 
dollars of farm assets is owned by the 
farm manager. This minimum equity 
ratio is equivalent to a debt-to-asset 
ratio of 0.67 and a leverage ratio of 2.0 
(Penson and Lins 1980). 
11 
income was assumed to equal total 
personal itemized deductions on 
Schedule A of the Federal Income 
Tax forms. The deductions reduced 
taxable income to 80 percent of net 
farm income. The producer's 
spouse had a full-time off-farm job, 
earning $16,000 a year. Two chil-
dren assisted with the farm labor, 
receiving no compensation. Family 
living expenses were allowed to 
vary from $18,000 to $25,000 per 
year, depending on farm income. 
The producer had $20,000 in off-
farm investments, earning about 
11 percent per year. Other fixed 
costs for the farm included $3,200 
for insurance, $3,000 for accoun-
tant and legal fees, $600 for proper-
ty taxes, and $5,000 for miscella-
neous fixed costs. Social Security 
costs were calculated according to 
present legislative mandates 
through 1988. 
Initial farm machinery pur-
chased before 1982 was depre-
ciated for tax purposes using the 
double-declining-balance method. 
Farm machinery purchased after 
1981 was cost recovered over a 5-
year period using the accelerated 
method. No first-year expensing 
was taken for capital items (primar-
ily equipment) purchased after 
1981. Instead, full investment tax 
credit was claimed on capital pur-
chases, thereby requiring a reduc-
tion in the initial tax basis of new 
capital assets. The reduction con-
sisted of one-half of investment tax 
credit claimed (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 
1971). 
A critical assumption in NPV 
analysis is the discount rate used to 
discount cash flows and ending net 
worth. The discount rate used in 
the study is the expected after-tax 
rate of return that could be earned if 
the farm manager's initial equity 
and borrowed capital were invest-
ed off the farm. A pre-tax rate of 
return equal to 11.24 percent, rep-
resenting the geometric10 mean of 
yearly returns assumed in the 
model for off-farm investments, 
10The geometric mean approach and 
the arithmetic mean approach are the 
two methods available to calculate an 
average return for a time period when 
returns differ within the time period. 
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TABLE 1. EXPECTED INTEREST AND INFLATION RATES 1984-88 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
Annual Interest Rates: Percent 
Pre-1984 L.T. Loans* 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 11.7 
Pre-1984 I.T. Loans* 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 
New L.T. Loans 13.1 11.7 10.9 10.5 10.5 
New I.T. Loans 14.8 14.9 14.1 13.7 13.7 
Refinance L.T. Loans 13.1 11.7 10.9 10.5 10.5 
Refinance I.T. Loans 14.8 14.9 14.1 13.7 13.7 
Operating Loans 15.2 15.4 15.6 14.2 14.2 
Return on Savings 11.8 11.9 11.1 10.7 10.7 
Annual Inflation Rates: 
Used Machinery 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 
Off-Farm Investments 11.8 11.9 11.1 10.7 10.7 
Farmland Capital Gains 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 7.1 
All Other Costs 5.4a 4.7 4.5 4.8 5.0 
On-Farm Buildings -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 -2.0 
Source: Penson ( 1983). 
* L.T.: Long-Term Loans. 
* I.T.: Intermediate-Term Loans 
8 lnitial prices used in the model for new farm .machinery and off-farm 
storage costs are for 1984. Therefore, inflation rates for these costs 
were equal to zero in 1984. 
was used in the discount rate calcu-
lations. A geometric mean for long-
term interest rates of 11.14 percent 
was used in calculating the cost of 
borrowed capital. Interest was the 
only tax shield available for the off-
farm investment. Based on these 
assumptions, an after-tax discount 
rate of 10.11 percent was used in 
NPV calculations for the base 
scenario. 
Interest and Inflation Rates 
Eight types of interest rates were 
used in the model. Annual values 
for these interest rates were set for 
each year in the 5-year simulation 
period. The various interest and 
inflation rates used are in Table 1. 
Interest rates on long-term loans 
obtained previous to the study 
period were 11.75 percent, with 
The principal difference between the 
two methods is the geometric mean 
accounts for the effect of compound-
ing of returns over time (Weston and 
Brigham 1981). 
interest rates on old intermediate-
term loans set at 15 percent. New 
long-term, intermediate-term, and 
operating loan rates were cal-
culated for 1984-87 using the 
COMGEM (Penson et al. 1984). 
These rates ranged from 10.5 to 
13.1 percent for long-term loans, 
13.7 to 14.9 percent for inter-
mediate-term loans, and 14.2 to 
15.6 percent for operating loans. 
For 1988, interest rates were held 
constant at 1987 levels. 
Annual inflation rates for 14 dif-
ferent production costs and re-
turns on investment were also 
specified in the model. In most 
cases, the general inflation rate 
predicted by COMGEM for farm 
inputs was used to inflate produc-
tion costs. The annual rates used 
were: 5.4 percent in 1984, 4.7 per-
cent in 1985, 4.5 percent in 1986, 4.8 
percent in 1987, and 5.0 percent in 
1988. Inflation rates for used equip-
ment were 0 percent for 1984-86 
and 1 percent in 1987-88. The 1987-
88 rates reflected the expectation 
that used equipment will become 
more scarce and, thus, more valu-
able during the latter part of the 
1980's. Increases in land values 
ere at a 7.1 percent annual rate 
and increased independent of 
changes in net farm income. The 
7.1 percent rate was the approxi-
mate increase in the study area 
land values during 1982-83 (Gilli-
land 1984). Although some have 
argued that land values are closely 
tied to income (Skees and Reid 
1984), others have maintained that 
farm income is only one of many 
factors influencing land values 
(Castle and Hoch 1983). Pope and 
Goodwin (1984) found agricultural 
productivity was the fifth most im-
portant characteristic considered 
by purchasers of rural land in Tex-
as. Proximity of the representative 
farm to the Houston metropolitan 
area causes land values to be rela-
tively immune to farm income vari-
ations. 
Production and Management 
A machinery complement was 
identified for the study farm, based 
on crop production requirements. 
Local farmers examined the com-
plement and made final adjust-
ments so it would be representa-
tive of the Liberty County area Gef-
frey 1983; Yates 1983). The comple-
ment was the same under both the 
SSR and SR rotations, recognizing 
the desired flexibili~ of producers 
to change rotations. 1 A list of the 
initial equipment complement is in 
Table 2. 
A 7-year productive life was as-
sumed for most equipment. Al-
though equipment replacement af-
ter 7 years is more often than the 
optimal replacement rate identified 
in previous economic analyses 
(Chisholm 1974; Kay and Rister 
1976; Bates et al. 1979), it appears 
appropriate, given the assumed 
level of annual equipment usage, 
timeliness, and anticipated high 
costs of breakdowns as the equip-
ment ages. Exceptions (i.e., longer 
11 Although individual producers may 
have equipment complements differ-
ent from that indicated in Table 2, the 
total dollar value of the other comple-
ments should be similar to the one 
used in the study. 
replacement policies) to the 7-year 
replacement policy were made for 
assets with low annual usage or 
high durability, including the grain 
carts, one pickup truck, the small 
tractor, and the levee plow, push, 
and roller. Current market values, 
original purchase prices, and cur-
rent replacement prices were ob-
tained from a local implement 
dealer (Yates 1983) and from The 
National Farm and Power Equipment 
Dealers Association Official Guide, 
Tractors and Farm Equipment (1983). 
All replacement equipment was 
new. 
Cash production costs for first 
crop rice and soybeans in 1984 
were calculated from 1983 budgets 
developed for Liberty County by 
Gerlow (1983) and Boldt and Ken-
nedy (1982). (A study by Rister and 
Griffin (1984) yielded cash costs for 
ratoon rice.) These costs are pre-
sented in Table 3. The exception to 
using these budgets was water 
cost. Because water is an important 
and costly input in rice production, 
the actual1984 rate charged by Lib-
erty-Chambers Counties Naviga-
tion District was used in the base 
analysis. All costs of production 
were inflated over the 1984-88 
period using the previously men-
tioned inflation rates. 
The farm manager employed 
two men full-time, with part-time 
assistance assumed available dur-
ing peak seasons. Because of high 
labor demands in rice production 
(Texas Agricultural Extension Ser-
vice 1983), an additional man was 
employed for the SR rotation strat-
egies. Each man worked from 250 
to 350 hours per month, depending 
on the time of year. 12 The farm 
manager worked 200 to 300 hours 
per month, working more hours 
during spring, summer, and fall, 
than in the winter. In addition, two 
of the producer's children worked 
full-time (300 hours each per 
month) during May, June, July, and 
August. The two children worked 
part-time (100-200 hours per 
month each) the rest of the year. 
Monthly per acre requirements 
12Work hours included maintenance 
and repair work, as well as normal 
field work. 
used were 10 percent less than 
those reported in Texas Agricultur-
al Extension Service (1983) budgets 
for the Upper Gulf Coast region, 
reflecting above average manage-
ment of the farm and economies of 
scale. Monthly labor requirements 
and labor supplied are given in 
Appendix B. 
Only 25 percent of the rice acre-
age produced a ratoon crop, con-
sistent with 1982 averages for Lib-
erty County (Griffin et al. 1984). It 
was assumed ratoon acreage was 
fertilized and irrigated before har-
vest. The farmer harvested 95 per-
cent of the planted soybean acre-
age and 99 percent of planted rice 
acreage. Both harvested acreage 
percentages are typical for Liberty 
County (TDA-USDA 1982). All 
first crop rice was harvested and 
sold in August. Ratoon rice was 
harvested in October and sold the 
following January. Soybeans were 
harvested in October, with 70 per-
cent of the beans sold in October 
and 30 percent sold in January 
(Grant et al. 1984). The percentage 
of the year operating loans were 
held varied by crop rotation-tenure 
strategy, from 36.9 percent for the 
SR rotation under a 1/7 share ar-
rangement to 42.2 percent for the 
SSR rotation under a 1/2 share ar-
rangement. 
Crop Prices and Yields 
Key assumptions in the study 
were the expected mean (average) 
prices and yields for rice and soy-
beans over time (Table 4), and the 
distributions about each mean. An-
nual mean values for rice and soy-
bean prices and yields are used in 
RICESIM to account for expected 
changes over time caused by tech-
nology, long-term shifts in de-
mand, etc. Distributions around 
the means represent price and 
yield uncertainty resulting from 
weather, insects, disease, changes 
in export demand, etc. Use of a 
random number generator13 in 
13 A random number generator is a 
computer routine that generates 
many random or uncorrelated stan-
dard deviates to be used in calculat-
ing stochastic variables. The use of 
13 
TABLE 2. EQUIPMENT COMPLEMENT FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM 
Year Current Original Current 
Equipment Purchased Market Value Purchase Price Replacement Cost 
160 H.P. Tractor 1980 S33,4 74 $39,798 $61,700 
160 H.P. Tractor 1979 31,769 33,568 61,700 
160 H.P. Tractor 1983 61,700 61,700 61,700 
230 H.P. Tractor 1978 34,945 52,4 75 94.800 
230 H.P. Tractor 1980 48,571 65,823 94.800 
65 H.P. Tractor 1975 7, 717 10,087 19,900 
Combine 1979 51.909 53,886 94,000 
Combine 1980 55,882 61,881 94.000 
Combine 1983 94,000 94,000 94,000 
1/2 Ton Pickup 1976 2,375 3,876 9,000 
1/2 Ton Pickup 1978 3,425 4,538 9.000 
1/2 Ton Pickup 1983 9,000 9,000 9,000 
22' 9" Disk 1980 4,500 9,800 15,300 
22' 9" Disk 1982 7,500 11,500 15.300 
24' 4" Disk 1978 3.500 9,200 19.300 
24' 4" Disk 1981 5,000 11,500 19.300 
Rolling Cultivator 1979 1,500 3,900 5,200 
Rolling Cultivator 1982 2,000 4,200 5,200 
8' Bean Planter 1976 4,500 4,371 10,250 
8' Bean Planter 1982 4,500 7,000 10,250 
Grain Cart 1975 2,000 1,320 6.800 
Grain Cart 1981 3,500 4,718 6.800 
16' x E;O' Land Plane 1977 3,000 8.000 17.500 
16' x 60' Land Plane 1978 7,376 7.600 17,500 
150 Levee Boxes 1982 6,000 7,500 11,250 
Levee Plow 1981 1,54 7 1,563 2,800 
Levee Push 1981 700 2,100 2,500 
Levee Roller 1978 350 350 650 
3 1' Field Cultivator 1981 4.500 5,800 9.800 
3 1' Field Cultivator 1982 5,500 7,100 9,800 
25' Field Cultivator 1978 2,500 5.800 9.800 
8 Row Bedder 1976 1,036 1,100 5,400 
8 Row Bedder 1979 1,500 3,500 5.400 
P1pe Harrow 1979 1,000 1,020 2,100 
Pipe Harrow 1980 1.100 1,600 2.100 
Du-AII 1978 3,500 8,600 11,500 
Miscellaneous Trucks 1977 50,000 60 .000 90,000 
Source: Jeffrey 1983; Yates 1983. 
combination with the distributions 
(also known as probability density 
functions) results in prices and 
yields that are random in a given 
year but which, when repeated 
defined distributions in combination 
with random numbers allows ran-
dom variables (e.g., prices and 
yields) to occur much as they would 
in actuality. 
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samplings are made, occur with 
about the same frequency as de-
fined in the distribution. 
Mean Soybean Yields and Prices 
The 1984 mean yields for soy-
beans were obtained from the sub:-
jectively estimated yield distribu-
tions (see following section on 
development of distributions). 
Means for subsequent years were 
calculated by increasing yields by 
0. 4 bu/ Nyear, based on expecta-
tions of agronomists working in 
the study region. The COMGEM 
model was used to predict annual 
national soybean prices through 
1987. The 1987 price was increased 
by 4 percent to obtain the national 
soybean price for 1988. Historical 
data from 1973-82 were used t 
calculate the differential between 
TABLE 3. 1983 PER ACRE CASH PRODUCTION COSTS FOR RICE AND SOYBEANS" 
Item 
Seed 
Fertilizer 
Chemicals 
Fuel-Lube 
Repairs 
Water 
Harvest 
Total 
Drying and Storage 
Custom Haul 
Sales Commission 
Total 
First Crop 
Rice 
$33.90 
51.00 
67.56 
18.60 
6.76 
68.00 
11.20 
$257.02 
$ .70/cwt 
.40 
. 13 
$ 1.23/cwt 
Ratoon 
Rice 
Per Acre Costs 
$0.00 
13.50 
10.00 
0.00 
0.00 
14.45 
8.55 
46.50 
Per Unit Costs 
$ .70/cwt 
.40 
. 13 
$ 1.23/cwt 
Soybeans 
$9.45 
14.36 
45.45 
12.68 
6.17 
0.00 
9.14 
$97.25 
$ .25/bushel 
.20 
0.00 
$ .45/bushel 
"Additional variable costs (such as labor and interest on operating capital) are 
internally calculated by RICESIM. 
Source: Texas Agricultural Extens ion Service (1983); Boldt and Kennedy (1983); 
Gerlow (1983); Griffin et al. (1984). 
the local price and the na tiona! 
soybean price. A significant differ-
ential existed between the two 
prices and increased with time at 
the approximate rate of inflation. 
The estimated equation was 
YT= -3.728+0.05048(T) 
(1.562) (0.0201) 
iF=0.374 
Durbin-Watson statistic 
(D.W.)=2.163 
where Y T =differential between 
Texas and U.S. soybean price, and 
T=time, as 73, 74, ... , 82. 
Values reported in the parentheses 
are standard errors for the es-
timated coefficients. Using the re-
gression equation, the 1984 local 
price was predicted to be $0.49/bu 
higher than the national average 
price. The predicted 1984 U.S. soy-
.Jean price was adjusted upward 
by $0.49/bu to represent the Liberty 
County soybean price. The $0.49/ 
bu differential was inflated over 
time at the same rate as soybean 
prices to adjust yearly U.S. soy-
bean price to Texas soybean price. 
Mean Rice Yields and Prices 
As with soybeans, the 1984 mean 
rice yield was estimated using sub-
jectively estimated yield distribu-
tions. Mean yields for rice over 
time were estimated based on ex-
pectations of agronomists working 
in the study region. A complicating 
factor in these estimations was the 
introduction in 1983 of Lemont, a 
new long-grain rice variety. In its 
first year of release, Lemont yield-
ed about 11 cwt (25 percent) more 
rice than traditional varieties pro-
duced by the same farmers (Texas 
Rice Research Foundation 1983). 
Although this yield level was ob-
tained by above average produc-
ers, Turner (1983) expects Lemont 
yields 10 cwt (22 percent) above 
traditional varieties (i.e., Labelle 
and Lebonnet) for average produc-
ers. 
The actual process of generating 
prices and yields in RICESIM con-
sisted of (1) generating indepen-
dent random normal deviates us-
ing the random number generator, 
(2) correlating the deviates, using 
the square root of the correlation 
matrix, (3) transforming the cor-
related random normal deviates in-
to uniform correlated random de-
viates (i.e., transforming the result 
to a unit scale from 0.0 to 1.0), 
(4) using each transformed value in 
a table look-up function of its re-
spective empirical distribution to 
obtain a number representing the 
deviation from the mean, and (5) 
adding the deviation value to the 
specified mean for that variable. 
Government Program 
Rice, similar to most other grains 
produced in the United States, is 
· subject to a government commodi-
ty program. The current program 
is voluntary and specifies (1) a na-
tional target price, (2) a national 
loan rate, and (3) a maximum defi-
ciency payment. The applicable de-
ficiency payment rate for rice is 
calculated using either the national 
target price minus the weighted 
average national rice price for the 
first 5 months of the marketing 
year (i.e., August-December) or 
the target price minus the loan rate, 
whichever is lower Gohnson et al. 
1982). The maximum deficiency 
payment that can be received by 
one person is $50,000. Because it is 
common for the farm affairs of an 
operation of this size to be ar-
ranged so that two persons qualify 
for government payments (Lin et 
al. 1981), a $100,000 payment limi-
tation was assumed for the farm. It 
was assumed the farm manager 
participated in the farm program 
during all years analyzed in the 
simulation period. 
The national loan rate for rice is a 
weighted average based on the ap-
plicable loan rates for short, medi-
um, and long grain rice. The na-
tional rice loan rate is used for 
calculating deficiency payments in 
all rice-producing states (if higher 
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TABLE 4. EXPECTED (MEAN) AVERAGE RICE AND SOYBEAN PRICES AND YIELDS 1984-88 
Cwt of Rice Bu of Soybeans 
Followin~ 1 Following 2 
Year of Soy eans Years of Soybeans 
Ratoon Following Following 
Rice Soybeans Rice 
Price Yielda Price y ·ield 3 Priceb Yield" Price Yield" Price Yield" 
1984 9.28 46.17 9.54 50.03 8.00 7.76 6.33 22.84 6.33 23.69 
1985 9.78 52.31 10.05 56.69 9.34 7.84 7.45 23.31 7.45 24.17 
1986 10.14 56.04 10.40 60.73 9.68 7.92 7.92 23.78 7.92 24.67 
1987 10.56 56.61 10.83 61.34 10.07 8.00 8.01 24.27 8.01 25.17 
1988 11.02 57.18 11.29 61.96 10.50 8.08 8.34 24.76 8.34 25.68 
8 Yield figures are on a per acre basis. 
bPrices are for ratoon rice in a SSR rotation and are 93 percent of first crop prices. 
Ratoon rice prices are also 93 percent of first crop rice prices for the SR rotation. 
Sources: Penson 1983; Grant, Beach, and Lin 1984; Liberty County Farmers and other Agricultural Professionals. 
than the 5-month average market 
price). In determining the appro-
priate loan rate for long grain rice, 
however, the effective long grain 
loan value factors are applicable. 
To simulate the rice farm pro-
gram for the representative farm, it 
was necessary to project Texas long 
grain rice loan rates and target 
prices for 1984-88. Because the cur-
rent political climate suggests fu-
ture government programs will be 
more austere (Adams 1984), na-
tional loan rates and target prices 
were held constant throughout the 
study period. Assuming a long 
grain rice turnout of 55/70 (i.e., 
head rice/total milling yield) 
(Brorsen et al. 1984), the average 
long grain loan rate has averaged 
107.894 percent of the national rice 
loan rate over the 1974-83 period. 
This percentage was used to adjust 
the national loan rate in 1984 
($8.00/cwt) to a Texas long grain 
loan rate equivalent. As a result, 
the loan rate and target price used 
in the study were $8.63/cwt and 
$12.53/cwt, respectively. 
Stansel (1983) estimates about 
100,000 A of Lemont will be plant-
ed in 1984, with most Texas acreage 
planted to Lemont in 1985 and af-
ter. To account for the introduction 
of this variety, 25 percent of the 
representative farm's 1984 rice 
acreage was assumed planted to 
Lemont, with the remaining 75 per-
cent in Labelle. Lemont acreage 
was increased to 75 percent in 1985 
16 
and constituted all rice acreage in 
1986 and after. As a result, rice 
yields for the representative farm 
increased 22 percent by 1986. 
Based on recommendations by 
Turner (1983), an additional40 lb of 
nitrogen were applied to the Le-
mont acreage, as well as one addi-
tional fungicide treatment, relative 
to Labelle acreage. After 1986, Tur-
ner (1983) estimated yields would 
increase only 1 percent per year 
through 1988. Ratoon rice yields 
were unaffected by the introduc-
tion of Lemont, increasing at a 1 
percent per year rate. 
The additional supply of rice at-
tributed to Lemont is expected to 
have a negative effect on domestic 
rice prices. The extent of the impact 
will depend on quantity of addi-
tional yield per acre achieved 
under field conditions and popu-
larity of Lemont among Southern 
rice farmers. Based on estimates by 
Stansel (1983), Lemont was as-
sumed to constitute 80 percent of 
all Texas rice acreage and 50 per-
cent of all non-Texas rice acreage in 
the South by 1988. Using these 
figures, an econometric simulation 
model developed by Grant, Beach, 
and Lin (1984) was used to estimate 
expected rice prices for 1984-88. 
The model predicted nominal 
U.S. rice prices would slowly rise 
during the period, assuming no 
change in the government farm 
program. The predicted prices per 
hundredweight were: $9.29 in 
1984, $9.77 in 1985, $10.11 in 1986, 
$10.52 in 1987, and $10.96 in 1988. 
Production was predicted to reach 
a high of 138 million hundred-
weight in 1986, falling to 136 mil-
lion hundredweight by 1988. The 
continued increase in production 
costs, coupled with an unchanging 
target price, were responsible for 
the decline in production. Public 
and private carryover stocks were 
predicted to increase from about 51 
million hundredweight in 1984 to 
56.6 million hundredweight in 
1988. The Grant, Beach, and Lin 
(1984) model predicted surplus 
stocks would continue to increase 
throughout 1984-88, with a result-
ing depressing effect on prices . The 
decline in production after 1986 
suggests stocks may begin to de-
crease after 1988. 
Monthly historical data from 
1974-81 was used to estimate the 
relationship between Texas Ion~ 
grain prices and national prices. 1 
The relationship was 
Texas= - 0.1840 + 1.0469 (National 
Price Price) 
(0.1986) (0 .0198) 
R2 = 0.961 
D.W. =0.623 
This equation was used to convert 
14Data for September 1976 to July 197 
were unavailable. 
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Figure 2. Yield distribution for ratoon rice. 
the projected national average 
price to a Texas long grain price. 
Ratoon rice prices were 7 percent 
less than first crop prices because 
of lower quality (Gerlow 1983; 
Brorsen et al. 1984). 
As mentioned previously, one of 
the principal advantages of the SSR 
rotation is the reduced incidence of 
red rice in the rice crop. Eastin 
(1983) estimates that an incidence 
of2.5 percent red rice is expected in 
rice following 1 year of soybeans, 
whereas only 0.5 percent red rice is 
expected when rice follows 2 years 
of soybeans. Brorsen et al. (1984) 
found rice prices in Lower Gulf 
Coast bid/acceptance auction mar-
kets were discounted $0.134/cwt 
for each 1 percent of red rice pres-
ent during 1979-81. Based on these 
observed discounts, mean prices 
for rice produced in the SR rotation 
were discounted $0.268/cwt from 
prices received for rice produced in 
the SSR rotation. The discount was 
held constant over time. 
Development of Distributions 
An example plot detailing the 
probability density function (pdf) 
for ratoon rice yields is displayed in 
Figure 2. The figure illustrates 
probability of yields within a par-
ticular range. The probability of 
ratoon yields between 7 and 9 cwt 
is about 30 percent, for example, 
while the probability of yields be-
tween 11 and 13 cwt is only about 2 
percent. The mean for this dis-
tribution is the 1984 mean for ra-
toon rice (about 8 cwt). When the 
mean increases, the distribution 
shifts to the right, making higher 
yields possible, while eliminating 
the possibility of very low yields . 
Plots of all other yield and price 
distributions are found in Appen-
dix C. Methods used to develop the 
means and their corresponding 
distributions are discussed below. 
The distribution for soybean 
prices was based on behavior of 
soybean prices during 1973-82. 
Thus, the probability of randomly 
drawing a very high price for soy-
beans in a given year of the plan-
ning horizon was the same as the 
percentage occurrence of that high 
price during 1973-82. The Grant, 
Beach, and Lin (1984) model was 
used to predict rice prices between 
1973-83. The differences or devia-
tions between the predicted price 
and actual price were used to de-
velop a distribution for first crop · 
ratoon rice prices. 
Unfortunately, only a few years 
of farm level data are available in 
Liberty County from which to esti-
mate empirical yield distributions. 
To overcome this problem, several 
producers and agricultural-related 
professionals from the Liberty 
County area were asked to subjec-
tively estimate (November 1983) 
the probability of 1984 crop yields 
falling within 1 of 10 yield inter-
vals. This procedure is similar to 
that used by Bessler (1977) to esti-
mate producers' price expecta-
tions. The resulting data were com-
bined to form composite distribu-
tions for the following five crops: 
(1) soybeans following soybeans, 
(2) soybeans following rice, (3) rice 
following 1 year of soybeans, 
( 4) rice following 2 years of soy-
beans, and (5) ratoon rice. 15 Means 
15The distributions for rice were es-
timated assuming Labelle rice was 
used. Lemont is expected to have a 
different distribution around the 
mean, but only a few years of field 
data exist with which to estimate the 
new distribution. Because of the lack 
of data, the Lemont distribution was 
assumed to be the same as the Labelle 
distribution . Sensitivity analyses are 
given in a later part of the report to 
determine the impact of this assump-
tion on the results. 
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for the respective empirical dis-
tributions were used as the 1984 
means in the model. The mean 
values were close to county aver-
age yields for soybeans and ratoon 
rice. For first crop rice, the means 
were 3 to 5 cwt above the county 
average, reflecting the assumed 
above average management level 
of the farmer in rice production. 
A correlation matrix16 was es-
timated for all rice and soybean 
price and yield variables used in 
the study (Table 5). Liberty County 
annual price and yield data for 
1973-82 were used as the principal 
source for estimating the correla-
tion matrix. The square root of the 
correlation matrix was used with 
means of the yield and price dis-
tributions to generate random mul-
tivariate prices and yields. As ex-
pected, first crop and ratoon crop 
rice prices were positively cor-
related (0.87), as were first crop 
and ratoon crop rice yields (0.63). 
First crop and ratoon rice yields 
and prices were negatively cor-
related (-0.42 and -0.24). First crop 
and ratoon rice and soybean yields 
exhibited a positive correlation 
(0.57 and 0.46). Correlation coeffi-
cients between other variables 
were less significant. Because coef-
ficients between current and past 
yields and prices were not signifi-
cant, autoregressive influences on 
current prices were assumed zero. 
The presence of 2.5 percent red 
rice in rice grown in the SR rotation 
caused this rice to be lowered to a 
number three grade rice. Accord-
ing to farm program regulations, 
grade three rice is discounted 
$0.30/cwt from the base loan rate. 
16
"Correlation measures the closeness 
of a linear relationship between two 
variables. If one variable x can be 
expressed exactly as a linear function 
of another variable y, then the correla-
tion is 1 or -1, depending on whether 
the two variables are directly related 
or inversely related. A correlation of 0 
between two variables means that 
each variable has no linear predictive 
ability for the other." (SAS Institute, 
Inc. 1982). A correlation matrix con-
sists of correlation coefficients for all 
variables, the number of variables 
determining the size of the matrix. 
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TABLE 5. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS" FOR RICE AND SOYBEAN PRICES AND 
YIELDS. 
Soybean First Rice Ratoon Rice Soybean July Rice January 
Yield Yield Yield Price Price Rice Price 
Soybean 
Yield 1.0 0.5714 0.4698 0.3055 -0.4209 -0.2476 
First Rice 
Yield 1.0 0.6323 -0.1485 -0.4289 -0.5923 
Ratoon Rice 
Yield 1.0 -0.1543 -0.7809 -0.8397 
Soybean 
Price 1.0 0.1172 0.2420 
July Rice 
Price 1.0 0.8709 
Jan. Rice 
Price 1.0 
"Correlation" measures the closeness of a linear relationship between two 
variables. If one variable x can be expressed exactly as a linear function of 
another variable y, then the correlation is 1 or -1, depending on whether the 
two variables are directly related or inversely related. A correlation of 0 
between two variables means that each variable has no linear predictive ability 
for the other" (SAS Institute, Inc. 1982). The lower half of the diagonal is the 
reciprocal of the upper half. 
Ratoon rice was assumed grade 
four and was discounted $0.60/cwt 
from the base loan rate (USDA 
1983). The discounts were held 
constant throughout 1984-88. 
Yields for the previous 5 years 
from a Liberty County farm of simi-
lar size and production levels were 
used to calculate proven yield 
levels used in the farm program. 
Participation in the rice farm pro-
gram required setting aside 20 per-
cent of farm acreage, with an addi-
tional 5 percent of the rice acreage 
placed in paid diversion. The set-
aside and paid diversion was 80 
percent effective in reducing pro-
duction, i.e., a slippage rate of 20 
percent was assumed. The soy-
bean farm program consisted sole-
ly of a loan rate. The loan rate 
($5.02/bu) was also held constant 
over the study period. 
Participation in the Federal Crop 
Insurance Program on only soy-
beans was assumed in the base 
analysis. Rice was not included· 
since examination of the yield dis-
tributions used indicated the prob-
ability of yields falling below the 
guaranteed minimum was small 
(less than 5 percent). 17 The low 
probability was a result of the large 
increase in expected rice yields as 
compared with proven rice yields. 
For soybeans, the insurance initial-
ly guaranteed a 14 bu/ A yield, 
about 65 percent of the initial mean 
soybean yield or level two of the 
insurance program (USDA-FCIC 
1982). 
Federal Crop Insurance price 
election for soybeans was at the 
highest level ($6.50/bu). The land-
owner shared in the cost of the 
insurance premium in proportion 
to the crop-share arrangement for 
soybeans. The insurance policy in-
cluded protection against hail and 
fire damage. Base yields for crop 
insurance increased over time 
(Table 4). Price election was also 
increased at the same rate as was 
assumed for mean soybean prices 
17When rice was insured in the model, 
probabilities of survival and success, 
NPV, and other analysis criteria fell 
for all four strategies. Dropping crop 
insurance seemed justified, based on 
this result. 
in the model. Premiums were in-
creased over time in accordance 
ith the increased prices, in-
creased yields, and loss experience 
(Pfluger 1984). The producer was 
assumed to have participated in 
the soybean crop insurance pro-
gram during the previous 3 years 
(1981-83). The farm used in cal-
culating proven yields for rice was 
also used for historical soybean 
yields. The actual farm reported 
yields below the guaranteed mini-
mum during 1982 and 1983. 
RESULTS AND ANALYSES 
Base Scenario 
Simulation results for the four 
crop rotation-tenure arrangement 
strategies are in Table 6. The soy-
bean-soybean-rice rotation with a 
1/7 crop-share arrangement (SSR 
1/7) offered the highest probability 
of survival (82 percent) of the four 
strategies examined. As indicated 
in the previous section, the proba-
bility of survival is the probability 
that the producer will maintain the 
farm's equity level above the mini-
mum levels (established by local 
financial institutions) throughout 
the 5-year study period. The soy-
bean-rice rotation under a 1/7 crop-
share arrangement (SR 1/7) offered 
a 78 percent probability of survival, 
highest for the two soybean-rice 
rotation strategies. All four strate-
gies exhibited a 50 percent or great-
er probability of survival. 18 
Probabilities of survival under 
each strategy for each year of the 5-
year study period are presented in 
Table 7. Survivability fell rapidly in 
the second year for the SSR 1/2 
strategy, the farm operation failing 
because of back-to-back years of 
poor soybean yields and prices or 
below average soybean and rice 
yields and prices. The greatest de-
crease in survivability for the other 
three strategies occurred in year 3, 
18The reader is cautioned not to misin-
terpret these and subsequent results . 
The results do not imply 82 percent of 
farms using the SSR 1/7 strategy will 
still be in operation in 1988, while the 
remaining 18 percent will be bank-
rupt. Nor should the results be inter-
preted as absolute. The results 
should be viewed as an approxima-
tion of the farm manager's probabili-
again because of combinations of 
low soybean and rice prices and 
(or) low yields several years in suc-
cession. 
Preference rankings between 
strategies were also the same when 
using the mean ending equity 
ratios. The mean ending equity 
ratios for all iterations include itera-
tions that became insolvent during 
the 5-year study period. The two 
117 share strategies performed 
much better, with average ending 
equity ratios above 0.55. The mean 
ending equity ratios for iterations 
surviving the 5-year period were 
higher than those for all iterations, 
but were much closer between 
strategies. 1However, the 1/7 share 
strategies had higher ending equi-
ty ratios than the 1/2 share strate-
gies. Initial equity ratios were 0.60 
for all four strategies. It can be 
concluded that, if a farm of the type 
modelled survives the 1984-88 pro-
duction period, the farm manager 
will probably improve his/her equi-
ty position. 
The SSR 1/7 strategy also offered 
the highest probability of economic 
success. Economic success is de-
fined as generating a positive after-
tax net present value for the farm. 
The SSR 1/7 strategy was the only 
strategy with a probability of 
economic success greater than 50 
percent. By contrast, the SSR 1/2 
strategy offered only a 12 percent 
probability of success, less than 
one-fourth that of the SSR 1/7 
strategy. Both 1/7 share arrange-
ments offered probabilities of 
economic success that were more 
than twice those of the 1/2 share 
arrangements. The much higher 
probability of success is not sur-
prising, since land rental costs are 
less variable under the 1/7 arrange-
ment. The farm manager using the 
117 arrangement receives more of 
the benefits accrued in a good year 
ty of still being in farming at the end 
of 1988, and should be used largely 
for comparison between results. In 
this instance, the results indicate the 
farm manager following the SSR 1/7 
strategy has a high probability of sur-
vival through 1988 and that the 
strategy offers a relatively higher 
probability of survival than do the 
three alternative strategies . 
than does the farmer using the 1/2 
share arrangement. 
As expected from examining 
probability of success figures, the 
average after-tax NPV was highest 
for the SSR 1/7 strategy. Because 
the discount rate represents the 
after-tax return if an equivalent in-
vestment was made in a risk-free 
off-farm investment, the results 
imply the farm manager may not 
receive a return to his investment 
greater than the return from the 
off-farm investment. 
The after-tax NPV cumulative 
distributions19 generated for each 
strategy are illustrated in Figure 3. 
One approach frequently used in 
ranking stochastically-generated 
observations is stochastic domi-
nance. An explanation of the theo-
retical framework supporting 
stochastic dominance as a decision 
criteria is in Appendix A. Stochas-
tic dominance uses paired com-
parisons to identify strategies pre-
ferred by persons with different 
attitudes towards risk. In this 
study, a particular type of stochas-
tic dominance approach, known as 
stochastic dominance with respect 
to a function (SDRF), was in the 
ranking process. SDRF permits 
identification of preferred strate-
gies over differing ranges of risk 
preference levels (Meyer 1977a). 
Five intervals were chosen for anal-
ysis to permit identification of opti-
mal strategies for farm managers 
with different risk preferences. 
These intervals were: (1) risk pre-
ferring, with Pratt coefficient 
bounds of -0.0003 and 0.0; (2) risk 
neutral, with coefficient bounds of 
0.0; (3) risk averse, with coefficient 
bounds of 0.0 to 0.0003; (4) risk 
preferring and risk averse (combi-
nation), with coefficient bounds of 
-0.0001 to 0.0001; and (5) strongly 
risk averse, with coefficient 
bounds of 0.0001 to 0.0003. Results 
of SDRF rankings for the base 
scenarios are presented in Table 8. 
In general, the SDRF rankings 
19The cumulative distribution indicates 
the probability that returns are below 
a certain level. For example, in Figure 
3, the probability of a NPV below zero 
for SSR 1/7 strategy is 0.48, or 48 
percent. 
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TABLE 6. RESULTS FOR SIMULATING A 2,300 A LIBERTY COUNTY RICE-SOYBEAN 
FARM UNDER DIFFERENT CROP-SHARE AND CROP ROTATION 
STRATEGIES--BASE SCENARIO 
SSR Rotation SR Rotation 
Analys is Variables 1/2 Share• 1/7 Share 1/2 Share• 1/7 Share 
Probability 
of Survival (o/o):b 50 82 72 78 
Probability 
of Success (o/o):c 12 52 20 40 
After-Tax Net 
Present Value($):d 
Mean -207,167. -23,183. -132,641. -52,266. 
Standard Deviation 188,318. 213,605. 177,131. 193,744. 
Maximum 225,998. 456,226. 250,238. 350,701. 
Minimum -531,767. -478,900. -490,366. -487,218. 
Mean Ending Equity Rat io 
(Surv iving Iterations): 0.606 0.679 0.596 0.659 
Mean Ending Equity Rat io 
(All Iterations): 0.381 0.586 0.473 0.555 
Mean Yearly Government 
Payments ($): 29,820. 47,750. 44,003. 56,702. 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -25,958. 23,677. -3,459. 16,536. 
"Share for rice only; share for soybeans is 1/7. 
bProbabilit y of survival is the probability that the farm wil l maintain its equ ity 
rat ios at greater than m inimum levels established for local financ ial 
institut ions. 
cProbability of success is the probability of generating a positive after-tax net 
present value for the farm. 
dAfter-tax net present value is the present value of the net annual fam i ly 
withdrawals plus the present value of change in net worth over the 5-year 
planning hor izon. 
varied depending on the assumed 
risk attitudes of the farm manager. 
The SSR 1/7 strategy was preferred 
or equally preferred for all catego-
ries of decisionmakers. The SR 1/7 
strategy was preferred or equally 
preferred with the SSR 1/7 strategy, 
for risk preferring and combination 
categories. The SSR 1/2 strategy 
was, in most cases, the least pre-
ferred strategy. The importance of 
knowing an individual farmer's 
risk preferences is demonstrated in 
these results. When widely diver-
gent Pratt coefficient bounds were 
used in the ranking process (imply-
ing little knowledge about the indi-
vidual's risk preferences) clear-cut 
rankings of strategies were not 
possible. When the bounds were 
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very narrow (as in the risk neutral 
and strongly risk averse catego-
ries), clear identification of pre-
ferred strategies was possible. 
Major factors influencing the 
general superiority of the 1/7 share 
strategies in farm survival, 
economic success, and ending 
equity position are assumptions re-
garding the price discount for red 
rice, high intermediate-term finan-
cial demands, rental arrange-
ments, differences in yields, and 
the value of diversification. The 
SSR rotations both benefit from 
higher rice prices because of the 
lower incidence of red rice in the 
rice crop. Expected yields for rice 
are also about 4 cwt (8 percent) per 
acre higher under the SSR rotation. 
The result is higher revenue per 
hundredweight of rice and an ap-
proximate $0.60/cwt (or 5 percent) 
decrease in production costs . 
Government deficiency pay-
ments to the tenant were much 
higher for the 1/7 share strategy, 
resulting in more cash income. 
Under the 1/2 share arrangement, 
1/2 of total government payments 
went to the landowner. The result 
was higher per acre rents and low-
er net returns for the 1/2 share 
operators. The government pro-
gram protected all strategies from 
price risk, although the payment 
limitation was reached in some 
years under the SR 1/7 strategy. 20 
As mentioned before, one im-
portant risk in soybean production 
is high yield variability. On a per 
acre basis, the Federal Crop Insur-
ance program protected producers 
operating under each strategy 
equally well from this risk. As a 
result, yield risk was not a major 
concern for soybean acreage. Rice 
yields were much less variable so 
yield risk was less of a concern. 
Major risks were associated with 
soybean prices (where near free 
market conditions prevail) and 
combinations of low to moderate 
yields and prices for soybeans and 
rice. 
Producers operating under all 
four strategies had to meet high 
levels of principal and interest pay-
ments, particularly for farm ma-
chinery and equipment. Under the 
1/2 share arrangements , not 
enough profit was generated to 
meet these high fixed cost cash 
flows during a bad year. The gov-
ernment program provided some 
protection against large losses in 
the operation for the 1/7 share pro-
ducer, while still allowing the pro-
ducer to receive most of the bene-
fits from a good year. Good years 
tended to generate enough surplus 
income to meet financial obliga-
tions during adverse years. In sev-
20Although per acre government pay-
ments were less under the SR rota-
tions, the larger number of rice acres 
caused the manager using the 1/7 
share arrangement to have more total 
government payments and thus 
reach the payment limitation sooner 
than other strategies. 
eral instances, insolvency occurred 
for the SSR 1/2 strategy as a result 
of bad soybean prices and/or 
yields, even when rice prices and/ 
or yields were excellent. Because 
the share received by the landown-
er was so large for rice acreage, 
soybeans became the principal 
crop for the SSR 1/2 and SR 1/2 
strategies. The 1/2 share arrange-
ment seemed to counteract the 
principal benefit of crop diversifi-
cation (i.e., risk reduction). 
Production and Management 
Sensitivity Analyses 
In this and subsequ~nt sections, 
sensitivity analyses are presented 
for the four strategies examined in 
the base scenario. The purposes of 
sensitivity analyses are threefold. 
The first is to explore the effect of 
major assumptions on the results. 
Researchers usually have more 
confidence in some assumptions 
than others. If the model is sensi-
tive to an assumption researchers 
are confident in, important and 
perhaps new recommendations 
can be made to other researchers 
and farm managers. Do changes in 
beginning equity position, for ex-
ample, cause large changes in sur-
vivability of the farm operation? 
When the model is sensitive to an 
assumption researchers do not feel 
confident in, the results can pro-
vide evidence for the need to do 
further research in the area. 
A second purpose of sensitivity 
analyses is to address some of the 
"what if ... 11 questions generated 
while identifying the initial set of 
assumptions. In the base scenario, 
for example, the farm manager was 
assumed to participate in the gov-
ernment farm program for rice. 
What if the farmer chose not to 
participate in the farm program? 
Would he/she be better or worse 
off? Addressing "what if ... 11 ques-
tions allows examination of differ-
ent farming situations and man-
agement practices, assisting farm 
managers in designing a manage-
ment strategy and broadening the 
applicability of the study results 
beyond farms defined in the base 
analysis. 
Third, sensitivity analyses allow 
identification of areas of the model 
that may not accurately reflect the 
TABLE 7. PROBABILITY OF 2,300 A LIBERTY COUNTY RICE-SOYBEAN FARM 
SURVIVING 8 A GIVEN NUMBER OF YEARS UNDER DIFFERENT CROP-
SHARE AND CROP ROTATION STRATEGIES - BASE SCENARIO 
SSR Rotation SR Rotation 
Year 1/2 Shareb 1/7 Share 1/2 Shareb 1/7 Share 
1984 100 100 100 100 
1985 78 96 92 94 
1986 68 86 84 86 
1987 54 86 78 84 
1988 50 82 72 78 
8 Survivability is defined as a positive net cash flow at the end of a 
production year with farm intermediate and long-term equity ratios 
above 0.33. 
bShare for rice only; share for soybeans is 1/7. 
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actual farming situation. If re-
ducing variable production costs 
does not generate results different 
from the base scenario, for exam-
ple, researchers should re-examine 
both the design of the model and 
assumptions made in the part of 
the model dealing with variable 
production costs. Sensitivity anal-
yses are one way of validating the 
model as a research toot as well as 
identifying its strengths and limita-
tions in addressing research prob-
lems (McCarl and Nelson 1983). 
Although the following sensitivity 
analyses are extensive, they repre-
sent only a fraction of the analyses 
that could be performed with the 
model. The following analyses 
focus on major assumptions and 
potential criticisms of the model. 
In this section, sensitivity results 
are presented for variable produc-
tion costs, management practices 
of farm managers, alternative land 
tenure arrangements, and effects 
of present and potential technolo-
gy developments. 
Variable Production Costs 
The variable costs used in the 
study and presented in Table 3 rep-
resent average production costs for 
farm managers of above average 
management ability. Suppose the 
farm manager could reduce his/her 
non-water variable production 
costs 10 percent below the Table 3 
values, still maintaining crop 
yields and quality at the assumed 
levels. What impact would this cost 
reduction have on the farming op-
eration? Conversely, what if the 
farmer were only an average mana-
ger, with non-water variable costs 
averaging 10 percent more than the 
costs assumed in the base analysis? 
In Table 9, the results of these two 
sensitivity scenarios are presented 
for the four base strategies. 
A 10 percent increase in costs 
caused survivability to fall from 12 
to 28 percentage points for the four 
strategies, with the impact most 
severe on the SR 117 strategy. Sub-
stantial changes also occurred in 
probabilities of economic success 
and average after-tax NPV. All 
mean NPV values were highly 
negative, indicating the farmer 
would be better off to liquidate 
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TABLE 8. PREDICTED PREFERENCE FOR CROP ROTATION AND TENURE 
ARRANGEMENT STRATEGIES - BASE SCENARIO 
Risk Preference Classa 
Preference Risk Risk Risk Strongly 
Sets Preferring Neutral Averse Combination Risk Averse 
Mostb SSR 1/7 SSR 1/7 SSR 1/7 SSR 1/7 SSR 1/7 
SR 1/7 
Second SR 1/7 SR 1/7 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 SR 1i7 
SR 1/2 SR 1/2 
Third SSR 1/2 SR 1/2 SSR 1/2 SR 1/2 
SR 1/2 
Fourth SSR 1/2 SSR 1/2 
8 Risk aversion coefficients were (-0.0003 to 0.0) for risk preferers, (0.0) for risk 
neutral, (0.0 to 0.0003) for risk averters, (-0.000 1 to 0.000 1) for combination 
preferences, and (0.000 1 to 0.0003) for strong risk averters. The results were 
quite robust to changes in the risk aversion coefficients values (McCarl and 
Bessler 1986). 
bThe second most preferred set is developed assuming the strategies in the most 
preferred set were not avai I able. Next strategies in sets one and two were 
excluded when selecting strategies for the third most preferred set, and so on. 
Two or more strategies appear together when they are equally preferred; that is, 
neither strategy dominates the other over the entire range of the risk preference 
class. 
farm assets and invest those assets 
off the farm when costs are 10 per-
cent above the base level. Ending 
equity positions for solvent itera-
tions also deteriorated, although 
the change was not as pronounced 
as with other evaluation criteria. 
The 10 percent decrease in costs 
generally resulted in a stronger 
change from the base results than 
the 10 percent increase. Survivabil-
ity improved by 12 to 32 percentage 
points for all expected probabilities 
of survivat exceeding 82 percent in 
all instances. Both 117 share strate-
gies generated a positive after-tax 
average NPV, with a substantial 
improvement in average NPV and 
average ending equity position oc-
curring for all four strategies. 
Although the effect of cost 
changes differed among strategies, 
strategies utilizing 112 share ar-
rangements tended to be less af-
fected by cost increases because 
some of the increases were ab-
sorbed by the landowner. Changes 
in costs would also have a greater 
impact on the SR strategies, since 
the cost of rice production is higher 
than that of soybean production, 
with a notable exception being the 
SSR 1/2 strategy when costs de-
creased 10 percent. For this 
strategy, large gains were obtained 
in survivability, and NPV results, 
because of the extra cash flow cush-
ion provided by lower production 
costs. In years of below average, 
but not disastrous, prices and 
yields, the additional cash flow 
was sufficient to ensure another 
year of farm survival. 
Water Costs 
Three different scenarios were 
examined in the area of water costs: 
(1) water costs were reduced to 
$40/A and $10/A for first and ratoon 
crop rice, respectively; (2) the infla-
tion rate for water was increased 
from 4._5 to 7 percent per year (i.e., 
a 50 percent increase); and (3) wa-
ter costs were increased to $100/A 
and $25/ A for first and ratoon crop 
rice, respectively, with a 7 percent 
inflation rate for water also as-
sumed. These scenarios compare 
with the base scenario in which 
water costs were $68/ A for first 
crop and $14.45/A for ratoon rice. 
These water costs represent the 
extremes for the Liberty County 
area (Griffin, Perry, and McCauley 
1984). Results for these three 
scenarios are given in Table 10. 
TABLE 9. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM -CHANGES IN NON-WATER COSTS 
10% Increase In Costs 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 38 62 48 50 82 
Change 
from Base: -12 -20 -24 -28 +32 
Probability 
of Success (%): 8 26 8 20 48 
Change 
from Base: -4 -26 -12 -20 +36 
Mean NPV ($): -267,65j, -132,883. -224,613. -195,197. -57,868. 
Change 
from Base: -60,486. -109,700. -91,972. -142,931. + 149,299. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.561 0.638 0.570 0.594 0.651 
Change 
from Base: -0.045 -0.041 -0.026 -0.065 +0.045 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -44,395. -5,836. -27,336. -25,638. 15,356. 
Change 
from Base: -18,437. -29,513. -23,877. -42,174. +41,314. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
Because water costs are paid by the 
landowners under 1/2 crop-share 
arrangements, the analysis was 
limited to strategies employing the 
117 crop-share arrangement. 
Reducing water costs had a sig-
nificant effect on both 1/7 share 
strategies, particularly on the SR 
1/7 strategy. Probabilities of survi-
val and success and ending aver-
age equity position for the SR 1/7 
strategy actually exceeded corre-
sponding values for the SSR 1/7 
strategy. The stochastic dominance 
rankings also changed, with the SR 
1/7 strategy being preferred by all 
risk neutral and extremely risk-
preferring individuals, and co-
preferred with SSR 117 in the other 
three risk classifications. 
Very little change resulted from 
an increase in the inflation rate for 
water. By 1988, the higher inflation 
rate had made only a $9/A dif-
ference in water costs. The effect of 
increased inflation would be great-
er if the study horizon were ex-
tended to a 10- or 15-year period. 
An extreme case was examined 
in the third situation. The effect of 
$100/A water costs with a 7 percent 
per year inflation rate was to great-
ly reduce almost all analysis vari-
ables. In the SR 1/7 strategy, proba-
bility of survival was reduced by 
more than half and probability of 
success to 10 percent. The prospect 
for long-term farm survival (should 
the manager using the SR 1/7 
strategy survive until1988) was not 
good, with the ending equity ratio 
for surviving iterations falling by 
almost 0. 08 from the base results. 
The SSR 1/7 strategy also suffered a 
substantial decline in survivability, 
success, and NPV, although not as 
severe as occurred for the SR 117 
strategy. 
Stochastic dominance rankings 
changed a great deal as a result of 
the higher water costs. The SR 112 
strategy was preferred by all risk-
neutral and risk-averse individuals 
and co-preferred with the SSR 117 
strategy for risk-preferring indi-
viduals. The SR 117 strategy be-
came the least preferred strategy 
for most risk categories. It can be 
concluded from the results pre-
sented in Table 9 that the cost of 
water is an important variable to 
consider when deciding on a ten-
ure arrangement or crop rotation. 
The 112 share arrangement pro-
vides protection to the farm mana-
ger from high water costs. 
Management Practices 
Three scenarios were examined 
under the general heading of man-
10% Decrease In Costs 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
94 90 94 
+12 +18 +16 
78 56 80 
+26 +36 +40 
143,638. -669. 127,636. 
+ 166,821. +13UP2. +179,902. 
0.772 0.672 0.763 
+0.093 +0.076 +0.104 
69,653. 33,247. 67,666. 
+45,976. +36,706. +51, 130. 
agement practices: (1) reducing ra-
toon acreage from 25 percent of 
total acreage to none, (2) reducing 
labor hours available from each 
full-time employee by 100 hours 
per month, and (3) reducing red 
rice present in the SR rotation from 
2.5 to 1.5 percent. Results for these 
scenarios are summarized in Table 
11. 
Eliminating ratoon acreage had 
very little overall impact on the 
results. The most surprising result 
of this scenario occurred under the 
117 share strategies, where elimina-
tion of ratoon acreage actually re-
sulted in an improvement in the 
mean yearly cash farm income. The 
cost-sharing component was prin-
cipally responsible for this result. 
Major additional costs incurred to 
produce ratoon rice were water, 
fertilizer, and chemicals. All of the 
water costs and approximately half 
of the fertilizer and chemical costs 
were paid by the landowner under 
the 112 share arrangement, while 
none of these costs were paid by 
the landowner using a 1/7 share 
arrangement. As a result, average 
returns to the farmer for ratoon rice 
were positive under the 112 share 
arrangement and negative under 
the 1/7 share arrangement. In both 
cases, however, the effect of ratoon 
rice on the representative farm op-
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TABLE 10. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - CHANGES IN WATER COSTS AND WATER INFLATION RATES 
100/A Water 
$40/A Water Cost 7% Water Inflation and 7% Inflation 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/7 SR 1/7 SSR 1/7 SR 1/7 SSR 1/7 SR 1/7 
Probab i I ity 
Survival (%): 90 90 82 76 54 38 
Change 
from Base: +8 +12 0 -2 -28 -40 
Probabi I ity 
Success (%): 64 68 52 34 26 10 
Change 
from Base: +12 +28 0 -6 -26 -30 
Mean NPV ($): 61,851. 65,216. -31,866. -68,036. -162,184. -247,214. 
Change 
from Base: +85,034. +1 17,482. -8,683. -15,770. -139,001. -194,948. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.717 0.724 0.669 0.648 0.654 0.581 
Change 
from Base: +0.038 +0.065 -0.010 -0.011 -0.025 -0.078 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): 46,812. 49,548. 20,656. 12,756. -12,499. -38,275. 
Change 
from Base: +23, 135. +33,0 12. -3,021. -3,780. -36,176. -54,811 . 
See Table 3 for base water prices and Table 1 for base inflation rates. 
eration was small. 
Above average labor efficiency 
was assumed in the base analysis 
to be the result of above average 
managerial ability. Reducing avail-
able labor hours for each full-time 
employee (and increasing part-
time labor requirements as a re-
sult), however, had little impact. 
After-tax NPV's were reduced for 
all strategies examined, but the 
probabilities of survival and 
economic success generally did not 
change, indicating the base results 
were not sensitive to the assump-
tions made concerning labor sup-
ply and demand. 
In the final scenario, red rice was 
reduced to 1.5 percent in the SR 
rotations. The reduction in red rice 
halved the market price discount 
for rice produced under the SR 
rotation and eliminated the differ-
ential between SSR and SR loan 
rates and target prices. The values 
for the analysis variables increased 
under this scenario for both strate-
gies, particularly for the SR 1/7 
strategy. In the stochastic domi-
nance analysis, one or both of the 
1/7 share strategies were preferred 
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at all risk preference intervals. The 
amount of red rice present in the 
rice crop, therefore, was an impor-
tant variable in the study results 
and was partly responsible for pre-
venting the SR 1/7 strategy from 
dominating the base scenario. 
Tenure Arrangements 
In the base scenario, two crop-
share arrangements common to 
the Upper Gulf Coast area were 
compared. Many different ar-
rangements are available to farm-
ers, however, including other 
share arrangements, cash rent, and 
ownership of all or part of the farm. 
In this section, the analysis of ten-
ure arrangements is extended to 
include cash rental arrangements 
and land ownership. In addition, 
the effect of reducing the landown-
er-.(..s share in the base crop-share 
arrangements is also examined. 
Finally, the roles are reversed and 
optimal strategies for the landown-
er are identified. 
Land Ownership 
Two scenarios were examined 
for land ownership, both maintain-
ing farm size at 2,310 A. In the first 
scenario, the farm manager owned 
1,160 A of the farm and leased the 
remaining 1,150 A. In the second 
scenario, the manager owned all 
2,310 A. In both scenarios, all other 
assets were held constant. The 
overall beginning equity ratio for 
both scenarios was the same as in 
the base analysis (i.e., 0.60). NPV 
discount rates were calculated us-
ing the methodology detailed on 
page 11. A 9.25 percent discount 
rate was used in calculating after-
tax NPV figures for the part-owner, 
while a 8. 97 percent rate was used 
for the fully-owned farm. Results 
for these scenarios are presented in 
Table 12. 
Results from both scenarios 
were different from the base re-
sults. On one hand, probabilities of 
survival were 100 percent for all 
strategies, an increase of as much 
as 50 percentage points above base 
results. Probabilities of success also 
increased for the 1/2 share strate-
gies. On the other hand, average 
after-tax NPV and yearly net cash 
farm income figures fell for most 
strategies. Net cash farm income, 
in particular, declined by large 
amounts for both 1/7 share strate-
gies. Mean ending equity ratios for 
solvent iterations were also re-
duced, but the equity ratios were 
higher for the part-owner strate-
gies when insolvent iterations 
were included. Since probabilities 
of survival were 100 percent for all 
strategies, the mean ending equity 
ratio for solvent iterations includes 
those iterations declared insolvent 
for the tenant because of low prices 
and yields. A comparison between 
mean equity ratios for all iterations 
provides a more accurate picture of 
the situation indicating the part-
owner fared better than the tenant. 
Despite the large negative aver-
age net cash farm income, the part-
owner farm operation maintained 
an equity position close to the ini-
tial position because of the high 
capital gains rate on land. 21 The 
greater improvement in the part-
21Recall that a 7.1 percent per year 
capital gain rate on land was assumed 
in the base analysis because of the 
study area's location relative to the 
Houston metropolitan area. 
TABLE 11. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM - EFFECTS OF SELECTED 
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 
Reduce Red Rice 
No Ratoon Acreage Poor Labor Management to 1.5% 
Analysis 
Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 50 82 72 78 50 80 68 78 80 84 
Change 
from Base: 0 0 0 0 g. -2 -4 0 +8 +6 
Probability 
of Success (%): 12 52 20 42 10 52 20 40 32 58 
Change 
from Base: 0 0 0 +2 -2 0 0 0 +12 +78 
Mean NPV ($): -211,862. -23,586. 138,366. -51,014. -216,516. -35,302. -144,175. -58,491. -101,587. -4,320. 
Change 
from Base: -4,695. -403. -5,725. -1,252. -9,349. -12,119. -11,534. -6,225. +31,054. +47,946. 
Mean Ending 
Equity Ratio: 0.600 0.683 0.589 0.662 0.591 0.672 0.591 0.649 0.603 0.686 
Change 
from Base: -0.006 +0.004 -0.007 +0.003 -0.015 -0.007 -0.005 -0.010 +0.007 +0.027 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -26,011. 25,065. -3,667. 19,113. -29,488. 20,252. -6,777. 14,746. 5,141. 29,940. 
Change 
from Base: -53. +1,388. -208. +2,597. -3,530. -3.425. -3,318. -1,790. +8,600. +13.404. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
owner 1/2 share strategies over 
base results was because of higher 
land rent cost paid when renting 
the land and using a 1/2 share ar-
rangement versus purchasing the 
land (with 40 percent of the land 
value still under mortgage). This 
conclusion can be clearly seen 
when comparing the full-
ownership results with those from 
the base. 
When comparing base results 
with those for full-owners, average 
NPV for the SSR 1/2 strategy was 
almost $85,000 more than SSR full-
owner strategy, but the SSR 1/7 
strategy's NPV was $100,000 less 
than the SSR full-owner strategy. 
Similar results occurred for the SR 
strategies. Superior performance 
of the 1/7 share strategies suggests 
that, if the farm manager were in-
terested in maximizing returns to 
investment, he/she would be better 
off selling land and leasing it back 
under a 1/7 share arrangement. 
Selling land would provide capital 
for farm expansion, thereby al-
lowing the manager to take advan-
tage of returns to scale benefits. 
Such a strategy would, however, 
also increase the risk of farm insol-
vency. 
Stochastic dominance results 
were not as distinct for the part-
owner as in the base analysis. The 
TABLE 12. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - PART-OWNER AND FULL-OWNER TENURE SCENARIOS 
50% Owned - 50% Leased 100% Qwned" 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR SR 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Change 
from Base: +50 +18 +28 +22 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 18 38 22 34 32 34 
Change 
from Base: +6 -14 +2 -6 
Mean NPV ($): -159,284. -82,577. -140;189. -93,535. -123,039. -119,508. 
Change 
from Base: +47,883. -59,394. -7,548. -41,269. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.584 0.617 0.594 0.614 0.675 0.677 
Change 
from Base: -0.022 -0.062 -0.002 -0.045 
Mean Yearly Net Cash 
Farm Income ($): -28,590. -5,702. -19,626. -6,388. -14,007. -9,688 
Change 
from Base: -2,632. -29,379. -16,167. -22,924 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (All Iterations): 0.584 0.617 0.594 0.614 0.675 0.677 
Change 
from Base: +0.203 +0.031 +0. 121 +0.059 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
• No "Change from Base " values are presented for these scenarios in asmuch as 
there are no comparable scenarios in the base scenario. 
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SSR 1/7, SR 1/2, and SR 1/7 strate-
gies were all co-preferred in the 
combination and risk averse risk 
classifications. The SSR 1/7 strategy 
dominated in the risk neutral and 
risk preferring classifications, and 
the SR 1/7 strategy dominated in 
the extremely risk averse classifica-
tion. 
Cash Rental Arrangements 
Three cash rental arrangements 
were examined in the analysis: 
(1) $20/A, (2) $30/A, and (3) $40/A. 
Almost one-half of the 1982 cash 
rented acreage in the Texas Rice 
Belt was obtained for $20 to $40/ A 
(Griffin et al. 1984). Average cash 
rent was $29.30/A. Cash rents used 
in the analysis, therefore, were 
representative of land rental costs 
in the rice-producing region. Re-
sults for the three cash rent 
scenarios are given in Table 13. 
It comes as no surprise to find 
that lowering rents improved sur-
vival, success, and ending equity 
position. A comparison between 
the SSR and SR rotation strategies, 
however, reveals that the SR rota-
tion strategies generated virtually 
identical probabilities of survival 
and average after-tax NPV' s as the 
SSR strategies. The choice between 
rotations, then, does not seem im-
portant from a risk management 
standpoint since neither rotation 
seems to reduce risk more than the 
other. 
Comparison of stochastic domi-
nance rankings between cash rent 
and base results demonstrated that 
the $30/A cash rent strategies were 
roughly co-preferred with the base 
share rent results for most risk 
classes. The $30/ A cash rent strate-
gies tended to rank above base 
results for risk preferring persons 
and below base results for risk 
averse persons. The $20/A cash 
rent strategies were preferred over 
all base strategies, but the $40/A 
strategies were generally not pre-
ferred to the base strategies. Riski-
ness of the cash rent strategies rela-
tive to crop-share strategies can be 
seen in a comparison of the SSR 1/7 
and SSR $30/ A strategies. The SSR 
$30/ A strategy averaged about 
$4,000 more in after-tax NPV but 
had a probability of survival that 
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TABLE 13. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - CASH RENTAL ARRANGEMENTS 
SSR Rotation SR Rotation 
Analysis Variables $20/A $30/A $40/A $20/A $30/A $40/A 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 90 74 50 90 78 52 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 68 56 28 72 60 28 
After-Tax Net 
Present Value: 
Mean ($) 104,315. -19,178. -166,728. 112,820. -5,401. -161,275. 
Standard Deviation 231,064. 249,279. 252,079. 213,451 . 216,176. 230,898. 
Maximum 608,878. 525,835. 430,921. 547,284. 457,557. 360,593. 
Minimum -455,988. -526,723. -597,458. -438,427. -468,846. -537,519. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.755 0.718 0.687 0.760 0.696 0.646 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (All Iterations): 0.696 0.574 0.395 0.701 0.587 0.397 
Mean Yearly Net 
Cash Farm Income ($): 58,137. 23,708. -16,251 . 61,418. 21 ,674 -17,877. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
was 8 percentage points lower than 
the SSR 1/7 strategy. 
A comparison between the SSR 
1/2 and SSR $40/ A strategies yields 
more impressive results. The SSR 
$40/A strategy offered an average 
after-tax NPV that was $40,000 
more than the SSR 1/2 strategy, yet 
both strategies offered the same 
probability of survival. The use of 
the 1/2 crop-share rental arrange-
ments reduces the probability of 
farm insolvency when incomes are 
the same. The value of share-
arrangements in reducing risk are 
quantified in a later section of the 
report. 
Reducing Landowner's Rental Shares 
Although the 1/7 and 1/2 share 
arrangements are examined in the 
base scenario, they are not the only 
arrangements used for rice and 
soybeans in the study region. Grif-
fin et al. (1984) found 1/6, 1/8, 1/9, 
and 1/10 are also common crop-
share arrangements for rice. The 
particular crop-share arrangement 
used depends on many factors in-
cluding land quality, size of acreage 
being leased, relative bargaining 
positions of tenant and landowner, 
and traditional arrangements used 
in the area. 
In this sensitivity scenario, the 
landowner's share of the rice crop 
was reduced from 1/7 to 1/10 and 
from 1/2 to 45 percent. The land-
owner's share arrangement for 
soybeans was reduced from 1/7 to 
1/10 for all strategies. Changing the 
1/7 arrangement to a 1/10 arrange-
ment results in the manager receiv-
ing 4.2 percent more of the crop, a 
smaller change than the 5 percent 
increase when moving from the 1/2 
arrangement to the 45 percent ar-
rangement. The larger increase 
was made recognizing the inferior-
ity of the 1/2 arrangement to the 1/7 
arrangement in the base solution 
from the farm manager 's perspec-
tive. Results are reported in Table 
14. 
Small changes in the crop-share 
rental arrangements caused large 
changes in analysis variables. 
Probabilities of survival increased 
to 80 percent or more for all strate-
gies, with large increases noted for 
45 percent share strategies. Proba-
bilities of success increased by 
more than probabilities of survival. 
All strategies except the SSR 45 
percent generated positive average 
after-tax NPV's. Average ending 
equity ratios for solvent iterations 
also registered significant gains for 
all strategies. 
TABLE 14. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - REDUCTION IN CROP-SHARE LAND RENTAL ARRANGEMENT 
Analysis Variables SSR 45% 8 SSR 1/10 SR 45%8 SR 1/10 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 80 90 88 90 
Change 
from Base: +30 +8 t16 +12 
Probability 
of Success (%): 46 64 62 70 
Change 
from Base: +34 +12 +42 +30 
Mean NPV ($): -69,250. 85,144. 20,278. 87.400. 
Change 
from Base: +137,917. +108,327. +152,919. + 139,666. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.644 0.734 0.692 0.746 
Change 
from Base: +0.038 +0.055 +0.096 +0.087 
Mean Government 
Payment Received ($): 34,097. 49,502. 46.416. 58,290. 
Change 
from Base: +4,277. +1,752. +2.413. +1,588. 
8 Share for rice only; share for soybeans is 1/10. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
Although shares were not re-
duced by equal amounts for all four 
strategies, SDRF rankings between 
strategies did not change from the 
base scenario. It is interesting, 
however, to compare the SSR re-
duced share strategies with those 
in the base scenario. The SSR 45 
percent and SSR 1/7 strategies gen-
erated roughly the same probabili-
ties of survival and success and 
average ending equity ratios, with 
average NPV and SDRF results 
favoring the SSR 1/7 strategy. The 
closeness of results does suggest, 
however, that the farm manager 
may be more or less indifferent 
between the two strategies. 
Landowner's Perspective 
The base analysis was conducted 
under the assumption the farm 
manager had a choice of four possi-
ble crop rotation-tenure arrange-
ment strategies and that the opti-
mal strategy could be implemented 
by the farm manager. In the case of 
the tenure arrangements, this as-
sumption implicitly assumes the 
landowner has no voice in the ten-
ure decision. In fact, tenure ar-
rangements are a result of negotia-
tion between tenant and landown-
er, with the landowner often dictat-
ing the rental terms. In most theo-
retical models, the landowner is 
assumed to make the tenure deci-
sion, choosing an arrangement 
that gives the farmer just enough to 
entice him/her to rent the land 
(Sutinen 1975; Cheung 1969). 
Based on theoretical research 
above, examining the four strate-
gies from the landowner's view-
point is also important. In this sec-
tion, the base results from the land-
owner's perspective are pre-
sented. 
As part of this sensitivity analy-
sis, several assumptions were 
made about the landowner. All 
acreage leased by the farm mana-
ger was assumed to be owned by 
one landowner. The landowner in-
herited the farm and in 1984 owned 
the land, worth $1,200/A, free of 
any debt. The landowner had an 
off-farm income of $40,000/year 
and used $30,000 to $45,000 of 
his/her on- and off-farm incomes 
for family living expenses. An 
after-tax discount rate of 7.32 
percent was used in NPV calcula-
tions. The landowner was 45 years 
old, married, with three children. 
Analysis results for the land-
owner are presented in Table 15. 
Probabilities of survival were 100 
percent for all four strategies, a 
result that was not surprising giv-
en the initial debt-free position of 
the landowner. 22 After-tax NPV fig-
ures were positive for all 50 itera-
tions of each strategy, because the 
capital gains rate for land (7.1 per-
cent) plus returns to land from 
farming exceeded the 7.32 percent 
discount rate. A graph of the NPV 
figures for all four strategies is giv-
en in Figure 4. 
Given the 100 percent probabili-
ties of survival and success, the 
major difference between strate-
gies was the amount by which each 
strategy exceeded the desired rate 
of return. The 1/2 share arrange-
ments offered an expected return 
to the landowner nearly double 
that offered by the 1/7 share ar-
rangements. The SR cropping 
strategies for each share arrange-
ment generated higher returns 
than the SSR rotation strategies for 
corresponding share arrange-
ments. 
In comparing tenant and land-
owner results, areas of both har-
mony and disagreement can be 
found. The best strategy for the 
tenant (SSR 1/7) was the worst for 
the landowner. The 1/7 strategies 
were preferred by the tenant, the 
1/2 strategies by the landowner. If 
tenant and landowner agreed to 
follow the 1/7 share arrangement, 
conflict would still arise over the 
best rotation. If both agree to fol-
low the 1/2 share arrangement, 
however, both would prefer the SR 
rotation. 
The 1/2 share arrangement is not 
always practical for some landown-
ers, since it requires substantial in-
volvement in the farming opera-
22When debt was increased to 50 per-
cent of assets (i.e., a 0.50 equity ratio) 
probability of survival remained 100 
percent. NPV results were lower, 
however, as returns were used to 
service debt. Rankings among strate-
gies did not change. 
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TABLE 15. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - BASE RESULTS FROM LANDOWNER'S PERSPECTIVE 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 100 100 100 100 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 100 100 100 100 
After-Tax Net 
Present Value($): 
Mean 419,538. 181,023. 484,670. 230,223. 
Standard Deviation 68,584. 31,145. 83,661. 32,046. 
Maximum 594,517. 257,754. 658,389. 300,275. 
Minimum 263,035. 109,097. 294,730. 152,585. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (All Iterations): 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Mean Yearly Government 
Payments($): 32,039. 9, 163. 44,871. 13,386. 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): 134,628. 73,432. 151,515. 86,714. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
tion. Nevertheless, about 50 per-
cent of the 1982 Texas share-
cropped rice acreage utilized the 
1/2 share arrangement (Griffin et 
al. 1984). Assuming these results 
hold in general for Texas rice farms, 
it appears that landowners in many 
cases make the final decision con-
cerning the type of share arrange-
ment used. This supports assump-
tions made in theoretical models of 
tenure arrangements. 
Effects of Technology 
Effects of current and potential 
technology are examined next. 
Three major technological issues 
were identified as particularly rele-
vant to Upper Gulf Coast farm 
managers: (1) increasing ratoon 
rice yields or quality, (2) the effect of 
Lemont, and (3) irrigating soy-
beans. 
Ratoon Rice 
In the base scenario, average ra-
toon rice yields increased 1 percent 
per year throughout the 5-year 
study period, resulting in a 32-lb 
increase in yields from 1984 to 
1988. The small annual rate of yield 
increase was based on the assump-
tion Lemont would have no effect 
28 
on ratoon rice yields. In this 
scenario, Lemont (or some other 
new technology) was assumed to 
have a significant impact on ratoon 
yields, with a yield increase of 200 
lb occurring from 1984 to 1988. 
Costs of production were assumed 
to remain the same as a result of the 
additional yield. Results are pre-
sented in Table 16. 
Although ratoon yields in-
creased 25 percent, the increase 
had almost no impact on the sen-
sitivity results. This outcome was 
partly because of the gradual phas-
ing in of the yield increases, the full 
benefits realized only in the last 
year of the study period. For the 
most part, however, the small 
change in results was because of 
the relatively small role ratoon rice 
had in the farming operation and 
the small profits generated from 
each acre of ratoon rice. For the 
representative farm, ratoon rice av-
eraged less than 8 percent of gross 
farm revenues under the SSR rota-
tion and less than 6 percent of 
revenues under the SR rotation. In 
addition,.pecause of the high costs 
of production, each acre of ratoon 
rice in 1984 generated an average 
net return above variable costs of 
less than $4/ A. Because of these 
factors, increasing ratoon rice 
yields had little impact on the re-
sults. 23 
A similar result was obtained in a 
sensitivity analysis involving ra-
toon rice quality. In the base 
scenario, ratoon rice was discount-
ed 7 percent below first crop rice 
because of quality factors. One 
might assume this price differential 
could be eliminated through 
varietal selection, improved man-
agement, better weed control, etc. 
In this sensitivity scenario, the 
price differential between first crop 
and ratoon rice was eliminated 
completely for all four strategies. 
As reported in Table 16, the change 
in quality had little impact on re-
sults. This result was because of 
the relatively small role ratoon rice 
played in the overall farm opera-
tion. 
Effect of Lemont 
In the base scenario, the Grant, 
Beach, and Lin (1984) rice 
econometric model accounted for 
the effect of Lemont on rice sup-
plies when generating mean rice 
prices. To test the price impact of 
widespread Lemont adoption, the 
simulation was repeated assuming 
that Lemont was not widely adopt-
ed in the South. The result indi-
cated a difference between the 
Lemont-influenced price and the 
price assuming no Lemont price 
effect, a difference that increased 
over time to a maximum level of 
$0.35/cwt in 1988. The increased 
difference between prices was 
caused by increased Lemont acre-
age in the South over time. 
Two scenarios were examined in 
connection with Lemont: (1) What 
was the effect of the negative price 
differential on base results? and 
(2) Given the positive increases in 
yields, increases in production 
costs, and the negative impact on 
prices, has development of Lemont 
made the farm manager better or 
23 An additional analysis was per-
formed with ratoon yields increasing 
450 lb over the base scenario. Little 
change occurred in the results, with 
probabilities of survival remaining 
unchanged for all four strategies. 
•' 
worse off? Results for these two 
analyses are found in Table 17. 
Elin1inating the negative price ef-
H::ct caused almost no change in the 
results. Probabilities of survival 
did not change for three strategies 
and probabilities of success 
changed by two percentage points 
or less for three strategies. 
Changes in NPV and ending equity 
ratio were also small for most strat-
egies. Two explanations account 
for this insensitivity. First, the price 
differential, although $0.35/cwt in 
1988, averaged less than $0.21/cwt 
for the entire 5-year study period. 
More importantly, however, reve-
nues lost as a result of the price 
effect were almost totally replaced 
by increased deficiency payments 
from the federal government. The 
price effect was most severe for the 
SR 1/7 strategy because this was the 
only strategy that sometimes 
reached the $100,000 government 
payment limitation imposed in the 
model. The other strategies never 
reached the payment limitation in 
any of the base simulation itera-
tions. 
In examining the scenario in 
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which Lemont was assumed to not 
have been developed, there is no 
doubt that farmers are better off 
with Lemont. Without Lemont, 
probabilities of survival declined as 
Figure 4. Net present values associated with each strategy-landowner's perspec-
tive. 
TABLE 16. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM - TECHNOLOGY CHANGES IN 
RATOON RICE PRODUCTION 
Increase Ratoon Yields lmQrove Ratoon Rice Qualit~ 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 50 82 72 78 50 82 70 78 
Change 
0 0 0 from Base: 0 0 0 -2 0 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 12 52 20 40 12 52 20 40 
Change 
from Base: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean NPV ($): -206,002. -20,567. -129,931. -47,695. -205.471. -20,291. -136.486. -48,377. 
Change from Base: +1, 165. +2,616. +2.710. +4,571. +1,696. +2,892. -3,845. +3,889. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.608 0.682 0.598 0.661 0.609 0.682 0.595 0.662 
Change 
from Base: +0.002 +0.003 +0.002 +0.002 +0.003 +0.003 -0.001 +0.003 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -25,778. 24,143. -3,117. 17,234. -25,509. 24.448. -4,707. 17,373. 
Change 
from Base: +180. +466. +342. +698. +449. +771. -1.248. +837. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
29 
TABLE 17. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM -EVALUATION 
OF LEMONT RICE VARIETY 
No Lemont Price Effect 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 52 82 72 78 34 
Change 
from Base: +2 0 0 0 -16 
Probability 
of Success (%): 12 54 22 52 8 
Change 
from Base: 0 +2 +2 +12 -4 
Mean NPV ($): -201,298. -17,725. -125.796. -34,674. -284.487. 
Change 
from Base: +5,869. +5.458. +6,845. + 17,592. -77,320. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.607 0.684 0.601 0.677 0.546 
Change 
from Base: +0.001 +0.005 +0.005 +0.018 -0.060 
Average Yearly 
Government Payments ($): 28,358. 44,999. 41,531. 53,335. 28,552. 
Change 
from Base: -1.462. -2.751. -2.422. -3,367. -1,268. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
much as 30 percentage points for 
the four strategies, with average 
after-tax NPV' s falling by over 
$160,000 for the two 117 share strat-
egies. The assumption that the 
farm manager was an above aver-
age manager was an important fac-
tor in this result. The farm manager 
adopted the Lemont variety more 
quickly than other farmers (100 
percent of all rice acreage in 1986 
for the manager, versus 40 percent 
for the South as a whole). Conse-
quently, he/she was able to benefit 
from the positive yield increases 
before the negative price effects 
were felt. Because the government 
commodity program shielded the 
manager from negative price ef-
fects, the farmer benefitted greatly 
from the development of Lemont. 
The results also illustrate the em-
phasis farmers should make on 
keeping abreast of and quickly 
adopting new technology in order 
to remain competitive in agricul-
ture. 
Irrigated Soybeans 
Uncertainty associated with tim-
ing and amount of rainfall is a 
serious problem for soybean pro-
ducers in the Upper Gulf Coast 
region. Irrigation is the principal 
method available to ensure ade-
quate supplies of water to the 
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plant, greatly reducing drought-
induced plant stress and associated 
lower crop yields. Despite availa-
bility of irrigation to reduce yield 
risk, few farm managers currently 
irrigate soybeans in the Upper Gulf 
Coast region. 
Three types of irrigation delivery 
systems could be used to irrigate 
soybeans. Field flushing, similar to 
flushing rice, allows levees to be 
left in the field but requires a preci-
sion-levelled field to ensure uni-
form water application. Furrow 
irrigation requires development of 
a system that delivers water to each 
furrow, requiring the elimination 
of levees. The third type of delivery 
system, sprinkler irrigation, does 
an excellent job of delivering water 
to the soybean crop, but requires 
an expensive capital investment 
and may not be feasible for rice 
irrigation. 
In this analysis, the potential for 
irrigated soybeans was examined 
for the representative farm. The 
representative farm was assumed 
precision-levelled; therefore, flush 
irrigation was the least cost ap-
proach. Water was assumed availa-
ble from the local canal company at 
a cost currently charged for flush-
ing rice fields ($8/A). Two irriga-
tions were used on the soybean 
crop, the first in late July and the 
Lemont Not Develo(2ed 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
52 44 42 
-30 -28 -36 
18 8 8 
-34 -12 -32 
-187,056. -240,223. -241,161. 
-163,873. -107,582. -188,895. 
0.625 0.552 0.544 
-0.054 -0.044 -0.115 
44,088. 40,652. 54,591. 
-3,662. -3,351. -2.111. 
second in August. Labor demands 
were increased accordingly in July 
and August. Non-water produc-
tion costs were increased by 
$6.32/A, mostly because of slightly 
higher fertilizer and harvesting 
costs. 
Yield distributions for irrigated 
soybeans were developed by Sij 
(1984). Plots of the distributions for 
irrigated soybeans following rice 
and non-irrigated soybeans follow-
ing rice are given in Figure 5. The 
distribution for irrigated soybeans 
was narrower, reflecting the ad-
vantage of irrigation in reducing 
yield variance. In addition, expect-
ed yield for irrigated soybeans fol-
lowing rice and irrigated soybeans 
following soybeans increased 
about 45 percent to 34 and 33.5 
bu/ A, respectively. 
Results for the irrigated soybean 
scenario are given in Table 18. All 
four strategies gained tremen-
dously from irrigating soybeans. 
Probabilities of survival exceeded 
86 percent for all strategies, with 
average NPV also positive in all 
four cases. The SSR 1/2 strategy 
benefitted most and the SR 1/2 
strategy least from soybean irriga-
tion. Soybean irrigation for the rep-
resentative farm definitely seem~ 
profitable, given the assumptions 
made about yields and production 
costs. The results also suggest 
another reason for the poor per-
formance of the SSR 1/2 share 
strategy in the base was its high 
dependence on soybeans to gener-
ate profits to keep the farm in busi-
ness. When soybeans became 
more profitable as a result of irriga-
tion, those strategies most depen-
dent on soybeans realized the 
greatest gain in survivability and 
NPV. In SDRF rankings, however, 
the SSR 1/7 strategy remained the 
prefered strategy for all but the 
combination risk preference 
classification, when the SSR 1/7 
and SR 1/7 were the co-preferred 
strategies. 
An important point is that the 
assumptions made in developing 
this scenario were based on a re-
searcher's expectations, not on 
field data or farmers' experiences. 
Whether mean yields can be great-
ly improved and yield variance re-
duced while minimizing cost in-
creases remains unknown. In par-
ticular, the cost of water is an im-
portant factor that must considered 
when evaluating soybean irriga-
tion. 24 The profitability of soybean 
irrigation as a means of partially 
paying for precision land levelling 
also remains questionable. There-
sults do suggest, however, that irri-
gation may substantially help soy-
bean farmers and that additional 
research could further quantify 
benefits and costs of irrigating soy-
beans. 
Yield and Price 
Sensitivity Analyses 
The major advantage in using a 
farm-level Monte-Carlo simulation 
model in agricultural economics re-
search is the ability to evaluate a 
farm operation in an environment 
of uncertainty. In RICESIM, for ex-
24When water costs for soybean irriga-
tion were increased to $30/A while 
maintaining the same yield distribu-
tion, probabilities of survival for each 
strategy were about the same as in the 
base analysis. Mean NPV figures, 
however, were approximately 
$40,000 above base results for each 
strategy. At higher water costs the 
farm manager's expected returns 
would still exceed that for non-
irrigated soybeans, but risk of farm 
insolvency would be greater. 
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Figure 5. Irrigated versus non-irrigated soybean yield distributions. 
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TABLE 18. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - IRRIGATING SOYBEANS 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (o/o): 86 94 88 92 
Change 
from Base: +36 +12 +16 +14 
Probab iIi ty 
of Success (o/o): 64 86 64 78 
Change 
from Base: +52 +34 +44 +38 
Mean NPV ($): 31,671. 195,076. 28,736. 114,892. 
Change 
from Base: +238,838. +218,259. +161,377. +167, 158. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.715 0.809 0.700 0.754 
Change 
from Base: +0.109 +0.130 +0.104 +0.095 
Mean Yearly Net 
Cash Farm Income ($): 34,245. 80,129. 37,809. 57,671. 
Change 
from Base: +60,203. +56,452. +41,268. +41, 135. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
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ample, uncertainty is introduced 
through crop prices and yields. Be-
cause uncertainty in yields and 
prices is a major advantage simula-
tion modelling has over budgeting 
and other less complicated ap-
proaches, sensitivity analyses 
should be performed on the pa-
rameters of the distributions used 
in generating the uncertain prices 
and yields. The sensitivity analyses 
provide some idea concerning ro-
bustness of the results (i.e., how 
much the results change when dif-
ferent parameters are changed) 
and how important higher or lower 
prices and yields are to farmers. In 
addition, changes in distribution 
parameters allow researchers and 
policy makers to evaluate the im-
plications to farm managers of in-
creasing or decreasing risk in 
prices and yields. 
As indicated in the section on 
model assumptions, the principal 
parameters used in generating the 
random variables were: (1) mean 
values for each random variable, 
(2) deviations used to develop an 
empirical distribution about each 
mean, and (3) a correlation matrix 
to introduce interaction between 
random variables. The focus of this 
section is on evaluation of the 
means and deviations used in the 
model. Sensitivity analysis on the 
values used in the correlation ma-
trix was not performed, although 
analyses relating to the assump-
tions of interaction between vari-
ables and the existance of empirical 
distributions are reported at the 
end of the section. 
Analyses of Mean 
Yields and Prices 
Changes in Soybean Yields 
Mean soybean yields were in-
creased and decreased by 10 per-
cent for each strategy, with the re-
sults summarized in Table 19. In-
creasing soybean yields caused av-
erage yearly cash farm income to 
increase by $14,000 or more for all 
strategies, with the largest gain as-
sociated with the SSR strategies. 
Average ending equity ratio for 
solvent iterations also increased 
significantly for all strategies. The 
SSR 1/2 strategy realized significant 
increases for all analysis variables, 
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underscoring the dependence of 
this strategy on soybeans. Perhaps 
most surprising, however, was the 
performance of the SR strategies. 
Both SR strategies had 50 percent 
less soybean acreage than the SSR 
strategies, yet improvement by the 
SR strategies over base results was 
only slightly less than improve-
ment by the SSR strategies. Im-
provement by the SR strategies, for 
example, in mean after-tax NPV 
was only about 15 percent less than 
improvement by the SSR strate-
gies. 
Decreasing soybean yields by 10 
percent generated changes in re-
sults almost exactly opposite the 
results for the 10 percent soybean 
yield increase. There was an inter-
esting difference, however, be-
tween the yield changes. When 
soybean yields increased 10 per-
cent, average NPV and yearly cash 
farm income figures for the 1/7 
share strategies increased more 
than corresponding 1/2 share strat-
egies for each rotation. When soy-
bean yield was decreased 10 per-
cent, however, the 1/2 share strate-
gies were hurt more than the 1/7 
share strategies. Thus, the 1/2 
share strategies require a good 
yield from soybeans just to meet 
overhead operating costs. 
Changes in Rice Yields 
First crop and ratoon crop yields 
were initially increased by 10 per-
cent and then decreased by 10 per-
cent to examine sensitivity of the 
base results to these changes. Re-
sults for both scenarios are report-
ed in Table 20. 
A large change in the results oc-
curred with changes in rice yields. 
Unlike the change in soybean 
yields, strategies with the most rice 
(i.e., SR 1/2 and SR 1/7) definitely 
outperformed their counterpart 
SSR strategies when rice yields 
were increased and fared worse 
when yield declined. In addition, 
decreasing rice yields 10 percent 
from the base generally had a larger 
absolute effect on the results than a 
10 percent increase in yields : 
Under the SSR 1/7 strategy, for ex-
ample, the absolute change in 
probability of survival resulting 
from a 10 percent rice yield de-
crease was three times that of the 
change when yield was increased. 
In part, the negative bias in results 
was generally caused by a good 
base position from which compari-
sons were made (i.e., probability of 
survival could only increase 18 per-
centage points, but could also de-
crease 82 percentage points). The 
farm manager's average tax pay-
ments more than tripled when rice 
yields were increased 10 percent, 
reducing the farm manager's after-
tax profit. 
An important point is that a 10 
percent decrease in base rice ap-
proximates average yields for Lib-
erty County. Probabilities of survi-
val were 60 percent or less for all 
four strategies at this yield level, 
suggesting that prospects are not 
favorable for farm manager survi-
val should they continue obtaining 
county average or less rice yields. 
Changes in Crop Prices 
In the final scenarios of this 
series, prices for all crops were 
alternately increased and de-
creased 10 percent from the base 
scenario. Results for both scenarios 
are given in Table 21 . As was the 
case with changes in mean yields, 
the absolute changes in analysis 
criteria were greater for the 10 per-
cent decrease in crop prices versus 
the 10 percent increase in prices. 
Reasons for the off-balanced re-
sults are favorable base position 
and changes in tax payments. 
Changing both soybean and rice 
prices in the same scenario would 
be expected to have a greater im-
pact than the yield scenarios, since 
changes in soybean yields were 
made holding rice yields constant 
and vice versa. This expectation 
generally did not hold true, how-
ever, for the SR rotation strategies. 
The 10 percent changes in rice 
yields had about the same impact 
on the SR strategy results as the 10 
percent change in rice and soybean 
prices. Recall the analyses dealing 
with the Lemont rice variety (see 
previous section on technology) to 
explain this result. The SR strate-
gies are more dependent on rice as 
the major source of farm revenue 
than are the SSR strategies. The 
government program for rice is de-
TABLE 19. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RIC!:: AND SOYBEAN FARM - CHANGES IN MEAN SOYBEAN YIELDS 
10% Increase in Yields 10% Decrease in Yields 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 58 86 78 - 84 36 74 58 74 
Change 
from Base: +8 +4 +6 +6 -14 -8 -14 -4 
Probability 
of Success (%): 26 62 34 58 8 34 8 32 
Change 
from Base: +14 +10 +14 +-18 -4 -18 -12 -8 
Mean NPV ($): - 145,110. 44,953. -77,865. 4,893. -273,746. -89,169. -193,166. -95,288. 
Change 
from Base: +62,057. +68, 136. +54,776. +57,159. -66,579. -65,986. -60,525. -43,022. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.650 0.716 0.631 0.690 0.543 0.638 0.559 0.608 
Change 
from Base: +0.046 +0.037 +0.035 +0.031 -0.063 -0.041 -0.037 -0.051 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -10,443. 40,580. 10,060. 31,339. -44,538. 7,243. -19,162. 2,440. 
Change 
from Base: +15,515. +16,903. +13,519. +14,803. -18,580. -16,434. -15,703. -14,096. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
TABLE 20. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM - CHANGES IN MEAN RICE YIELDS 
10% Increase in Yields 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 60 90 86 92 36 
Change 
from Base: +10 +8 +14 +14 -14 
Probability 
of Success (%): 26 68 44 72 8 
Change 
from Base: +14 +16 +24 +32 -4 
Mean NPV ($): -142,834. 95,479. -40,116. 105,098. -280,969. 
Change 
from Base: +64,333. +118,662. +92,525. +157,364. -73,802. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.644 0.745 0.639 0.750 0.550 
Change 
from Base: +0.038 +0.066 +0.043 +0.091 -0.056 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -6,671. 56,636. 21,235. 60,960. -48,233. 
Change 
from Base: +19,287. +32,959. +24,694. +44,424. -22,275. 
Mean Yearly 
Government Payments ($): 31,552. 49,169. 44,443. 57,749. 29,884. 
Change 
from Base: +1,732 +1,419. +440. +1,047. -64. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
signed to stabilize farm income by 
guaranteeing a price (subject to the 
payment limitation). As a result, 
changing the mean rice price 
caused changes in the government 
payments received by the farm 
manager, but usually had little im-
pact on per acre net farm revenues 
for rice. 
A Parting Analysis of Mean Results 
In most of the scenarios pre-
sented thus far, changes in vari-
ables have affected the farm opera-
tion primarily by causing changes 
in net farm income. It is not sur-
prising to learn that the level of net 
farm income is linked to farm survi-
val; this linkage is apparent to any 
farmer. It is not clear from the re-
sults, however, just how important 
on- and off-farm income is to survi-
val. How much, for example, can 
the farm manager improve his/her 
10% Decrease in Yields 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
58 42 44 
-24 -30 -34 
26 8 16 
-26 -12 -24 
-155,673. -244,440. -231,066. 
-132,490. -111,799. -178,800. 
0.641 0.561 0.582 
-0.038 -0.035 -0.077 
-12,305. -32,322. -33,011. 
-35,982. -28,863. -49,547. 
46,385. 43,010. 56,817. 
-1,365. -993. -115. 
probability of survival by increas-
ing average yearly cash farm in-
come by $1,000? 
In virtually all scenarios ana-
lyzed, the 1/7 share strategies (and 
in particular the SSR 1/7 strategy) 
have dominated as preferred strat-
egies, generating a second ques-
tion: Do the 1/2 share strategies 
inherently offer lower probabilities 
of survival, or is the poorer per-
formance of the 1/2 share strategies 
33 
TABLE 21. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM -CHANGES IN RICE AND 
SOYBEAN PRICES 
10% Increase in Prices 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 68 90 84 88 26 
Change 
from Base: +18 +8 +12 +10 -24 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 38 72 52 70 4 
Change 
from Base: +26 +20 +32 +30 -8 
Mean NPV ($): -99,014. 114,768. -29,968. 93.403. -316,011. 
Change 
from Base: +108,153. +137,951. + 102,673. +145,669. -108,844. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.661 0.771 0.663 0.759 0.526 
Change 
from Base: +0.055 +0.092 +0.067 +0.100 -0.080 
Mean Yearly 
Government Payments ($): 22,674. 36,162. 32.491. 42.409. 42,948. 
Change 
from Base: -7,146. -11,688. -11,512. -14,293. +13,128. 
Mean Yearl~ Net 
Cash Farm ncome ($): 2,773. 61,906. 24,608. 56,098. -53,315. 
Change 
from Base: +28.731. +38,229. +28,067. +39,562. -27,357. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
directly linked to net cash farm 
income? Would a farmer utilizing 
the SSR 1/2 strategy, for example, 
have the same probability of survi-
val as a farmer using the SSR 1/7 
strategy, if both strategies gener-
ated the same net cash farm in-
come? If not, how much does the 
1/2 share arrangement increase or 
decrease probability of survival 
when net cash farm income is the 
same across all strategies? 
The six scenarios dealing with 
changes in mean prices and yields 
provide a good data set for analysis 
because changes in each scenario 
had a direct effect on net cash farm 
income, while other factors of pro-
duction (e.g., variable costs, ma-
chinery complement, etc.) were 
constant. In addition to these six 
scenarios (with four observations 
each), the three scenarios (with 
two observations each) dealing 
with cash rent tenure arrange-
ments were added to the data set. 
Inclusion of the cash rent scenarios 
allowed examination of three dif-
ferent tenure arrangements (i.e., 
cash, 1/2 share, and 1/7 share). The 
base scenario (with four observa-
tions) was also added to the data 
set, increasing the data set to 34 
total observations. Variables used 
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in the regression were probability 
of survival, mean yearly net cash 
farm income for all 50 iterations, 
and class variables for the different 
rotations and tenure arrange-
ments. 
Analysis of covariance was used 
to test the hypothesis that intercept 
terms and slope coefficients were 
equal across rotations and rental 
arrangements. Standard regres-
sion procedures were used to esti-
mate the regression coefficients. 
The equation represents a two-way 
fixed effects analysis of covariance 
model with one covariate. Rotation 
and rental arrangement are the two 
class factors, with two and three 
levels respectively. Consistent with 
the analysis criteria suggested by 
Candler and Cartwright (1969), 
models for all possible variable 
combinations were estimated and 
the model that maximized R2 was 
selected as the best model to repre-
sent the data. 
A logit functional form was used 
in the regression estimation. The 
function estimated was as follows: 
10% Decrease in Prices 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
54 50 48 
-28 -22 -32 
20 8 14 
-32 -12 -26 
-169,806. -231.424. -208,186. 
-146,623. -98,783. -155,920. 
0.601 0.543 0.583 
-0.078 -0.053 -0.076 
66,608. 61,153. 78,681. 
+18,858. +17,150. +21,979. 
-13,956. -25,608. -23,070. 
-37,633. -22,149. +39,606. 
where Survivali=probability of 
survival for the 
ith strategy, 
"'=the maxim urn 
possible proba-
bility of survival 
(100), 
ai =intercept term 
for the ith 
strategy, 
l3i = slope coefficient 
on income for 
the ith strategy, 
exp = e x p o n e n t i a 1 
function e, and 
NETii =average yearly 
net cash farm in-
come for the ith 
strategy. 
The estimated ai and l3i values for 
the six sgategies are given in Table 
22. The R2 value was 0.976 for the 
empirical model. 
Several insights into the previ-
ous results can be gained from 
analysis of the model. The average 
net cash farm income variable had 
the same effect on survival, regard-
less of the crop rotation followed. 
When net cash farm income is zero, 
probability of survival is 2.0 to 2.4 
percentage points higher for the SR 
rotation. By this measure, the SSR 
TABLE 22. ESTIMATED PARAMETERS FOR SURVIVAL FUNCTION 
Strategy Parameter Std. Error 
SSR 1/2 
Intercept: -0.80026 0.0588* 
Slope Coefficient: -3.2928x 1 o·s 1.75x1o·s 
SSR 1/7 
Intercept: -0.65629 0.05519 
Slope Coefficient: -2.7353x1o·s 1.28x10"6 
SSR Cash 
Intercept: -0.46986 0.07887 
Slope Coefficient: -2. 7986x 1 o·s 1.94x10"6 
SR 1/2 
Intercept: -0.90231 0.05069 
Slope Coefficient: -3.2929x 1 o·s 1.75x1o·s 
SR 1/7 
Intercept: -0.75833 0.05307 
Slope Coefficient: -2.7353x10"5 1.28x 10"6 
SR Cash 
Intercept: -0.57190 0.07885 
Slope Coefficient: -2.7986x10·5 1.94x10"6 
* The standard errors are reported for the convenience of the reader. They 
should not be used to perform t-statistic tests of significance. 
is a riskier rotation. This result is 
not surprising, since soybeans (the 
dominant crop in the SSR rotation) 
are subject to both price and yield 
risk, whereas price risk for rice is 
largely eliminated by the govern-
ment program. 
When average yearly net cash 
farm income is equal to zero, the SR 
1/2 strategy has the highest proba-
bility of survival (71 percent) and 
the SSR cash strategy has the low-
est probability of survival (61.5 per-
cent). In general, the 1/2 share 
strategies have a three percentage 
point survival advantage over the 
1/7 share strategies, which, in turn, 
have a four percentage point ad-
vantage over the cash rent strate-
gies. The share rental strategies, 
then, do reduce risk to the farmer. 
They also reduce income, however, 
and the reduction in income is 
primarily responsible for the poor 
performance of the 1/2 share strate-
gies examined in the previous sen-
sitivity analyses. This result sug-
gests the need for a readjustment 
of traditional crop-share arrange-
ments to more accurately reflect 
current production and marketing 
conditions. 
The effect of average net cash 
farm income on survival differed 
with changes in rental arrange-
ments. Each additional $1,000 of 
income, at a zero income level, 
raises probability of survival from 
0.7 to 0.8 percentage points. To 
raise probability of survival by 1 
percentage point (again at the zero 
average income level) requires in-
come be increased by as little as 
$1,434 for the SSR 1/2 strategy to 
$1,697 for the SR strategy. In gener-
al, each dollar of additional income 
was most beneficial to the 1/2 share 
arrangements and least beneficial 
to the 1/7 share arrangements. 
When average yearly net cash farm 
income is $30,000, increasing prob-
ability of survival by 1 percentage 
point requires increasing income 
by from $2, 173 to $2,755 for the 
different strategies. At an average 
income of $-30,000, however, rais-
ing probability by 1 percentage 
point necessitates only $1,216 to 
$1,473 in additional income. In-
come is much more important to 
survival when at a very low level 
than at a very high level and is 
more important to the 1/2 share 
strategies than to the 1/7 and cash 
rent strategies. 
In all scenarios, the farm mana-
ger's spouse was assumed to earn 
$16,000/year in off-farm income. 
Off-farm income has the same 
value to the farm manager (in 
terms of survival) as on-farm in-
come, since both contribute to the 
total farm-family cash flow needs. 
The off-farm income raised proba-
bility of survival (assuming a zero 
on-farm income level) from 8.7 to 
10 percentage points. Similarly, by 
raising off-farm income to $30,000/ 
year (an increase of $14,000), prob-
ability of survival would be expect-
ed to improve by an additional 6.1 
to 6. 7 percentage points. The value 
of this off-farm income becomes 
even more valuable as net cash 
farm income becomes negative, be-
cause of the farm's sensitivity to 
additional income at negative in-
come levels. An off-farm income of 
about $90,000 to $122,000 is neces-
sary to ensure a 98 percent proba-
bility of survival. 25 The level of off-
farm income, then, is an important 
factor in farm survival, even for a 
relatively large farm such as the 
representative farm. 
Distribution Changes 
The scenarios in this section 
were analyzed to examine changes 
in probability density functions for 
crop yields and prices. For most 
scenarios, each change involved 
multiplying deviations of each em-
pirical distribution being examined 
by a scaler, or single number. Multi-
plying each distributional devia-
tion by the same number is equiva-
lent to changing the distribution 
variance by that same amount. 
In Figure 6, the base scenario 
yield distribution is given for rice 
following soybeans. Superim-
posed over this base distribution is 
25Because of the nature of the function-
al form used in the estimation proce-
dure, a 100 percent probability of 
survival cannot be achieved unless 
income is at a positive infinity. The 98 
percent survival level provides a 
good approximation of the income 
needed to obtain the 100 percent 
probability of survival. 
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Figure 6. Effect of increasing rice following soybean yield variability by 25 
percent. 
the same distribution, except each 
deviation from the mean is 25 per-
cent more than the associated devi-
ation in the base. Increasing the 
yield deviations 25 percent de-
creases the chance that a random 
yield will fall within 20 percent of 
the mean and increases the chance 
that a random yield will be above or 
below 20 percent of the mean. In 
addition, high and low extremes 
not attainable in the base are possi-
ble with the modified distribution, 
although the chance of a random 
yield falling in these extreme areas 
is small (less than 4 percent). 
In essence, increasing the dis-
tribution variance increases the po-
tential for the farm manager to at-
tain high yields (and high returns 
per acre), while also increasing the 
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potential for low yields (and poten-
tially serious financial trouble). In-
creasing variance is generally con-
sidered undesirable, since most in-
dividuals are assumed averse to 
risk, choosing not to risk the poten-
tial for lower incomes, even if the 
potential for high incomes is also 
increased (Barry 1984). The pur-
poses of these scenarios are 
twofold: (1) To determine how sen-
sitive the results are to the price 
and yield distributions, and (2) to 
determine whether the farm mana-
ger is better or worse off when yield 
and price variances are increased 
or decreased. 
Changes in Rice Yield Distributions 
In the first set of distribution 
sensitivity scenarios, the influence 
of the variance parameters was ex-
amined for the rice yield distribu-
tions. Variance was alternately in-
creased and decreased by 25 per-
cent for both first crop and ratoon 
rice yields. Figure 6 illustrates the 
effect of a 25 percent increase in 
yield variance for the rice following 
soybeans distribution. Results for 
each strategy for the two scenarios 
are presented in Table 23. 
Increasing variance in rice yields 
generally caused probabilities of 
survival and success and NPV to 
decline for the farm manager. The 
SR rotation strategies suffered 
most from the increase in variance, 
with probabilities of survival fall-
ing by 8 and 10 percentage points 
for the 1/2 and 1/7 share arrange-
ments, respectively The SSR 1/2 
strategy showed almost no re-
sponse to the increase in variance 
because rice is least important to 
this strategy of the four strategies 
examined and because yield risk is 
shared with the landowner. The 
change in analysis variables was 
caused by a fall in net cash farm 
income. Rice yield distributions, 
although exhibiting a higher 
variance in the base analysis, had 
the same mean yields as in the 
base. Expected total revenue is a 
function of the price and yield 
means multiplied, plus the 
covariance between prices and 
yields. 26 Increasing yield variance 
increased yield-price covariance. 
Because covariance was negative, 
the net effect of increasing yield 
variance was to reduce expected 
gross revenue. 
A 25 percent decrease in 
variance had a favorable effect on 
all four strategies. The results for 
decreasing variance, however, 
were not the inverse of the results 
that were generated when yield 
variance was increased. The 1/7 
share strategies benefitted most 
from the decrease in variance, with 
changes in probabilities of survival 
and success both being twice those 
of the corresponding 1/2 share 
strategies. Mean ending equity 
ratios rose for all four strategies. In 
2tYrhis result is demonstrated for nor-
mal distributions by Mood, Graybill, 
and Boes (1974). 
TABLE 23. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM - CHANGES IN RICE YIELD 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
25% Increase in Variance 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 50 80 64 68 54 
Change 
from Base: 0 -2 -8 -10 +2 
Probability 
of Success (%): 12 50 20 34 12 
Change 
from Base: 0 -2 0 -6 0 
Mean NPV ($): -212,640. -37,105. -156,255. -90,259. -190,167. 
Change 
from Base: -5,473. -13,922. -23,614. -37,993. +17,000. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.602 0.672 0.590 0.647 0.618 
Change 
from Base: -0.004 -0.007 -0.006 -0.012 +0.012 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -29,496. 18,033. -11,405. 1,988. -21,675. 
Change 
from Base: -3,538. -5,677. -7,946. -14,548. +4,283. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
summary, farmers would prefer to 
reduce yield variance because ex-
pected returns and probabilities of 
survival are increased. 
Changes in Soybean Yield Distribu-
tions 
The scenarios examined for rice 
yield distributions were also ex-
amined for soybean yields. Results 
for soybean scenarios are given in 
Table 24. Increasing soybean yield 
variance had a different effect on 
the four strategies than the same 
percentage increase in rice yield 
variance. Although an increase in 
variance caused probabilities of 
survival to fall for both soybeans 
and rice, probabilities of success 
and average after-tax NPV rose for 
soybeans. The reason for the dif-
ference in results between the two 
crops was the farm manager's use 
of crop insurance for soybeans. 
When rice yield variance was in-
creased 25 percent, the manager 
had no protection from increased 
incidence of low crop yields. As a 
result, increases in rice yield 
variance were more harmful than 
beneficial. When soybean yield 
variance increased 25 percent, 
however, the crop insurance-
guaranteed minimum yield level 
was assumed to remain in place. 
The manager was able to achieve 
high yields more often without 
realizing the effects of increased 
incidence of lower yields. The net 
effect of increasing the variance 
was to increase expected mean 
yield, the guaranteed minimum 
yield being substituted into the 
mean yield calculation when yields 
fell below the minimum. Despite 
the increases in NPV, the small 
decreases in probability of survival 
suggest crop insurance does not 
provide 100 percent protection 
from increased incidence of very 
low soybean yields. When compar-
ing the soybean results with those 
for rice, however, one can conclude 
that crop insurance for soybeans is 
beneficial to the farm manager. 
A decrease in soybean yield dis-
tribution variance also generated 
some surprising results. Probabili-
ties of survival increased for three 
of the farm strategies, but probabil-
ities of success actually fell for the 
SSR strategies. NPV increased for 
the SSR 1/7 strategy but the abso-
lute increase was much smaller 
than when variance was increased. 
NPV for the SSR 1/2 strategy actual-
ly fell when variance was reduced. 
Average ending equity ratios fell 
for all strategies, as did mean year-
ly cash farm income. Unlike the 
changes in variance for rice yields, 
changes in soybean yield variance 
25% Decrease in Variance 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
86 76 86 
+4 +4 +8 
54 26 56 
+2 +6 +16 
-687. -115,991. -24,837. 
+22,496. +16,650. +27,429. 
0.685 0.594 0.659 
+0.006 -0.002 0.000 
29,509. 1,392. 25,247. 
+5,832. +4,851. +8,711. 
did not result in clear-cut recom-
mendations. If the farm manager is 
risk preferring, he/she would pre-
fer an increase in yield variance; if 
risk averse, a reduction in variance 
would be preferred. 
Changes in Crop Price Distributions 
Variances for soybean and rice 
prices were alternately increased 
and decreased by 25 percent, in 
line with the sensitivity analyses 
for the yield distributions. Results 
for these two scenarios are given in 
Table 25. The changes in the analy-
sis variables were greater in these 
scenarios than in the previous 
scenarios that dealt with soybean 
yield distributions. The changes 
were less pronounced, however, 
than those occurring for changes in 
the rice yield distributions. Results 
from the price distribution changes 
were also inversely related to rice 
yield distribution results. As with 
soybean yield variance, the pro-
ducer is generally better off with 
increased price variance because of 
the guaranteed minimum return 
for both rice and soybeans. In this 
case, the guarantee is in the form of 
the government loan and target 
price program. The results also 
support theoretical work done in 
the area of agricultural policy, sug-
gesting producers are better off 
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TABLE 24. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM - CHANGES IN SOYBEAN 
YIELD DISTRIBUTIONS 
25% Increase in Variance 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 48 82 66 78 52 
Change 
from Base: -2 0 -6 0 +2 
Probability 
of Success (%): 14 52 24 44 10 
Change 
from Base: +2 0 +4 +4 -2 
Mean NPV ($): -203,396. -12,665. -132,000. -45,878. -208,199. 
Change 
from Base: +3,771. +10,518. +183. +6,388. -1,032. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.628 0.693 0.616 0.670 0.578 
Change 
from Base: +0.022 +0.014 +0.020 +0.0 11 -0.028 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -25,506. 26,843. -2,881. 18,819. -26.400. 
Change 
from Base: +452. +3, 166. +578. +2,283. -442. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
with fluctuating demand for their 
crop (hence fluctuating price) and 
stable production (Tweeten 1979). 
The demand side is represented in 
the model by crop prices, the sup-
ply side by crop yields. The results 
provide further validation of the 
model as an analysis tool, since 
they conform with accepted 
economic theory. In summary, all 
farmers of the type represented in 
the study would prefer more price 
variance, since the government 
provides protection from the nega-
tive effects of price variance. 27 
Alternative Types of Distributions 
The scenarios examined in this 
section have dealt with changes in 
the variance of empirical distribu-
tions used in the base analysis. The 
base assumption that random 
prices and yields can best be de-
scribed with multivariate empirical 
distributions has not yet been ex-
amined. Many different types of 
distributions can be employed to 
describe the behavior of random 
variables, each distribution pos-
27This result ignores the effect of price 
risk on marketing margins. As Grant 
et al. (1984) have demonstrated, in-
creased price risk increases market-
ing margins, with most of the in-
creased margin passed to farm mana-
gers. 
38 
sessing a particular set of prop-
erties. Researchers attempt to 
select the distributional form to 
most closely depict the actual situa-
tion. In this study, the choice of 
multivariate empirical distribu-
tions was made based on several 
beliefs, including (1) prices and 
yields were correlated with one 
another within a year (i.e., a good 
rice yield likely occurred simul-
taneously with a good soybean 
yield), (2) farmers and agricultural 
experts could make subjective esti-
mates of yield variance that were 
more accurate than information 
available from historical or experi-
mental sources, (3) historical be-
havior of prices provided the best 
source for predicting future price 
behavior, and (4) the multivariate 
empirical distribution best de-
scribed the behavior of the subjec-
tive and historical data. 
The normal distribution is the 
most commonly used to describe 
random events in research. It re-
quires knowledge of only two pa-
rameters (mean and variance), is 
easily understood, highly useable, 
and has been used in many set-
tings, including distribution esti 
mations for test scores, diameter of 
a hole made by a drill press, and 
the length of a newborn baby 
(Hogg and Craig 1978). As Day 
25% Decrease in Variance 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
84 74 78 
+2 +2 0 
50 20 42 
-2 0 +2 
-19,205. -131,245. -47,207. 
+3,978. +1,396. +5,059. 
0.666 0.584 0.656 
-0.013 -0.012 -0.003 
23,196. -3.465. 16,378. 
-481. -6. -158. 
(1965) has shown, however, the 
normal distribution may not accu-
rately represent some random vari-
ables, such as crop yields. The use 
of the normal distribution, in both 
independent and multivariate situ-
ations, nevertheless, is common in 
simulation modelling (Pederson 
1984; King 1979). 
Two scenarios were examined to 
determine the influence of dis-
tribution choice on the study re-
sults. In the first scenario, empiri-
cal distributions were used, but 
were assumed independent (i.e., 
not multivariate). The assumption 
of independence means any ran-
dom price. or yield had no influence 
on any other random price or yield. 
Results for this scenario are in Table 
26.Thechangetoindependentem-
pirical distributions did not cause a 
large change in results, but did 
have some impact. The results also 
varied from strategy to strategy. 
Probabilities of survival rose and 
the probabilities of success fell for 
the SSR 1/2 and SR 1/7 strategies, 
suggesting risk increased in the 
absence of covariance. The oppo-
site results occurred for the SSR 1/7 
and SR 1/2 strategies. The SSR 1/2 
and SR 1/7 represent extreme strat-
egies in the study; the SSR 1/2 is the 
strategy most dependent on soy-
beans, the SR 1/7 is the strategy 
TABLE 25. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM -CHANGES IN RICE 
AND SOYBEAN PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS 
25% Increase in Variance 25% Decrease in Variance 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SA 1/2 SA 1/7 SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SA 1/2 SA 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 52 82 72 82 46 80 70 78 
Change 
from Base: +2 0 0 +4 -4 -2 -2 0 
Probability 
of Success (%): 16 58 30 58 10 46 16 38 
Change 
from Base: +4 +6 +10 +18 -2 -6 -4 -2 
Mean NPV ($): -190,039. 5,819. -112,865. -11,651. -230,251. -55,676. -151,707. -71,769. 
Change 
-23,084. from Base: +17,128. +29,002. +19,776. +40,615. -32.493. -16,934. -19,503. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.626 0.700 0.623 0.'678 0.580 0.653 0.576 0.646 
Change 
from Base: +0.020 +0.021 +0.027 -0.022 -0.026 -0.026 -0.020 -0.013 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -22.419. 32,567. 2,595. 27.417. -32,208. 14,715. -8,070. 11.250. 
Change 
+6,054 . . from Base: +3,539. +8,890. +10,881. -6,250. -8,962. -4,611. -5,286. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
TABLE 26. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM - CHANGES IN TYPE OF 
DISTRIBUTION USED 
lnde~endent Em~irical 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SA 1/2 SA 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 48 90 76 72 88 
Change 
from Base: -2 +8 +4 -6 +38 
Probability 
of Success (%): 12 46 20 46 18 
Change 
from Base: 0 -6 0 +6 +6 
Mean NPV ($): -200,620. -10,977. -126,221. -46,884. -90,539. 
Change 
from Base: -6,547. + 12.206. +6,420. +5,382. +116,628. 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (Solvent Iterations): 0.545 0.627 0.577 0.660 0.561 
Change 
from Base: -0.061 -0.052 -0.019 +0.001 -0.045 
Mean Yearly 
Government Payments ($): 30,935. 46,861. 43,125. 58,383. 35,268. 
Change 
from Base: +1,115. -889. -878. +1,681. +5,448. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
most dependent on rice. High de-
pendence on a particular crop 
causes correlation between prices 
and yields to have the most impact 
of all the correlation values. In both 
cases, price and yield correlations 
are negative, providing a stabiliz-
ing influence on net farm income 
for those strategies. When yields 
for soybeans were up, for example, 
prices were down, and vice versa. 
When correlation was assumed to 
be nonexistent, returns became 
more variable and risk increased. 
The SSR 1/7 and SR 1/2 strategies 
were more evenly dependent on 
both crops, causing correlation be-
tween yields to become more im-
portant. Because yields were posi-
tively correlated, imposing the 
assumption of independence 
between distributions increased 
the probability that low yields for 
one crop could occur at the same 
lnde~endent Normal 
SSR 1/7 SA 1/2 SA 1/7 
100 100 98 
+18 +28 +20 
84 46 76 
+32 +26 +36 
112,028. -20,069. 101,096. 
+135,211. +112,572. +153,362. 
0.703 0.591 0.696 
+0.024 -0.005 +0.037 
54,107. 49,237. 63,908. 
+6,357. +5,234. +7,206. 
time high yields occurred for the 
other crop. In other words, the 
assumed positive correlation be-
tween crop yields increased the 
volatility of net cash farm income, 
thereby increasing risk for the farm 
manager. 
The results have several implica-
tions. First, researchers need to 
consider multivariance when de-
veloping yield and price distribu-
tions. Second, farmers need to 
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understand that correlation exists 
between different crops both for 
yields and prices. A knowledge of 
correlation can help the farm 
manager identify a cropping plan 
that is optimal in reducing income 
risk and enhancing survival. 
In the second scenario, indepen-
dence between variables was also 
assumed, but the normal distribu-
tion was used instead of the empir-
ical distribution. Results for this 
scenario are reported in Table 26. 
The use of independent normal 
distributions had a large positive 
impact on results for all strategies 
examined. Probabilities of survival 
were 88 percent or greater for the 
four strategies, and actually 
reached 100 percent for the SSR 1/7 
and SR 1/2 strategies. Although the 
117 share strategies realized the 
greatest gains in NPV and probabil-
ity of economic success, the analy-
sis variables for the 1/2 share strate-
gies also showed marked gains. A 
large increase was also observed 
for government payments. 
The reason for marked improve-
ment in all strategies was the 
skewedness present in most of the 
base analysis empirical distribu-
tions. Although the possibility of 
very high prices and yields was 
present, most of the weight (or 
probability of occurrence) of the 
distribution was below the mean. 
By design, the normal distribution 
places an equal amount of weight 
on both sides of the distribution, 
hence its bell-type shape. The re-
sults illustrate the influence of the 
distribution type on results ob-
tained from simulation models. An 
erroneous choice can cause results 
that are too optimistic or pessi-
mistic. 
Financial, Interest, and Inflation 
Sensitivity Scenarios 
An important component in a 
farming operation is the amount 
and type of debt held by the farm 
manager. Debt has become a com-
mon means to finance farm 
growth, replacement of machinery, 
and day to day farm operations. 
During the 1960's and 1970's, farm-
ers converted many of their short-
term assets into assets of a more 
long-term nature (Boehlje and Eid-
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man 1983), leaving themselves fi-
nancially exposed to liquidity and 
cash flow problems. The recent fi-
nancial problems of many U.S. 
farmers are indicative of the effect 
debt can have on farm survival 
(Knutson and Richardson 1984). 
Because debt is such an impor-
tant factor, results for the repre-
sentative farm were undoubtedly 
influenced by the financial as-
sumptions made in the base 
scenario. It is not clear from the 
results, however, what effect 
changes in the farm's financial 
position would have on analysis 
variables. For example, how much 
equity must initially be held by the 
farm manager to ensure survival 
for the next 5 years? Also, what 
effect does a lender's credit policy 
have on the viability of a farming 
operation? Examining other finan-
cial positions also broadens the ap-
plicability of results, facilitating 
comparisons between the repre-
sentative farm and actual farms in 
the study area. 
In the base scenario, several as-
sumptions were made concerning 
the behavior of the U.S. economy 
during the 1984-88 period, particu-
larly in regard to future interest 
and inflation rates. While care was 
taken to obtain the best estimates 
of what these variables will be, 
they are, nonetheless, estimates. It 
is useful, then, to examine how 
sensitive the results for the repre-
sentative farm are to these interest 
and inflation rates. In this part of 
the sensitivity analyses, some of 
the assumptions dealing with mac-
roeconomic and financial variables 
are examined. 
Beginning Equity and 
Credit Rationing Effects 
A sequence of bad income years 
may force highly leveraged farm 
managers to seek additional capital 
or liquidate their farm holdings. 
Although wanting to assist a farm-
er in a weak financial position, 
lenders may believe the risks inher-
ent with such loans are too great. 
When refinancing is refused and 
insolvency occurs, credit policy of 
the financial institution involved 
frequently becomes the farmer's 
scapegoat. It is often unclear, how-
ever, if the decision to withhold 
credit prematurely forced the farm 
manager out of business or saved 
him from losing additional equity. 
In the RICESIM model, credit 
policy is represented as the mini-
mum equity required to maintain 
solvency. The farm manager is con-
sidered . to have survived in each 
iteration that equity remains above 
the minimum level each year. The 
minimum required equity level 
chosen, then, would be expected to 
have a significant influence on the. 
results. The initial equity with 
which the farm manager begins the 
5-year period would also be expect-
ed to have significant influence on 
results. Several questions can be 
raised about both variables. When 
is a producer 's beginning equity 
position important and when does 
it have no effect on the survivability 
of the farm? When is a lender 's 
credit policy important? When is a 
lender's credit policy more impor-
tant than a producer's beginning 
equity level, and vice versa? How 
does the importance of equity and 
credit policy differ between tenant 
and a farm manager who owns part 
of his/her farm? In this section, 
these and other related questions 
are examined. 
Six different beginning equity 
levels were examined for the 100 
percent tenant operation assumed 
in the base scenario, one level of 
which was that assumed in the 
base. The same equity ratios were 
also used to examine a 50 percent 
owned-50 percent leased farm. 
That is, even though the dollar 
value of assets owned by the part-
owner was much greater than for 
the tenant, the ratio of owned as-
sets to total assets was the same for 
part-owner and tenant at each 
equity level. Description of the six 
beginning equity positions for ten-
ant and part-owner are presented 
in Tables 27 and 28, respectively, 
along with the after-tax discount 
rates used for each position. 
Six different lender's credit ra-
tioning policies were also iden-
tified for analysis, one of which 
was used in the base scenario (i.e., 
a leverage ratio of 2.0). The remain-
ing five credit policies represented 
both tighter and less restrictive 
levels than the base level. The six 
policies examined were leverage 
ratios (equity ratios) of 1.0 (0.50), 
1.5 (0.40), 2.5 (0.286), 3.0 (0.25), 
and 4.0 (0.20). All six beginning 
equity levels were examined for 
each credit policy, making a total of 
36 different beginning equity-
credit policy scenarios for each 
strategy. Because the number of 
scenarios was so large, only the 
SSR 1/7 strategy was examined in 
the analyses. Results are reported 
by each analysis criterion. 
Farm Survival 
Probabilities of survival for the 
tenant at each combination of be-
ginning equity and credit policy 
examined in the study are indi-
cated in Table 29. Survival was 
above 90 percent at all credit policy 
levels, when initial equity posi-
tions were 90 percent and above. 
Survival was also above 90 percent 
for all but one of the 0. 75 beginning 
equity ratio positions. Conversely, 
at a 0.25 beginning equity ratio 
position, probability of survival for 
all credit policies was less than 20 
percent. 
Credit policy had little impact on 
survival of the tenant when begin-
ning equity ratios were 0. 75 or 
more. Credit policy also had little 
effect on tenant survival at a 0.25 
equity ratio, with farm liquidation 
occurring over 80 percent of the 
time even at a 4.0 leverage ratio 
credit policy. Only at intermediate 
equity levels did credit policy play 
a significant role in farm survival. 
At 60 percent initial equity, a four-
fold increase in the maximum per-
mitted leverage ratio (from 1.0 to 
4.0) caused survivability to in-
crease from 26 to 92 percent. 
Higher probabilities of survival 
occurred at lower beginning equity 
levels for the part-owner versus the 
tenant farmer (Table 29). Survival 
was 100 percent for all but one of 
the 0.60 beginning equity ratio 
scenarios, and was 100 percent for 
all part-owner equity ratios above 
0.60. As with the wholly-leased 
farm, the part-owner had little 
chance of survival at low beginning 
equity levels. The probabilities of 
survival at a 0.25 beginning equity 
TABLE 27. FINANCIAL POSITIONS AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE 
TENANT RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM IN LIBERTY COUNTY, TEXAS 
Initial Farm Equity Positions 
0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.0 
Total On-Farm Assets: 
Intermediate ($) 570,200 570,200 570,200 570,200 570,200 570,200 
Long-Term ($) 167,000 167,000 167,000 167,000 167,000 167,000 
Intermediate-Term Debt: 
Debt($) 421,948 332,937 226,081 134,536 53,848 0 
Leverage Ratio 2.85 1.40 0.67 0.31 0.10 0.00 
Equity Ratio 0.26 0.42 0.60 0.76 0.91 1.00 
Long-Term Debt: 
Debt ($) 130,928 109,385 66,800 49,766 19,873 0 
Leverage Ratio 3.63 1.90 0.67 0.42 0.14 0.00 
Equity Ratio 0.22 0.35 0.60 0.70 0.88 1.00 
Overall Debt: 
Debt($) 552,876 442,322 292,881 184,302 73,721 0 
Leverage Ratio 3.00 1.50 0.67 0.33 0.11 0.00 
Equity Ratio 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.00 
Discount Rate• (%): 10.96 10.60 10.18 9.62 9.08 8.69 
"The discount rate represents the after-tax rate of return that could be earned if the 
farmer were to invest his equity and borrowed capital in an off-farm investment with a 
pre-tax return of 10.97 percent. 
ratio the tenant exceeded or were 
equal to the probabilities of survi-
val for the part-owner. An impor-
tant assumption influencing this 
result is the capital gain rate on 
land. 28 To perform sensitivity anal-
ysis on the relative effects of credit 
and beginning equity on farm sur-
vival, data in Table 29 were used to 
estimate survivability equations for 
the tenant and part-owner farm 
scenarios. The estimated equations 
are: 
ST= -7.637 + 2.7974BE- 0.0159BE2 
(19.207) (0.4640) (0.0032) 
-2.0049ME+ .0168BE·ME 
(0.4736) (0.0067) 
28When the capital gain rate for land 
becomes smaller, beginning equity 
becomes more important to the part-
owner. When the capital gain rate is 
small, and especially when it is nega-
tive, the tenant operation offers a 
higher probability of survival, even at 
intermediate debt levels. For more 
information on the effect of the land 
capital gain rate, see Perry et al. 
(1985). 
for O::sBE::s100 and 
Sp= -48.740 + 5.4017BE- 0.0423BE2 
(42.8) (1.405) (.0126) 
- 2.4310ME + 0.0256BE·ME 
(0. 9694) (0.0183) 
for O::sBE::s75, 
where ST is the probability of survi-
val for the tenant, Sp is the proba-
bility of survival for the part-
owner, BE is initial equity ratio 
(times 100), and ME is the mini-
mum equity ratio (times 100) re-
quired by financial institutions 
(i.e., lender's credit policy). The 
values in parentheses indicate 
standard errors for the cogespond-
ing coefficients. 29 The R2 values 
were 0.930 and 0.861 for the tenant 
and part-owner, respectively. The 
90 and 100 percent equity level data 
were not used in the equation es-
timated for the part-owner because 
29The standard errors cannot be used in 
tests of significance because RICES 1M 
results are not stochastic in the classi-
cal sense (Skees et al. 1985). 
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no variation in survivability oc-
curred between these higher equi-
ty levels and the 75 percent equity 
level. 
For the tenant, a 1 percentage 
point increase in minimum re-
quired equity (e.g., changing ME 
from 33 to 34 percent) decreases 
the probability of survival by 
(-2.0049 + 0.0168BE) percentage 
points. When BE is 25 percent, for 
example, the decrease in survival is 
1.58 percentage points. At a begin-
ning equity level of 75 percent, 
however, the 1 percentage point 
change in ME causes probability of 
survival to decrease by 0.74 per-
centage points. On the average, 
changes in credit policy have a 
greater effect at low levels versus 
high equity levels. The results indi-
cate that a tenant farm manager in a 
weak financial position is more 
sensitive to a lender's credit policy 
than a manager in a good financial 
position. A 1 percentage point in-
crease in ME for the part-owner, 
evaluated at a BE value of 25 per-
cent, decreases survivability by 
1.79 percentage points. When eval-
uated at a BE value of 75 percent, 
however, a 1 percentage point in-
crease in ME decreases survivabili-
ty by 0.51 percentage points. When 
beginning equity is low, the part-
owner is more sensitive to credit 
policy than the tenant, but at high 
beginning equity levels the reverse 
is true. 
A 1 percentage point increase in 
beginning equity, evaluated at a 
beginning equity level of 25 per-
cent (and a minimum equity of 33 
percent) causes survivability to in-
crease by 2.56 percentage points 
for the tenant and 4.13 percentage 
points for the part-owner. When 
beginning equity is 60 percent, an 
increase in equity to 61 percent 
increases the probability of survi-
val for the tenant by 1.44 percent-
age points, while raising the proba-
bility of survival for the part-owner 
by only 1.17 percentage points. 
Several conclusions can be made 
from these results: (1) Beginning 
equity is more important for survi-
val to the low-equity-level part-
owner, but is more important to the 
tenant at moderate to high equity 
levels (above 55 percent), (2) begin-
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TABLE 28. FINANCIAL POSITIONS AND DISCOUNT RATES FOR A REPRESENTATIVE 
PART-OWNER RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM IN LIBERTY COUNTY, TEXAS 
Initial Farm Equity Positions 
0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.0 
Total On-Farm Assets: 
Intermediate ($) 570,200 570,200 570,200 570,200 570,200 570,200 
Long-Term ($) 1,547,000 1,547,000 1,547,000 1,547,000 1,547,000 1,547,000 
Intermediate-Term Debt: 
Debt ($) 421,948 332,937 226,081 134,536 53,848 0 
Leverage Ratio 2.85 1.40 0.67 0.31 0.10 0.00 
Equity Ratio 0.26 0.42 0.60 0.76 0.91 1.00 
Long-Term Debt: 
Debt($) 1,166.438 937.482 528.455 394.485 157,794 0 
Leverage Ratio 3.06 1.54 0.67 0.34 0.11 0.00 
Equity Ratio 0.246 0.394 0.60 0.745 0.898 1.00 
Overall Debt: 
Debt($) 1,588,386 1,270.419 754,536 529,021 211,642 0 
Leverage Ratio 3.00 1.50 0.67 0.33 0.11 0.00 
Equity Ratio 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.00 
Discount Rate• (%): 10.67 10.10 9.25 8.60 7.93 7.49 
"The discount rate represents the after-tax rate of return that could be earned if the farmer 
were to invest his equity and borrowed capital in an off-farm investment with a pre-tax 
return of 10.97 percent. 
ning equity has a greater influence 
on farm survival credit policy 
when equity levels are low, and 
(3) at all levels of beginning equity 
and minimum required equity, the 
effect of a 1 percentage point 
change in beginning equity is 
greater than the effect of a 1 per-
centage point change in credit 
policy. 
Ending Equity Position 
From the survivability results 
presented, it appears both tenant 
and part-owner farmers in the in-
termediate debt range (i.e., 0.40 to 
0.60 equity ratios) are particularly 
sensitive to credit policy. If the 
lender relaxes credit policy, the 
farmer has a greater chance of still 
being in operation at the end of 
1988. Survivability statistics do not, 
however, provide an indication as 
to where the farmer will be finan-
cially at the end of the 5-year period 
for different credit policy levels. 
The surviving farm manager could -
be either on the brink of bankrupt-
cy in 1988 or free of any debt. 
Survivability results also do not 
provide insight into whether tight-
er credit policies tend to prema-
turely force operations into insol-
vency. A prematurely insolvent op-
eration is one that would be forced 
out of business at an initial credit 
policy but, when given additional 
credit, is able to recover from its 
precarious financial position. In 
this study, farms forced out prema-
turely are those whose leverage 
ratios rise above the cutoff level for 
credit in 1 year (causing farm liqui-
dation), but survive under a more 
liberal credit policy and finish the 
5-year period with a lower leverage 
ratio than at which they were pre-
viously forced out of business. 
Ending equity ratios for the 
scenarios sensitive to credit policy 
are summarized in Table 30 for a 
credit policy with a maximum 
leverage ratio of 4.0. The 4.0 lever-
age ratio was used because it was 
the least restrictive, allowing large 
losses in equity before forcing the 
manager out of business. 30 At a 
30Results for other credit policies were 
not reported because they would be 
much the same as those reported for 
the 4.0 leverage ratio. The major dif-
TABLE 29. PROBABILITY OF SURVIVAL• FOR A REPRESENTATIVE TEXAS RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM WITH DIFFERENT BEGINNING 
EQUITY POSITIONS AND CREDIT RATIONING POLICIES 
Initial Farm Equity Positions 
Credit Rationing ------------------ -------Tenant--------------------------- ------------------------Part -Owner---------------------
Policiesb 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.0 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.p 
1.0 0 0 26 78 96 100 0 0 74 100 100 100 
1.5 0 2 58 92 100 100 0 4 100 100 100 100 
2.0 2 20 82 96 100 100 0 42 100 100 100 100 
2.5 8 36 86 98 100 100 0 70 100 100 100 100 
3.0 6 40 88 98 100 100 2 84 100 100 100 100 
4.0 18 54 92 98 100 100 16 92 100 100 100 100 
•Probab i lity of survival is the probability that the farm manager will maintain the farm' s intermediate and long-term leverage 
ratios at less than maximum levels established by local financial institutions. 
bMaximum permitted leverage ratios. 
TABLE 30. PROBABILITY OF ENDING EQUITY RATIOS FALLING BETWEEN 
INDICATED INTERVALS FOR SELECTED BEGINNING EQUITY 
POSITIONS WHEN REQUIRED LEVERAGE RATIO IS 4.0 
40% Beginning Eguity 60% Beginning Egu ity 
End ing Equity 
Rat io Intervals Tenant Part-Owner Tenant Part-Owner 
Above 0.50 38% 6% 
Below 0.50 and 
Above 0.33 12% 58% 
Below 0.33 and 
Above 0.20 4% 22% 
Below 0.20 46% 
beginning equity ratio of 0.40, nei-
ther tenant nor part-owner opera-
tions were successful in the long 
run. The part-owner operation ap-
peared to maintain its initial finan-
cial position, with a 58 percent 
chance that ending equity ratio will 
be within the 0.33 to 0.50 range. 
The tenant's ending equity ratios 
were more volatile than the part-
owner's, with a 38 percent chance 
of an ending equity ratio in excess 
of 0.50 and a 48 percent chance of 
an ending ratio less than 0.20. 
Results were more favorable at a 
beginning equity ratio of 0.60. 
Chances of ending equity ratio be-
ing greater than 0.50 exceeded 70 
percent for both tenant and part-
owner and were as high as 86 per-
ference would be that tighter policies 
would prevent equity levels from fall-
ing below 20 percent, since credit 
would be cut off sooner. 
14% 
72% 86% 
16% 14% 
4% 0% 
8% 0% 
cent for the part-owner. The part-
owner farm operator with a 0.60 
beginning equity ratio appeared to 
have a good chance of improving 
his/her equity position, when capi-
tal gain rates for land were nega-
tive, providing credit policies are 
sufficiently liberal to allow the 
manager a chance to recover from a 
bad year. 
The harshness of the 1. 0 leverage 
ratio credit policy when beginning 
equity was 60 percent is borne out 
in examining the iterations forced 
into insolvency at that credit level. 
At the 1. 0 credit policy, 37 iterations 
were forced out in the tenant 
scenario (i.e., a probability of sur-
vival equal to 26 percent). Of these 
37 iterations, 62 percent ended the 
study period below the 1. 0 lever-
age ratio threshold. 31 Of the 13 
31The 62 percent figure was calculated 
as follows: for the tenant with a 0.60 
part-owner simulation iterations 
forced out at a 1.0 credit policy 
leverage ratio, 54 percent were be-
low the 1. 0 leverage ratio at the end 
of 1988. These results suggest a 1.0 
credit policy has a better than even 
chance of prematurely terminating 
a farm operation that probably will 
recover if given additional credit. 
When beginning equity is 40 per-
cent, tight credit policy appears 
more appropriate. As mentioned 
before, the part-owner has little 
hope of increasing equity in his/her 
farming operation, but stands a 
good chance of losing remaining 
equity. From these results, it ap-
pears that optimal credit policy is 
inversely related to beginning 
equity position, tightening as equi-
ty falls and loosening as equity is 
increased. 
A leverage ratio of 2.0 performed 
much better as a credit policy. 
When beginning equity was 40 per-
cent, the tenant was prematurely 
forced into insolvency in 38 percent 
of the iterations at a 2.0 credit poli-
cy leverage ratio. For the same be-
ginning equity level, the 2.0 credit 
policy prematurely forced the part-
beginning equity ratio, 36 iterations 
(72 percent in Table 30) ended the 5-
year period with leverage ratios less 
than 1.0. Of these, 13 survived when 
the credit policy leverage ratio was 
1.0. The remaining 23 iterations rose 
above 1. 0 sometime during the 5-year 
period, but were below the 1.0 lever-
age ratio in 1988. 
Therefore, 23 of 37 iterations (62 per-
cent) were prematurely declared in-
solvent. 
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TABLE 31. ENDING AVERAGE DEBT LEVELS FOR SOLVENT AND INSOLVENT ITERATIONS AT A 0.60 BEGINNING EQUITY RATIO 
AND ALL CREDIT POLICIES 
Tenant 
( 1) Solvent Iterations 
Percent of All Iterations: 
Average Ending Liabilities ($): 
Change from Beginning ($): 
(2) Insolvent Iterations 
Percent of All Iterations: 
Average Ending Liabilities($): 
Change from Beginning($) 
II. Part-Owner 
(1) Solvent Iterations 
Percent of All Iterations 
Average Ending Liabilities($): 
Change from Beginning($): 
(2) Insolvent Iterations 
Percent of All Iterations: 
Average Ending Liabilities($): 
Change from Beginning($): 
owner out of business 42 percent of 
the time. 
Another method of illustrating 
the impact of different credit poli-
cies is reporting total debt held by 
the farm manager in the last year of 
operation. These debt levels are 
particularly important to the lend-
er, because they represent poten-
tial gains or losses to his/her finan-
cial institution that accompany the 
credit policy decision. These debt 
levels are reported in Table 31 for 
both tenant and part-owner at a 
beginning equity level of 60 per-
cent. The results are separated into 
solvent and insolvent categories to 
illustrate average changes in debt 
when the farm survives through 
1988 and when insolvency occurs 
in or before 1988. 
In every instance, because begin-
ning equity was only 60 percent, 
average ending debt exceeded be-
ginning debt. Liberalizing credit 
policy for tenants and part-owners 
resulted in ending debt for surviv-
ing iterations increasing by about 
$100,000, while debt for insolvent 
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Leverage Ratio 
1.0 1.5 2.0 
26 58 82 
299,600. 317,601. 370,696. 
6,719. 24,720. 77,815. 
74 42 18 
535,374. 620,032. 652,954. 
242,493. 327,151. 360,073. 
74 100 100 
1,059,635. 1, 157,124. 1, 155,503. 
305,099. 402,588. 400,967. 
26 0 
1,407,643. 
653,107. 
tenant iterations increased by 
about $300,000. Ending debt for all 
iterations was minimized at lever-
age ratios of 2.0 to 3.0 for tenants 
and was approximately the same 
across all leverage ratios for the 
part-owner. 
Net-Present Value 
The after-tax NPV results for the 
tenant and part-owner at each level 
of beginning equity and credit poli-
cy appear in Tables 32 and 33, re-
spectively. Both the tenant and 
part-owner farming operations 
generated a higher average rate of 
return than the available off-farm 
investments when beginning equi-
ty was greater than or equal to 75 
percent. Average NPV returns were 
highest at the 100 percent equity 
levels for both scenarios. Because 
assets were held constant across all 
equity positions, total returns were 
highest when cash outflows to 
lenders were lowest. At equity 
positions of 75 percent or less, NPV 
returns per dollar of equity were 
greater for the tenant than the part-
0 
2.5 3.0 4.0 
86 88 92 
382,543. 385,643. 402.852. 
89,662. 92,762. 109,971. 
14 12 8 
673 ,729. 671,065. 825,131. 
380,848. 378,184. 532,250. 
100 100 100 
1, 155,245. 1, 155,222. 1, 155,222. 
400,709. 400,686. 400,686. 
0 0 0 
owner, suggesting a farmer desir-
ing to maximize returns to equity 
should consider renting all his/her 
land if unable to acquire high initial 
equity in owned land. 
The NPV standard deviations 
tended to be highest at inter-
mediate levels of debt for the part-
owner and tenant, again reflecting 
sensitivity of the farm in an inter-
mediate debt-level position to ex-
ternal circumstances. The farm 
manager can significantly increase 
his/her debt.load in 1 or 2 bad years, 
resulting in large losses for the farm 
and a negative NPV. The high equi-
ty farm, by contrast, has lower 
fixed costs and can suffer through 
several years of low crop yields and 
prices without adding additional 
debt. The low equity farm manager 
has little equity to lose, with farm 
liquidation occurring in most cases 
after only 1 or 2 bad years. Ending 
net worth differed little from begin-
ning net worth. Although returns 
and losses were much smaller for 
the tenant than the part-owner, 
standard deviations at each equity 
position and credit policy were 
roughly the same for both, reflect-
ing a greater risk in being a tenant 
farmer, regardless of the financial 
position or credit policy. 
Changes in credit policy had no 
effect on the part-owner's financial 
performance at equity levels of 75 
percent or more and had only a 
minor effect at the 60 percent level. 
Liberalized credit at low equity 
levels resulted in a decline in NPV, 
as farm managers were allowed to 
go deeper in debt during adverse 
years before being forced to liqui-
date their holdings. Conversely, 
credit policy had an impact on the 
tenant farm at all six levels of begin-
ning equity, although the impact 
was quite different at low and high 
equities. As with the part-owner, 
more liberal credit policies at low 
beginning equity levels allowed 
the farm manager to go farther in 
debt before reaching insolvency. At 
high equity levels, however, liber-
alized credit caused average NPV 
to increase because of (1) continued 
refinancing of a farm that reached 
the tight credit policy level, with 
the farm subsequently recovering 
and (2) the relative advantage of 
long-term refinancing of debt. 32 
When extending liberal credit 
terms, a financial institution is, in 
effect, making available more long-
term liquidity to be used in adverse 
years. The net result is higher an-
nual profits and a higher NPV for 
the operations. 
Changes in Interest Rates 
The increased dependence on 
borrowed capital has caused great-
er sensitivity by farm managers to 
interest rates. During the late 
1970' s, real interest rates (i.e., 
nominal interest rates less infla-
tion) were very low or even nega-
tive, encouraging managers to use 
borrowed capital to finance farm 
operations. By 1983, the situation 
had reversed. The Federal Re-
32Refinancing debt on a long-term loan 
results in a 1.5 to 3 percent difference 
in interest rate and lower yearly prin-
cipal, both of which improve farm 
cash flow. Because the yearly cost is 
lower, profits are enhanced and the 
need for future refinancing is re-
duced. 
TABLE 32. NET PRESENT VALUE RESULTS FOR REPRESENTATIVE TEXAS RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM WITH DIFFERENT BEGINNING EQUITY POSITIONS AND CREDIT RATIONING 
LEVELS-TENANT FARM 
In itial Farm Eguit~ Positions 
Credit Rationing 
Policies• 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.0 
1.0 Mean -77,539. -97,877. -80,297. 34,538. 104,038. 116,218. 
Std.Dev. 134,936. 120,306. 179,846. 202,335. 174,212. 183,881. 
P(NPV>O)b 28 18 34 62 68 72 
1.5 Mean -92,730. -101,995. -46,590. 40,206. 89,327. 115,665. 
Std.Dev. 123,823. 134,192. 221,253. 202.474. 188,0 11. 185,310. 
P(NPV>O) 24 16 48 60 68 72 
2.0 Mean -106,915. -110,928. -51,743. 45,377. 89,528. 115,721. 
Std.Dev. 130,214. 157,865. 152,650. 195,968. 187.:B20. 185,208. 
P(NPV>O) 14 24 52 60 68 72 
2.5 Mean -100,866. -98,574. -18,554. 43,317. 88,932. 116,584. 
Std.Dev. 140,775. 189,900. 210.400. 202,209. 188,981. 183,604. 
P(NPV>O) 16 32 52 60 68 72 
3.0 Mean -123,358. -126,038. -18,346. 44.456. 89,541. 116,609. 
Std.Dev. 136.446. 209,058. 213,204. 202,152. 187,856. 183,560. 
P(NPV>O) 12 34 52 60 68 72 
4.0 Mean -115,059. -106,079. -12,921. 45,060. 89,574. 117,379. 
Std.Dev. 149,825. 224,287. 211,203. 201,989. 187,846. 182,279. 
P(NPV>O) 18 40 52 60 68 72 
"Maximum permitted leverage ratios. 
bRepresents the probability of NPV being greater than zero (i.e., probability of success). 
TABLE 33. NET PRESENT VALUE RESULTS FOR REPRESENTATIVE TEXAS RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM WITH DIFFERENT BEGINNING EQUITY POSITIONS AND CREDIT RATIONING 
LEVELS-PART OWNER FARM 
Initial Farm Eguit~ Positions 
Cred it Rationing 
Policies• 0.25 0.40 0.60 0.75 0.90 1.0 
1.0 Mean -211,088. -202,062. -94,965. 13,877. 153,007. 235,692. 
Std.Dev. 156,359. 156,941. 220,497. 204,593. 208,385. 199,790. 
P(NPV>O)b 10 12 38 58 78 86 
1.5 Mean -211,088. -237,245. -82,838. 13,877. 153,007. 235,692. 
Std.Dev. 156,359. 156,570. 198,440. 204,593. 208,385. 199,790. 
P(NPV>O) 10 8 38 58 78 86 
2.0 Mean -211,086. -260,688. -82,553. 13,877. 153,007. 235,692. 
Std.Dev. 156,361. 231.453. 197,814. 204,593. 208,385. 199,790. 
P(NPV>O) 10 10 38 58 78 86 
2.5 Mean -226,167. -226,597. -82,398. 13,877. 153,007. 235,692. 
Std.Dev. 140, 136. 249,847. 197,524. 204,593. 208,385. 199,790. 
P(NPV>O) 6 12 38 58 78 86 
3.0 Mean -241.496. -206,015. -82,387. 13,877. 153,007. 235,692. 
Std.Dev. 147,100. 242,063. 197.499. 204,593. 208,385. 199,790. 
P(NPV>O) 6 12 38 58 78 86 
4.0 Mean -316,847. -193,439. -82,387. 13,877. 153,007. 235,692. 
Std.Dev. 167,680. 232,511 . 197,499. 204,593. 208,385. 199,790. 
P(NPV>O) 6 12 38 58 78 86 
•Maximum permitted leverage ratios. 
bRepresents the probability that NPV w i ll be greater than zero. 
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TABLE 34. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM -DECREASES IN INTEREST RATES 
2% Decrease All Rates 2% Decrease-New Loans Onl:t 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 54 88 80 82 54 
Change 
from Base: +4 +6 +8 +4 +4 
Probability 
of Success (%): 22 62 30 58 16 
Change 
from Base: +10 +10 +10 +18 +4 
Mean NPV ($): -168,613. 27,658. -85,728. -318. -178,603. 
Change 
+38,554. +50,841. +46,913. +51,948. +28,564. from Base: 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.650 0.693 0.620 0.682 0.635 
Change 
from Base: +0.044 +0.014 +0.024 +0.023 +0.029 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -13.453. 36.215. 9,734. 3,0839. -17,275. 
Change 
from Base: +12,505. +12,538. +13,193. +14,303. +8,683. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
serve's decision to stabilize growth 
of the money supply, growth in the 
federal government's budget defi-
cit, and uncertainty about the fu-
ture level of the deficit all combined 
to cause real interest rates to rise to 
historically high levels. 
In the base scenario, real interest 
rates were assumed to remain at 
high levels throughout the 1984-88 
study period, although rates were 
lower than 1983levels. If the deficit 
were reduced and (or) financial in-
stitutions felt more confident about 
the future, both nominal and real 
interest rates would be expected to 
decline. The decline in interest 
rates would affect agriculture in 
two ways: (1) Interest costs would 
be reduced and (2) the flow of 
foreign capital into the United 
States would decrease, causing the 
exchange rate to become more 
favorable for U.S. exporters. The 
more favorable exchange rate 
would increase overseas demand 
for U.S. agricultural products, 
thereby increasing U.S. farm 
prices. In this section, the sensitivi-
ty of base results to a decrease in 
interest rates is examined for the 
cost side only, assuming the inter-
est rate change has no effect on 
prices. Although this assumption 
is not accurate, it allows examina-
tion of the interest rate effects 
46 
alone, without the price effects oc-
curring simultaneously. 
In the first scenario, all interest 
rates listed in Table 1 were reduced 
2 percentage points in each year. If 
pre-1984 loans were made at fixed 
interest rates, a decrease in the 
deficit would have no effect on 
rates for these loans. A second 
scenario, therefore, was also ana-
lyzed, where the pre-1984 long-
term and intermediate-term rates 
were held constant at the base 
levels and all other rates were re-
duced 2 percentage points. Results 
for these scenarios are summarized 
in Table 34. 
The 2 percentage point drop in 
all interest rates had a significant 
positive impact on all four strate-
gies. The strategies benefitting 
most from lower interest rate costs 
differed, depending on the analy-
sis variable examined; the SR strat-
egies realized the largest gains in 
average after-tax NPV, the SR 1/2 
strategy had the largest increase in 
probability of survival, and the SSR 
1/2 strategy realized the largest in-
crease in ending equity ratio. 
Results were different for some 
strategies when the 2 percentage 
point reduction was limited to new 
loans versus being applied to all 
loans. Probabilities of survival 
were within 2 percentage points of 
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
86 78 82 
+4 +6 +4 
56 30 52 
+4 +10 +12 
12.233. -105,303. -26,602. 
+35.416. +27,338. +25,664. 
0.687 0.610 0.665 
+0.008 +0.014 +0.006 
32,853. 4.490. 23,524. 
+9,176. +7,949. +6,988. 
the results when all interest rates 
were reduced, but changes in NPV 
varied 25 to 50 percent of the all-
interest-rate change scenario. 
Results suggest that, despite 
about $300,000 in outstanding debt 
at the beginning of the simulation 
period, the farm manager is more 
sensitive to future interest rates 
than past rates. In this study, the 
farm manager was not permitted to 
buy land and only gradually re-
placed machinery over time. The 
remaining reasons for borrowing 
new capital are for operating and 
refinancing to pay operating loss-
es. Both are likely at work in re-
ducing annual costs and increasing 
probability of survival. In several 
instances, the farm was declared 
insolvent in the base scenario 
when the farm manager's equity 
position was only slightly below 
the minimum requirement for con-
tinued operation. In these anal-
yses, the farm manager survived 
and was able to continue operation 
for another year because the 2 per-
cent lower interest rate reduced 
losses enough to enable the farm 
manager to finance his/her losses 
. with remaining farm equity. 
Changes in Inflation Rates 
Aside from reducing the federal 
deficit or increasing financial in-
TABLE 35. SENSITIVITY ANALYSES FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN FARM -CHANGES IN INFLATION RATES 
2% Increase in All Inflation Rates 2% Increase Only: in Cost Inflation 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 SSR 1/2 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 44 70 . 62 62 36 
Change 
from Base: -6 -12 -10 -16 -14 
Probability 
of Success (%): 10 44 16 34 8 
Change 
from Base: -2 -8 -4 -6 -4 
Mean NPV ($): -229,120. -64,825. -169,290. -116,397. -279,019. 
Change 
from Base: -21.953. -41,642. -36,649. -64,131. -71,852. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.557 0.644 0.551 0.612 0.530 
Change 
from Base: -0.049 -0.035 -0.045 -0.047 -0.076 
Mean Yearly Cash 
Farm Income ($): -42,366. -2,009. -25.497. -13,318. -46,990. 
Change 
from Base: -16.408. -25,686. -22,038. -29,854. -21,032. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
stitutions' confidence about the fu-
ture, a third method to reduce real 
interest rates is to increase the in-
flation rate. Inflation is created 
principally by increasing the econ-
omy's monetary base (e.g., de-
mand deposits, currency, savings 
deposits, etc.) at a faster than nor-
mal rate. In the 1980's era of high 
federal deficits and constant in-
creases in the monetary base, infla-
tion could be increased if the Feder-
al Reserve financed a larger 
amount of the federal govern-
ment's borrowings. 
The effects of inflation can be 
harmful or beneficial to a farm 
manager, depending on his/her cir-
cumstances. During an infla-
tionary period, costs of production 
rise more rapidly, as do living 
costs. Crop prices also rise, but 
may not rise enough to maintain 
the farm manager's standard of 
living at pre-inflation levels. Infla-
tion also weakens the exchange 
rate for the dollar, a positive benefit 
for farmers who produce export-
able commodities. Overseas de-
mand for U.S. farm products in-
creases, raising farm price for these 
products. Perhaps the most impor-
tant benefit of inflation is received 
by managers owing fixed debts to 
others. The effect of inflation is to 
reduce the real amount of fixed 
debt owed by the farm manager. If 
a farmer owed 20 percent of his/her 
farm's value to a bank, for exam-
ple, and the value of the farm 
doubled because of inflation, the 
farmer would owe only 10 percent 
of the farm's value to the bank. The 
manager has done nothing to earn 
the transfer of additional equity to 
his/her ownership, but is wealthier 
as a result of inflation. 
In this section, the effect of a 2 
percentage point increase in infla-
tion is examined for the representa-
tive farm. All inflation rates were 
increased 2 percentage points 
above the values shown in Table 1, 
with the exception of inflation for 
land, which was increased 3 per-
centage points. In the base 
scenario, the capital gain rate for 
land was 50 percent greater than 
other inflation rates. The capital 
gain rate in this sensitivity analy-
sis, therefore, was also 50 percent 
greater than the increase in other 
inflation rates. To enable examina-
tion of inflation's impacts exoge-
nous of price impacts, it was as-
sumed the higher inflation rates 
would have no effect on crop 
prices. To further understand the 
negative effects of inflation on the 
representative farm, a second 
scenario was implemented in 
which the 2 percentage point in-
crease in inflation did not affect 
crop prices nor the value of farm 
land, buildings, equipment al-
ready owned, and off-farm invest-
SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
62 54 58 
-20 -18 -20 
30 8 22 
-22 -12 -18 
-131,654. -216,012. -161,182. 
-108.471. -83,371. -108,916. 
0.625 0.550 0.590 
-0.054 -0.046 -0.069 
-5,065. -24,844. -11,054. 
-28,742. -21,385. -27,590. 
ments. Only the negative effects of 
inflation (i.e., higher production 
costs and living expenses) were felt 
in the second scenario. 
Results for both scenarios are 
presented in Table 35. The overall 
effect of inflation on the represent-
ative farm, when only crop prices 
were not affected by higher infla-
tion rates, was negative for all four 
strategies. Particularly hard hit by 
the effects of inflation were the 1/7 
strategies. Because landowners 
pay part of the costs under a 112 
share arrangement, the tenant us-
ing the 112 share arrangement is 
less vulnerable to the effects of pro-
duction cost inflation than when 
using the 117 share arrangement. 
The SSR strategies were not affect-
ed as severely as the SR strategies 
because the average per acre cost of 
production across all crops was 
lower under the SSR rotation. 
In the second scenario, negative 
effects of inflation can be seen more 
clearly in the results. The small 
increase in inflation of production 
costs and family living expenses 
had a strongly negative effect on 
the farm operation. In comparing 
the two scenarios, however, one 
can see that inflation of land and 
machinery values resulted in defi-
nite positive benefits in the first 
scenario. Differences in average af-
ter-tax NPV between scenarios 
ranged from about $45,000 for the 
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SR 117 strategy to $67,000 for the 
SSR 1/7 strategy. A comparison be-
tween mean net cash farm in-
comes, however, shows little dif-
ference between the two scenarios, 
since all positive benefits of infla-
tion are gained through increasing 
the value of assets. The results in-
dicate inflation does have substan-
tial positive effects on a farm opera-
tion. Had the farm manager owned 
a large part of the farm, the overall 
effect of inflation (ignoring crop 
price effects) probably would have 
been positive. In addition, favor-
able impacts of inflation on crop 
prices may outweigh any negative 
effects, even if the inflation impacts 
on asset values are ignored. 
A Repeat of 1978-81 
Macroeconomic Policy 
The previous two sections have 
provided a partial analysis of 
changes in interest and inflation 
rates for the representative farm. In 
both cases, however, crop prices 
were held constant. In this section, 
effects of changes in interest and 
inflation rates, including their ef-
fects on prices, are examined by re-
enacting 1978-81 macroeconomic 
policy. 
During most of the 1960's and 
1970's, the Federal Reserve used 
monetary policy to stimulate the 
economy during recessionary 
periods and restrict the economy 
during over-expansionary periods. 
During 1975-77, in particular, the 
Federal Reserve had expanded the 
money supply at a very rapid rate 
to aid in the economy's recovery 
from the 197 4-75 recession and to 
stabilize interest rates at low levels. 
By 1978, effects of the expanded 
money supply were showing in the 
rate of inflation. In 1978, the infla-
tion rate was 7.7 percent; in 1979, 
11.3 percent; and in 1980, 13.5 per-
cent (U.S. Department of Com-
merce 1984). 
With a change in 1978 of the 
Federal Reserve Board chairman-
ship, the Board moved from a poli-
cy of regulating interest rates to 
stabilizing the growth of the mone-
tary base (The Wall Street Journal 
1984). The discount rate used by 
the Federal Reserve began moving 
upward to 7.5 percent in 1978, 10.3 
48 
percent in 1979, 11.8 percent in 
1980, and 13.4 percent in 1981. De-
spite the high nominal interest 
rates, however, real interest re-
mained low until1982. During this 
period, the dollar was weak rela-
tive to other currencies and exports 
of farm products reached all-time 
highs. In short, the 1978-81 period 
was characterized by high infla-
tion, real interest rates, and high 
overseas demand for U.S. agricul-
tural products. 
In this scenario, a repeat of 1978-
81 macroeconomic policy was im-
plemented for the 1985-88 study 
period. Assumptions for 1984 were 
not changed from the base 
scenario. A model developed by 
Chambers and Just (1982) was used 
to predict standard drawing rights, 
or exchange rates for the period. 
The exchange, interest, and infla-
tion rates were then used in the 
Grant, Beach, and Lin (1984) model 
to predict rice prices for 1985-88. 
Soybean prices were assumed to 
move in the same proportion as 
rice prices. The government pro-
grams were held constant through 
1988 at 1984 levels. 
Although the exchange rate 
started in a stronger position in 
1985 than in 1978, by 1988 it had 
weakened to about the 1979 level. 
The result of the weakened dollar 
and higher inflation rate on rice 
price was startling. Expected U.S. 
rice price, as predicted by the 
Grant, Beach, and Lin (1984) mod-
el, rose to $10.49/cwt in 1985, 
$11.47/cwt in 1986, $12.28/cwt in 
1987, and $15.82/cwt in 1988.33 The 
1988 figure seems particularly 
large, but in the late 1970's, rice 
price also increased substantially 
above earlier levels. Both private 
and public projected rice carryover 
declined substantially in the 1985-
88 period, with total carryover fall-
33Because the farm program provisions 
were frozen at 1984levels, the rise in 
expected price for rice and soybeans 
resulted in the program being much 
less lucrative to farm operations. Par-
ticipation in the program by farmers, 
therefore, was assumed to drop to 50 
percent by 1988. Sensitivity analyses 
revealed that a 20 percent versus 50 
percent rate of participation had very 
little effect on price. 
ing from 51 million hundred-
weights in 1984 to 36 million hun-
dredweights in 1988. The frozen 
government programs, combined 
with rapid inflation, moved the rice 
industry into essentially a free-
market position by 1988. Rice acre-
age fell over time as a result of the 
higher inflation rate and fixed 
target price. 
The effects of higher prices, in-
flation, and interest rates on the 
representative farm are sum-
marized in Table 36. All four strate-
gies fared much better under this 
scenario than under the base 
scenario. The 1/2 share strategies, 
in particular, realized large in-
creases in probabilities of success 
and survival. The large gains in 
mean ending equity ratios were 
equally impressive, indicating a 
substantial strengthening in the fi-
nancial position of all strategies. 
Government payments decreased 
as expected, reflecting the move 
toward a free market situation. De-
spite the large change in absolute 
results, stochastic dominance 
rankings for the four strategies did 
not change from the base scenario. 
Thus, the representative farm 
would benefit from a repeat of the 
1978-81 macroeconomic policy. 
Farm Program 
Sensitivity Scenarios 
Several sensitivity scenarios 
dealing with potential farm pro-
gram options are examined in this 
section. In general, the policy 
scenarios represent potential pro-
grams for rice that could be incor-
porated into the 1985 or subse-
quent farm bills. Scenarios were 
also designed to examine impacts 
of non participation in the farm pro-
gram, strict enforcement of the 
$50,000 payment limitation, and 
the current premium for long-grain 
rice in the loan program. Effects of 
altering any provisions of the cur-
rent government farm program as 
presented here are short-term (i.e., 
3 to 5 years). The limited planning 
horizon constrains the usefulness 
of the results in suggesting longer-
term consequences of the policy 
changes. 
Non-Participation in Program 
The current farm program for 
rice is voluntary, relying on Inone-
tary and risk reduction incentives 
to encourage participation. In most 
of the study period, 20 percent of 
the acreage was required as set-
aside acreage to qualify for the rice 
loan program and deficiency pay-
ments. An additional 5 percent of 
rice acreage was set-aside as paid 
acreage diversion. No acreage set-
aside was required to qualify for 
the soybean loan. Despite the pro-
gram benefits, a farm manager may 
consider costs of participation are 
too great, i.e., that he/she is better 
off operating outside the program. 
Or, the farm manager may be fun-
damentally opposed to any sub-
sidization of agriculture. The effect 
of choosing to remain out of the 
farm programs for rice and soy-
beans is indicated in Table 37. 
For all four strategies non-
participation in the farm programs 
can only be described as devastat-
ing. Survivability fell below 20 per-
cent for all strategies and was only 
6 percent for the SR 117 strategy. 
Probabilities of economic success 
were zero for both SR strategies. 
NPV numbers for all strategies de-
clined by large amounts. When the 
large changes in other analysis var-
iables were examined, mean end-
ing equity ratios for surviving itera-
tions only declined by modest 
amounts. The mean ending equity 
ratio for all iterations, however, 
was well below the minimum re-
quired for survival and was actual-
ly negative for the SR 117 strategy. It 
is not surprising that the average 
ending equity ratios were below 
the 0.33 level, but the depth to 
which they declined suggests 
many iterations lost large amounts 
of money in the last year of opera-
tion. 
The results suggest that a farm 
similar to the representative farm is 
very dependent on government 
farm programs for continued survi-
val. Government payments are an 
essential part of the farm mana-
ger's annual cash flow. Although a 
similar analysis was not carried out 
for farms smaller than the repre-
sentative farm, Smith (1982) has 
shown that for Southern High 
Plains cotton farms smaller acreage 
operations are more dependent on 
TABLE 36. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - REPEAT OF 1978-81 MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN 1985-88 
STUDY PERIOD 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 78 90 90 92 
Change 
from Base: +28 +8 +18 +14 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 56 82 72 80 
Change 
from Base: +44 +30 +52 +40 
Mean NPV ($): -1,858. 199,814. 78,927. 203,596. 
Change 
from Base: +205,309. +222,987. +211,568. +255,862. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.677 0.788 0.697 0.777 
Change 
from Base: +0.071 +0.109 +0.10 1 +0.118 
Mean Yearly Government 
Payments ($): 21,236. 32,854. 30,371. 38,584. 
Change 
from Base: -8,584. -14,896. -13,632. -18,118. 
See Table 6 for def initi on of the analysis variables. 
TABLE 37. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - NO PARTICIPATION IN GOVERNMENT FARM PROGRAM 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 10 18 12 6 
Change 
from Base: -40 -64 -60 -72 
Probability 
of Success (%): 0 6 0 0 
Change 
from Base: -12 -46 -20 -40 
Mean NPV ($): -373,559. -370,016. -394.456. -463,102. 
Change 
from Base: -166,392. -346,833. -261,815. -410,836. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.610 0.595 0.537 0.510 
Change 
from Base: -0.004 -0.084 -0.059 -0.149 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(A II Iterations): 0.143 0.130 0.105 -0.043 
Change 
from Base: -0.238 -0.456 -0.368 -0.598 
See Table 6 f~r definition of the analysis variables. 
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TABLE 38. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT PAYMENT 
LIMITATION 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probab i I ity 
of Survival (%): 42 64 50 48 
Change 
from Base: -8 -18 -22 -30 
Probability 
of Success (%): 10 38 4 22 
Change 
from Base: -2 -14 -16 -18 
Mean NPV ($): -237,634. -117,176. -222.470. -186.758. 
Change 
from Base: -30.467. -93,993. -89,829. -134.492. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.584 0.643 0.567 0.625 
Change 
from Base: -0.022 -0.036 -0.029 -0.034 
Mean Yearly Government 
Payments ($): 24,962. 31.449. 30,335. 36,224. 
Change 
from Base: -4,858. -16,301. -13,668. -20.478. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
farm programs than are large acre-
age operations. If this holds in gen-
eral for all farms, many operations 
in the Liberty ~County area could 
benefit from participating in the 
farm program. 
Enforcement of $50,000 
Payment Limitation 
In the base scenario, the mana-
ger was limited to $100,000/year in 
government payments, repre-
senting a maximum of $50,000/year 
to both the farmer and a partner. In 
theory, the government imple-
mented the $50,000 payment limi-
tation to reduce program costs, 
judging those farm operations 
which qualify for more than 
$50,000 in payments to not need 
the additional monies. Quite often, 
however, the limitation can be 
avoided by legal means. Part of the 
farm's assets, for example, can be 
put in the spouse's name. Since the 
limit is $50,000 per person, the 
spouse partner becomes eligible for 
an additional $50,000. In addition, 
crop-share tenure arrangements 
are commonly utilized to transfer 
some government payments to the 
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landowner as part of the land rent, 
thus reducing the effective rent 
paid by the farm manager. Incen-
tives to side-step the payment limi-
tation depend, of course, on the 
amount of government payments 
lost by the producer when he/she 
complies with the limitation. A 
strict enforcement of the limitation 
would have an effect on strategies, 
since all farms exceeded the limita-
tion in one or more base scenario 
iterations. In this scenario, it was 
assumed that the government 
strictly enforced the limitation, al-
lowing the farm operation no more 
than $50,000/year in deficiency and 
diversion payments. 
Effects of enforcing the govern-
ment payment limitation on a per 
farm basis are in Table 38. The SR 
rotation strategies suffered more 
than the SSR strategies as a result 
of the limit, with probability of 
survival falling to 50 percent or less 
for both SR strategies. For all strate-
gies, probabilities of success fell to 
as low as 4 percent and mean after-
tax NPV dropped by an average of 
$87,000 from base scenario levels. 
Perhaps the most telling statistics 
were the changes in average gov-
ernment payments to the tenant, 
which fell by over 35 percent in 
some cases. Although the change 
in government payments was 
greater for the SSR 1/7 versus the 
SR 1/2 strategy, the changes in 
probabilities of survival and suc-
cess were greater for the latter 
strategy, again demonstrating the 
greater need the 1/2 share strate-
gies have for additional cash flow. 
A graph of all NPV numbers for the 
four strategies is given in Figure 7. 
All distributions lie to the left of 
their corresponding base strate-
gies, indicating their relative in-
feriority. In particular, the SSR 1/7 
and SR 1/7 are much farther apart 
and SSR 1/2 and SR 1/2 are much 
closer together when the payment 
limit is strictly enforced. 
Several implications can be 
drawn from these results. When 
the payment limit is strictly en-
forced, both SR rotations are less 
desirable to the farm manager. The 
payment limitation can, therefore, 
have an impact on the choice of an 
optimal crop rotation, tending to 
discourage intensive cropping of 
crops eligible for deficiency pay-
ments. Removal of the payment 
limitation would probably cause 
many farm managers to push more 
strongly for a 1/7 share in place of a 
1/2 share arrangement when 
negotiating the land rental ar-
rangement, since the 1/7 share ar-
rangement becomes more lucrative 
as the payment limit is raised. Last-
ly, the results demonstrate a sub-
stantial economic motivation for 
large farms to find ways to circum-
vent the $50,000 payment limita-
tion. 
Increasing Long-Grain 
Loan Premium 
Prices for long-grain rice are usu-
ally above those of medium and 
short-grain rices, reflecting con-
sumer preference for longer-
grained varieties. The price differ-
ential is also reflected in govern-
ment commodity programs (USDA 
· 1983). As mentioned in the section 
on study assumptions, the Texas 
rice loan rate in the model was 
increased 7.894 percent above the 
$8.00/cwt national rate assumed for 
1984-88. The percentage figure re-
flected a premium for long-grain 
rice and the average difference be-
tween long-grain loan rates and 
national loan rates for 1976-82. 
Throughout the 7-year period, the 
premium remained close to 7 per-
cent. In 1983, however, the pre-
mium jumped to 14.475 percent. 
Because the higher premium oc-
curred only in 1 year, the earlier 
long-grain rice loan premium was 
used in the base analysis . In this 
section, the potential importance 
of a higher premium, should it 
become permanent, is examined. 
The loan rate used in the sen-
sitivity analysis for ailS years of the 
study period was $9 .16/cwt, a 
$1.16/cwt premium above the na-
tional loan and an increase of 
$0.53/cwt over the loan rate in the 
base scenario. Rice following 1 year 
of soybeans and ratoon rice was 
again discounted $0.30/cwt and 
$0.60/cwt, respectively, reflecting 
lower rice quality. The $3.90/cwt 
maximum deficiency payment 
limit was held constant, requiring 
target prices to also rise by $0.53 to 
$13.06/cwt. Results for this analysis 
are in Table 39. 
All four strategies examined ben-
efitted from the higher loan rate. 
The two SR strategies, in particular, 
received a substantial boost from 
the premium increase, with 6 to 8 
percentage point rises in probabili-
ties of survival occurring for both 
strategies. Changes in mean after-
tax NPV suggest the 1/7 share strat-
egies benefitted most from the 
higher loan premiums. 
The principal factor influencing 
these results is the large increase in 
average government payments re-
ceived under each strategy and the 
largest increases observed among 
all scenarios examined in the study. 
These increases caused gross farm 
revenues to increase only 1.5 to 3 
percent for each strategy. In addi-
tion, the higher loan rate reduced 
downside price risk, since the farm 
manager was now guaranteed a 
higher minimum price. The com-
bined effect of the higher target 
price and loq.n rate was to guaran-
tee the farmer a higher return for 
his/her crop without any increase 
in operating costs. The additional 
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Figure 7. Net present values for each strategy when payment limitation enforced. 
gross revenue caused a propor-
tional increase in net cash farm 
income. 
Eliminating Target Price Program 
Several policy options available 
to lawmakers writing the 1985 farm 
bill for rice are considered in this 
and subsequent analyses. To ex-
amine the effect of the different 
policy options on the representa-
tive farm, it was necessary to first 
determine the effects of the respec-
tive policy alternatives on the en-
tire U.S. rice industry. In particular, 
effects of policy on U.S. farm prices 
are essential in evaluating the poli-
cy impacts at the farm level. Be-
cause macro- and micro-economic 
aspects of policy are important to 
policy makers, both perspectives 
are reported in the subsequent 
scenarios. The Grant, Beach, and 
Lin (1984) model was used to simu-
late the macro aspects of the rice 
industry. 
The primary purpose of target 
prices are to stabilize farm income. 
The target price program has been 
I 
increasingly criticized as costly to 
the government and overstimula-
tive to agricultural production. 
Some involved in the rice industry 
feel that "as a concept, target price 
may be very difficult to maintain in 
the 1985 farm bill" (Adams 1984). 
In this scenario, the target price 
program for rice was eliminated, 
leaving the non-recourse loan as 
the only farm program in opera-
tion. 
Elimination of the target price, 
with no accompanying changes in 
other facets of the farm program, 
was assumed to substantially re-
duce incentives for farm managers 
to participate in the farm program. 
As a result, it was assumed only 50 
percent of the U.S. rice producers 
participated in the farm program 
after 1985. Reduced participation 
resulted in fewer managers com-
plying with the 20 percent set-aside 
and 5 percent paid diversion provi-
sions of the program. Because of 
the lower realized price for rice, 
however, some farm managers 
were assumed to quit producing 
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TABLE 39. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - INCREASE IN LOAN RATE PREMIUM FOR TEXAS LONG GRAIN 
RICE 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probabi I ity 
of Survival (%): 54 88 80 84 
Change 
from Base: +4 +6 +8 +6 
Probability 
of Success (%): 18 60 36 60 
Change 
from Base: +6 +8 +16 +20 
Mean NPV ($): -180,650. 31,010. -82,084. 9,555. 
Change 
from Base: +26,517. +54, 193. +50,557. +61,821. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(So I vent Iterations): 0.629 0.697 0.620 0.701 
Change 
from Base: +0.023 +0.0 18 +0.024 +0.042 
Mean Government 
Payments ($): 35,871. 56,244. 52,105. 65,497. 
Change 
from Base: +6,051. +8,494. +8, 102. +8,795. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
TABLE 40. U.S. RICE PRICES USED FOR BASE ANALYSIS AND POLICY SCENARIOS 
- ($/CWT) 
Year 
Scenario 1986 1987 1988 
Base: 10.11 10.52 10.96 
No Target Price Program: 10.21 10.66 11.10 
Change from Base: +0.10 +0.14 +0.14 
No Set-Aside: 9.74 9.89 10.15 
Change from Base: -0.37 -0.63 -0.81 
10% Reduction of Target 
Price and Loan Rate: 9.92 10.40 10.90 
Change from Base: -0.19 -0.12 -0.06 
Allotment Program: 10.26 10.78 11.29 
Change from Base: +0.15 +0.26 +0.33 
Free Market: 9.21 9.30 10.34 
Change from Base: -0.90 -1.22 -0.62 
Note: 1984 and 1985 rice prices were the same in these scenarios as in the base 
analysis. 
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rice. The total acreage taken out of 
production was assumed to be 
equal to 75 percent of the set-aside 
acreage held by those participating 
in the program. This acreage 
voluntarily taken out of production 
represented 9.4 percent (i.e., 
0.5 x 0.25 x 0. 75) of all base rice 
acreage. National farm prices gen-
erated under the scenario, as well 
as prices used in the base and sub-
sequent policy scenarios, are pre-
sented in Table 40. This and all 
subsequent policy scenarios ad-
dress potential policies adopted af-
ter the 1985 crop year. The 1984 and 
1985 U.S. rice prices were the same 
for all policy scenarios. 
With the elimination of the target 
price program, the Grant, Beach, 
and Lin (1984) model predicted rice 
prices would change very little 
from the base scenario. Reduced 
production caused by lower ex-
pected rice price more or less offset 
the increased acreage caused by 
the lower farmer participation 
level. A long-term upward trend in 
price was predicted, however, as 
carryover stocks level off between 
1986-88. The expected results of 
eliminating the target price pro-
gram, then, are slightly higher 
farm prices, a large reduction in 
government payments to farmers 
(with no deficiency payments), 
and stabilization in production and 
stock levels. 
The representative farm in 
RICESIM was assumed to partici-
pate in the farm program because 
of the loan program and paid diver-
sion. Results for the four strategies 
are found in Table 41. Elimination 
of the target price program had a 
significantly negative impact on 
the representative farm. Probabili-
ty of survival fell 20 percentage 
points below base levels for three 
of four strategies, with none of the 
strategies offering more than a 62 
percent probability of survival. 
Probability of success and average 
after-tax NPV also fell by substan-
tial amounts, particularly the 1/7 
share strategies. One item of inter-
est was the larger negative effect of 
the target price elimination on the 
SSR 1/7 strategy versus the SR 1/7 
strategy, a surprising result since 
the SR 1/7 strategy received more 
income from the government than 
the SSR 117 strategy. On a per acre 
basis, however, the SR 117 some-
times received less government 
payments, because of the payment 
limitation. From the results, one 
can conclude that elimination of 
the target price program would 
hurt farm managers of the type 
modelled by the representative 
farm. The large amounts of carry-
over stocks by the end of 1985 
prevented prices from rising 
enough to offset the loss of govern-
ment payments. 
Eliminating Set-Aside 
One extreme possibility in new 
policy formulation involves the 
elimination of a set-aside re-
quirement for government pro-
gram participation eligibility. Ad-
vocates of this policy alternative 
support it on the basis of its "max-
imum income protection" for pro-
ducers. The potential budget expo-
sure to the federal government is 
large, however, especially when 
likelihood of expanding carryover 
stocks as a result of no production 
cutbacks is incorporated into the 
analysis. 
If the set-aside requirement was 
eliminated, the Grant, Beach, and 
Lin (1984) model predicted rice 
prices would fall below the base 
scenario levels by $0.37/cwt in 
1986, $0.63/cwt in 1987, and 
$0.811cwt in 1988. The increasingly 
wide differential between prices 
under this scenario and base level 
prices was the result of continued 
rice overproduction. Public and 
private carryovers were predicted 
to increase over time, exceeding 60 
million hundredweight in 1988. 
The increasing size of carryover 
stocks indicates overproduction 
would become a more severe prob-
lem, depressing price and increas-
ing government deficiency pay-
ment and storage costs. Net gov-
ernment payments may decrease, 
however, as the elimination of di-
version payments is greater than 
the increase in deficiency pay-
ments. 
RICESIM results for the repre-
sentative farm are given in Table 42. 
Eliminating set-aside generated 
TABLE 41. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - ELIMINATION OF TARGET PRICE PROGRAM AFTER 1985 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 38 62 52 58 
Change 
from Base: -12 -20 -20 -20 
Probability 
of Success (%): 8 34 10 28 
Change 
from Base: -4 -18 -10 -12 
Mean NPV ($): -255,684. -125,940. -217,366. -146,027. 
Change 
from Base: -48,517. -102,757. -84,725. -93,761. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.565 0.650 0.556 0.637 
Change 
from Base: -0.041 -0.029 -0.040 -0.022 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
different results for the representa-
tive farm, depending on the par-
ticular strategy followed by the 
manager. The 112 share strategies 
largely gained because of the policy 
change, with after-tax NPV values 
rising nearly $15,000 for both strat-
egies. The 1/7 share strategies were 
worse off as a result of the set-aside 
elimination. The SR 117 strategy, in 
particular, realized a drop in after-
tax NPV of almost $75,000 and a 24 
percentage point decline in proba-
bility of survival. 
Several factors were responsible 
for the varied results of this 
scenario. An increase in govern-
ment deficiency payments largely 
offset the effect of lower rice prices 
for most strategies. The major ex-
ception was the SR 1/7 strategy, 
which sometimes reached the pay-
ment limitation in the base analy-
sis. When prices fell, the payment 
limitation was more of a factor, 
resulting in a decrease in per acre 
revenues for rice. The payment 
limitation also had an effect on the 
SSR 1/7 strategy, but of equal im-
portance was the loss of the paid 
diversion acreage. This loss was 
the major reason for the decline in 
average government payments to 
the representative farm. For the 1/2 
share strategies the payment limi-
tation was no problem, resulting in 
the farm manager receiving the 
same per hundredweight price for 
rice as in the base scenario. In 
addition, acreage brought back in-
to production increased total re-
turns to the farm manager, suffi-
cient in the case of the SSR 112 
strategy to increase the probability 
of survival. 
In summary, elimination of the 
set-aside requirement for participa-
tion in the farm program was bene-
ficial if the farm manager was sel-
dom reaching the payment limita-
tion. When the payment limitation 
was a factor in limiting deficiency 
payments, elimination of the set-
aside hurt the farm operation. 
Since the target price program and 
payment limitation policy is de-
signed to help smaller farm opera-
tions while minimizing govern-
ment costs, one can conclude that 
small farm managers would be 
against the set-aside requirement, 
while farmers with large opera-
tions would favor the requirement. 
From the government's perspec-
tive, eliminating the acreage diver-
sion payments would more than 
offset increased deficiency pay-
ments, with an expected net reduc-
tion in government payments. 
Overproduction of rice would be-
come more a problem, however, 
with the increase in rice acreage. 
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TABLE 42. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - NO SET-ASIDE REQUIREMENT AFTER 1985 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 52 72 70 54 
Change 
from Base: +2 -10 -2 -24 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 14 50 24 32 
Change 
from Base: +2 -2 +4 -8 
Mean NPV ($): -192,770. -63,110. -116,966. -127,060. 
Change 
from Base: +14,397. -39,927. + 15,675. -74,797. 
Mean· Ending Equity Ratio 
(So I vent Iterations): 0.603 0.673 0.610 0.663 
Change 
from Base: -0.012 -0.006 -0.014 +0.004 
Mean Government 
Payments ($): 28,155. 45,947. 42,103. 56,168. 
Change 
from Base: -1,665. -1,803. -1,900. -534. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
TABLE 43. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - 10% REDUCTION IN TARGET PRICE AND LOAN RATE 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 44 78 68 70 
Change 
from Base: -6 -4 -4 -8 
Probability 
of Success (%): 12 44 18 38 
Change 
from ·Base: 0 -8 -2 -2 
Mean NPV ($): -228,784. -63,098. -158,000. -84,173. 
Change 
from Base: -21,617. -39,915. -25,359. -31,907. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.595 0.663 0.599 0.666 
Change 
from Base: -0.011 -0.016 +0.003 +0.007 
Mean Yearly Government 
Payments ($): 27.481. 42,937. 39,723. 52,586. 
Change 
from Base: -2,339. -4,813. -4,280. -4,116. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
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Reduction of Target Price 
and Loan Rate 
An alternative to eliminating the 
target price program would be to 
reduce target prices and loan rates. 
Implementation of this policy 
could have several advantages. 
First, reduction of the target price 
would reduce some of the incen-
tive to overproduce that is current-
ly plaguing most crops covered in 
the farm program. Second, reduc-
tion of the loan would reduce the 
probability of farmers forfeiting 
their crops in the CCC loan to the 
government, since the lower loan 
would increase the probability of 
world market clearing price being 
above the loan. Lower CCC stocks 
would reduce government costs 
associated with storage of these 
stocks. Third, reduction of the loan 
and target would also reduce gov-
ernment exposure to deficiency 
payment obligations, thereby re-
ducing farm program costs. 
In this scenario, it was assumed 
the federal government chose to 
reduce the loan rate by 10 percent 
($0.80/cwt) in 1986, holding the 
rate at that level through 1988. The 
$3. 90/cwt maximum deficiency 
payment limitation was not 
changed, causing target price in 
1986-88 to also fall by $0.80 to 
$10.71/cwt. The set-aside and paid 
diversion portions of the program 
were assumed not to change, as 
was farmer participation rate. 
The Grant, Beach, and Lin (1984) 
model projected government car-
ryovers would be reduced under 
the new policy, with 1988 carryover 
10 percent below the base level. 
Public carryovers were also re-
duced about 9 percent from the 
1988 base, largely because of a 3.5 
percent reduction in U.S. rice pro-
duction. Production fell because of 
the target price reduction. Despite 
the favorable effects of reduced 
production and lower carryover, 
farm price fell below base levels by 
6 to 19 ¢./cwt in 1986-88. The loan 
rate reduction was primarily re-
sponsible for the lower prices, the 
loan acting as a floor for domestic 
rice prices. A 10 percent decline in 
the floor price caused farm price to 
fall by 2 percent or less primarily 
because of the positive price effects 
of lower production. 
RICESIM results for the four 
strategies examined under this 
scenario are in Table 43. The 
change in policy had a moderate 
impact on most analysis variables. 
Probabilities of survival fell by as 
much as 8 percentage points below 
base results for the four strategies 
analyzed. Average ending equity 
ratios for solvent iterations 
changed little, suggesting the poli-
cy only hurt the farm operation 
when it was already in a weak 
position. Government payments 
and mean after-tax NPV also de-
clined, but the change suggests the 
new policy would not have nearly 
the adverse effect on the farm oper-
ation as would other policies ex-
amined in this study. 
Three factors were responsible 
for this result. The target prices and 
loan rates assumed in the base, 
combined with rising mean rice 
prices over time, resulted in the 
farm manager being less depen-
dent on income supports during 
the last 3 years of the 5-year study 
period. Changing the program for 
the last 3 years, then, had less 
impact on the manager than it 
would have had if the policy 
change occurred in 1984. Secondl)j 
in some of the base scenario itera-
tions, the farm manager was con-
strained by the payment limitation 
from obtaining all the deficiency 
payment he/she had qualified for. 
Reducing the loan rate and target 
price by 10 percent, therefore, did 
not cause a 10 percent reduction in 
the deficiency payments received 
by the farm manager. Third, the 
deficiency payment rate was main-
tained so the level of income was 
largely unchanged. The effect of 
the new farm polic)j therefore, was 
moderate. 
Allotment Program 
Until 1974, a combined acreage 
allotment and marketing quota 
were used to stabilize rice prices at 
high levels. Many managers who 
farmed both during the era of mar-
ket controls and since 1974, when a 
freer market has prevailed, have 
expressed support for a return to 
production controls. Supporters 
believe market controls would 
TABLE 44. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - IMPLEMENT AT ION OF ACREAGE ALLOTMENT PROGRAM 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 26 56 38 54 
Change 
from Base: -24 -26 -34 -24 
Probabi I ity 
of Success (%): 6 20 10 20 
Change 
from Base: -6 -32 -10 -20 
Mean NPV ($): -304,963. -170,183. -260,408. -194,111. 
Change 
from Base: -97,796. -147,000. -127,767. -141,845. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(Solvent Iterations): 0.557 0.639 0.577 0.603 
Change 
from Base: -0.049 -0.040 -0.019 -0.056 
Mean Yearly Government 
Payments ($): 25,577. 37,156. 35,094. 48,375. 
Change 
from Base: -4,243. -10,594. -8,909. -8,327. 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
eliminate many of the overproduc-
tion problems plaguing the rice in-
dustr)j reduce price uncertaint)j 
increase expected price, and re-
duce government expenditures. 
In this scenario, an acreage allot-
ment program for rice was adopted 
after 1985. All farm managers were 
required to participate in the pro-
gram and to set-aside 35 percent of 
base acreage. The acreage set-aside 
allowed planting to other crops. 
The allotment was assumed to re-
duce price variability to pre-1974 
levels, i.e., 21 percent of base 
variance levels (Grant et al. 1984). 
Based on results from the Grant, 
Beach, and Lin (1984) model, im-
plementing an allotment on rice 
acreage did have some moderately 
positive effects. Production was re-
duced by 6 percent from 1988 base 
levels and carryover in 1988 was 3 
percent below base levels. The 
small decline in production had 
some effect on prices, causing 
prices to rise by $0.15/cwt, 
$0.26/cwt, and $0.33/cwt above 
1986, 1987, and 1988 base levels, 
respective! y. 
RICESIM results for the repre-
sentative farm are given in Table 44. 
The effect of the allotment on the 
representative farm was strongly 
negative. Probabilities of survival 
fell by 24 to 34 percentage points 
below base levels. Average after-tax 
NPV fell by $100,000 or more for all 
strategies. Government payments 
fell by about 15 percent, a large 
change considering the figure in-
cludes government payments dur-
ing 2 years when the allotment 
program was not in effect. 
Again, several factors are re-
sponsible for this result. The allot-
ment program offered only modest 
increases in expected rice price. 
The farm manager gave up the paid 
acreage diversion program, how-
ever, when the allotment program 
was adopted. Although soybeans 
were planted on the formerly di-
verted acreage, returns were lower 
and more variable than those as-
sociated with the paid diversion 
program. More importantly, re-
ducing rice price variance had a 
negative impact on the farm opera-
tion. In the base analysis, the high 
rice price variance made possible 
the occasional observation prices 
above the target price. The loan 
and target price programs pro-
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TABLE 45. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR LIBERTY COUNTY RICE AND SOYBEAN 
FARM - RETURN TO FREE MARKET AFTER 1985 
Analysis Variables SSR 1/2 SSR 1/7 SR 1/2 SR 1/7 
Probability 
of Survival (%): 22 42 34 26 
Change 
from Base: -28 -40 -38 -52 
Probab i I ity 
of Success (%): 4 12 4 8 
Change 
from Base: -8 -40 -16 -32 
Mean NPV ($): -310,945. -255,036. -304,785. -362,022. 
Change 
from Base: -103,778. -231,853. -172,144. -309,756. 
Mean Ending Equity Ratio 
(So I vent Iterations): 0.568 0.595 0.525 0.573 
Change 
from Base: -0.038 -0.084 -0.071 -0.086 
Mean Ending Equity 
Ratio (All Iterations): 0.239 0.285 0.238 0.106 
Change 
from Base: -0.142 -0.301 -0.235 -0.449 
See Table 6 for definition of the analysis variables. 
vided price and income protection 
from low prices in the base analy-
sis. When variance was reduced, 
the probability of observing a price 
above the target level was reduced 
to near zero. Without the occasion-
al higher prices to provide an occa-
sional boost to the farm's financial 
situation, the farm was worse off 
than in the base scenario. The allot-
ment program, then, does provide 
a beginning for solving many mac-
ro level problems with rice farm 
policy, but it does so at consider-
able cost to the farm manager ex-
amined in this analysis. 
Return to Free Market 
Another alternative advocated 
by some in agriculture is a market-
oriented farm policy. At the ex-
treme, this type of a policy could be 
implemented by completely 
eliminating farm programs, includ-
ing target price, government CCC 
loan, and paid acreage diversion. 
Government would not interfere in 
any way with the marketplace, al-
lowing world supply and demand 
situations to determine the market 
price. A free market policy would 
be a substantial departure from 
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past policy for rice, the crop having 
been subject to an allotment pro-
gram or target price program since 
1954 (Holder and Grant 1979). 
In this scenario, the free market 
policy after 1985 was adopted for 
rice only; the loan provisions of the 
soybean program were in place to 
examine the effect of the new rice 
policy. Because the Grant, Beach, 
and Lin (1984) model was de-
veloped using data from a non-free 
market period, its limitation in this 
scenario should be recognized. 
The structural relationships could 
be altered should agriculture take 
on a free market orientation for all 
crops. The model, however, does 
account for many of the non-policy 
influences on the rice market and 
so was used to predict rice prices in 
a free market. 
Carryover stocks held by the 
government at the end of 1985 
were projected at 24 million hun-
dredweight. With termination of 
the farm program, the government 
was assumed to rid itself of excess 
stocks as rapidly as possible. As a 
result, rice price was projected to 
fall below the base scenario price 
by $0.90/cwt in 1986 and $1.22/cwt 
in 1987. Contributing to the de-· 
pressed price situation was an in-
crease in rice acreage, caused by 
eliminating the set-aside re-
quirement. By 1988, the govern-
ment no longer held rice stocks and 
production began to fall in re-
sponse to low rice prices, causing 
prices to rise over $1/cwt above 
1987levels. Public holdings of rice 
stocks increased dramatically, 
however, as government stocks 
were eliminated. By 1988, public 
stocks were projected at 55 million 
hundredweight, a level close to the 
1988 stocks in the base scenario for 
government and private stock-
holders. 
RICESIM results for the repre-
sentative farm are given in Table 45. 
The effect of the free market policy 
was a large reduction in all analysis 
variables. Probabilities of survival 
fell by as much as 52 percentage 
points and mean NPV by over 
$300,000. Probabilities that the rep-
resentative farm would be solvent 
in 1989 ranged from only 22 per-
cent for the SSR 1/2 strategy to 42 
percent for the SSR 1/7 strategy. In 
general, the SSR 1/7 strategy con-
tinued to be predominant among 
the four strategies. The SR strate-
gies performed more poorly, a not-
too-surprising result since the free 
market scenario was implemented 
only for rice. 
In summary, the move to a free 
market policy had an adverse nega-
tive effect in the short run on the 
viability and financial position of a 
typical rice and soybean farmer in 
the Upper Gulf Coast. Prices fell 
sharply and production was slow 
to react to the adverse situation. 
Much of the carryover stocks held 
in the past by the government 
were, in essence, shifted to the 
private sector. Government pay-
ments were virtually eliminated. 
At the micro level, the representa-
tive farm was negatively affected 
by the free market policy. 
CONCLUSIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many conclusions and recom-
mendations can be made from the 
study results. The results are limit-
ed by the examination of only one 
farm, rather than examination of 
many different types of farms. Yet, 
because many scenarios were ex-
amined, insight can be gained into 
commercial farms currently operat-
ing in the Upper Gulf Coast area 
that are similar to the farm studied. 
As mentioned before, the absolute 
numbers given in the different 
scenarios are not as useful as the 
general pattern they illustrate. The 
conclusions and recommendations 
are separated into categories di-
rected at (a) farm managers, 
(b) policymakers, (c) researchers, 
and (d) other groups. 
Farm Managers 
. The principal objective of the 
study was to identify the preferred 
crop rotation and tenure arrange-
ment among those currently used 
by Liberty County farmers. Of the 
two principal tenure arrangements 
examined, a strategy utilizing a 1/7 
share arrangement was predomi-
nant in every case. The 1/2 share 
arrangement offered some signifi-
cant benefits, including protection 
from high water costs, a lower risk 
level for the farm, and a method to 
sidestep the payment limitation. 
The price to the farmer for these 
benefits, nevertheless, was too 
high. With the large share (1/2) of 
the crop going to the landowner, 
the farmer was left with insufficient 
cash flow to meet farm operation 
needs. The results suggest that 
farm managers similar to the study 
farmer would benefit from the 1/7 
share arrangement. Because bene-
fits to the landowner are so lucra-
tive under a 1/2 share arrangement, 
the farm manager may find it dif-
ficult to obtain a 1/7 share arrange-
ment from his/her landowner. 
Cash rent of less that $30/ A and 
land ownership with low debt are 
alternatives that may be preferred 
by the farmer over the 1/7 share 
arrangement. 
Recommendations as to an opti-
mal crop rotation are not as clear. 
The SR rotation is somewhat less 
risky than the SSR rotation, but 
may generate a smaller return to 
the farmer. Despite the higher risk 
level, the SSR rotation can be rec-
ommended as the preferred rota-
tion with several qualifications at-
tached to the recommendation: 
(1) Government deficiency and di-
version payments must be limited 
to less than $100,000 for the farmer, 
with more restrictive limits causing 
the SSR to be even more preferred, 
(2) red rice must be less of a prob-
lem in the SSR than SR rotation, 
(3) a 1/7 share land rental arrange-
ment must be followed, and (4) 
soybeans must be at least as profit-
able as assumed in the base analy-
sis. Of course, the presence of so 
many qualifications makes the 
choice of a rotation highly depen-
dent on the particular farm situa-
tion. If the farm manager is re-
quired to rent land under a 1/2 
share arrangement, for example, 
he/she would benefit by following 
a SR rotation. 
Variable production costs were 
highly influential in determining 
the continued viability of the repre-
sentative farm. A 10 percent 
change in variable costs was shown 
to have a major impact on all analy-
sis variables. The importance to 
farmers of cost containment in 
their operations can,not be overem-
phasized. As an example, consider 
the scenario in which water costs 
were reduced by $26 to $40/A. Both 
117 share strategies realized sub-
stantial benefits from this lower 
water cost. Yet any combined re-
duction in all costs of $26/A, while 
maintaining yield and quality fac-
tors, would generate the same re-
sults (for those using the 1/7 share 
strategies). 
One of the best ways to reduce 
production costs is through adop-
tion of new technology. The Le-
mont rice variety, for example, had 
a positive impact on the represent-
ative farm. In part, this positive 
impact was the result of a reduction 
in per unit production costs when 
using the new variety. The as-
sumed rapid adoption of Lemont 
also was a positive factor for the 
farm manager. By quickly adopting 
Lemont (or any other new technol-
ogy), he/she was able to obtain the 
benefits inherent with the new va-
riety much sooner, thereby increas-
ing profits earlier. In addition, the 
manager enjoyed the benefits 
(higher yields) before the negative 
effects (lower prices) had had an 
opportunity to occur. The Lemont 
results suggest any new technolo-
gy, whether it be a new crop vari-
ety, a new small business compu-
ter, or a more fuel-efficient tractor, 
may give the farm manager the 
competitive edge needed to stay in 
business. The results for irrigated 
soybeans suggest that some poten-
tially profitable new technologies 
may not yet be in general use. More 
economic research is needed, how-
ever, to quantify the potential ben-
efits and costs of the new tech-
nologies. 
Ratoon acreage had little positive 
impact and sometimes had a nega-
tive effect on the representative 
farm. The small profit margin and 
high yield variability were partly 
responsible for the unimportance 
of ratoon rice. More important was 
the small share ratoon rice con-
stituted of total farm income. Giv-
en current technology, Upper Gulf 
Coast farmers should carefully 
consider the decision to produce 
ratoon rice. Ratoon rice production 
is more favorable under a 1/2 crop 
share arrangement or when the 
farm manager has not reached the 
deficiency payment limitation. 
Off-farm income is important, 
even to a farm operation of the size 
modelled in this study. This income 
reduces variability of cash flows to 
the farm manager and provides a 
source of cash during bad years. 
Off-farm income is especially im-
portant to a farmer utilizing a 1/2 
crop share arrangement because 
cash flow is more of a problem 
under this tenure arrangement. 
The use of leverage in financial 
management is sometimes referred 
to as a "double-edged sword." 
Farmers experienced the positive 
edge of the leverage sword in the 
1970's, with large increases in asset 
(particularly land) values occurring 
almost every year. Now farmers 
are learning about the other side of 
the leverage sword. Based on re-
sults in this study, some Upper 
Gulf Coast farmers are going to 
continue to suffer because of too 
much debt. For farm managers in a 
high to intermediate debt position 
(i.e., those holding less than 60 
percent equity in their operations) 
the results sound a clear signal; 
take on no more debt than is neces-
57 
sary to survive. In fact, it may be 
better to liquidate the farm opera-
tion if debt is at intermediate to 
high levels, since the probability of 
losing remaining equity is high. 
For farm managers with little or no 
debt, however, expansion through 
debt financing may not be harmful 
in the short run and may be profit-
able in the long run. The farm 
manager who owns all his/her land 
free of any debt should be able to 
borrow 20 percent of the farm's 
asset value and use the money to 
purchase additional land without 
seriously risking farm insolvency. 
Upper Gulf Coast farmers 
should participate in the govern-
ment program as much as possible. 
To refrain from participating is the 
equivalent of financial suicide. Sev-
eral farm program alternatives sug-
gested for the 1985 farm bill were 
analyzed. All the alternatives ex-
amined left the farm manager 
worse off than continuing the cur-
rent program through 1988. Of the 
alternative programs suggested, 
the least detrimental program to 
the representative farm was the 10 
percent reduction in target price 
and loan rate. 
Policy Makers 
The farm debt problem has be-
come a much discussed topic 
among government policy makers. 
The results from the study offer 
several insights into the proposals 
that may be enacted by the govern-
ment. First, any proposed debt re-
lief program should be targeted to 
those in need. Farm managers in a 
low debt position simply do not 
need financial assistance from the 
government. Second, if the mac-
roeconomic scenario assumed in 
the study becomes a reality, noth-
ing short of a massive buy down of 
debt or large increases in capital 
gain rates on land will save farm 
managers in a high debt situation 
from insolvency. Any debt buy-
down program will be extremely 
expensive to taxpayers. Third, be-
cause declines in land value are 
partly responsible for the current 
debt crisis, policies aimed at halt-
ing or reversing this decline may 
prove as effective as current pro-
posals in dealing with the debt 
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cns1s. As demonstrated in the 
scenario reenacting 1978-81 mac-
roeconomic policy, increases in as-
set values and improved prices 
may more than compensate for the 
negative effects of inflation. An in-
flationary policy may well be the 
best debt relief program the federal 
government could devise. 
A continuation of the current 
rice farm policy was predicted to 
cause increases in stocks held by 
private individuals and by the gov-
ernment. In addition, an extension 
of the current program would like-
ly continue to be very expensive to 
taxpayers. By contrast, all pro-
posed alternatives for rice farm pol-
icy left the representative farm 
manager worse off, but generated 
some positive benefits for society 
as a whole. Elimination of the 
target price program, reduction of 
the target price and loan rate levels, 
an allotment program, and return 
to a free market all reduced ac-
cumulation of CCC stocks and gov-
ernment payments. 
The decline in exports and high 
interest rates has caused farmers to 
become more dependent than ever 
on government farm programs. 
The President, Secretary of Agri-
culture, and many members of 
Congress are advocating return to 
a free market situation in agricul-
ture (USDA 1985; Stenholm 1985; 
Helms 1985). Given this scenario, a 
reasonable alternative could be to 
hold changes in target price and 
loan rates to something less than 
100 percent of changes in costs. If 
costs of production increased 5 per-
cent in 1 year, for example, target 
price and loan rate could increase 
by 90 percent of that amount, or 4.5 
percent. By use of such a mecha-
nism, government programs 
would slowly become ineffective 
and agriculture would return to a 
free market orientation. 
Research Scientists 
Several of the results have im-
portant implications to agrono-
mists. Development of new tech-
nology in agriculture is looked up-
on by many agronomists as making 
all farmers better off. This is not 
always true. The scenarios involv-
ing Lemont provide a case in point. 
The farm manager was better off 
with Lemont than without it, be-
cause the negative price effects 
were minimized by the govern-
ment farm program. Consider, 
though, the farmer who does not 
or cannot adopt Lemont. He/she is 
not better off and may well be 
worse off because of Lemont. Tech-
nology, though beneficial to society 
as a whole, may well be harmful to 
some segments of society. Physical 
scientists should carefully consider 
the benefits and costs of a potential 
technology before commiting re-
sources towards its development. 
When appraising the impact of a 
new technology, researchers 
should consider examining more 
than the expected return of the 
new technology. Variance and 
higher statistical moments may al-
so be important. In addition, evalu-
ations of new technology would be 
more useful if made in context of 
the situation that may result from 
the new technology. When a new 
technology is expected to reduce 
prices, for example, technology 
should be evaluated using the low-
er price. To do otherwise results in 
biased results and a recommenda-
tion of technology development 
that may not be justified. 
The results also provide impor-
tant information about the behav-
ior of simulation models. The type 
of distributional form used to gen-
erate random variables has a large 
impact on the results. Researchers 
using simulation models should 
make every attempt to learn about 
past and expected future behavior 
of random variables. Historical da-
ta and subjective expectations of 
farmers and physical scientists 
merit careful consideration when 
deciding on the type of distribution 
utilized. 
Correlation of random variables 
is also important in a Monte Carlo 
simulation analysis. As demon-
strated in this study, even the use 
of the same correlation matrix may 
have a different effect on one crop 
rotation - tenure arrangement 
strategy than on another. Correla-
tion commonly occurs between 
crop yields and between crop 
prices. Contrary to assumptions 
made in other studies (Skees and 
Reid 1984), correlation may also 
occur between price and yields and 
so should not be automatically dis-
missed. 
The RICESIM model performed 
satisfactorily in attaining the ob-
jectives of the study. A major ad-
vantage in using RICESIM was the 
freedom allowed in parameteriza-
tion of the model. Few assump-
tions made in the study were im-
posed within the framework of 
RICESIM. In addition, underlying 
reason or cause for the results was 
almost always discernable, al-
though at times the results were 
initially counterintuitive. 
RICESIM is a complex simula-
tion model. Because of its complex-
ity and large data requirements, 
errors were identified in both the 
data set and the model itself. Solu-
tions for the base scenario, for ex-
ample, were obtained perhaps a 
dozen times. Sensitivity analyses 
were very helpful in identifying 
errors. In addition, the sensitivity 
analyses provided additional in-
sights in to the base and other 
scenarios. For these reasons, re-
searchers using RICESIM should 
undertake some sensitivity anal-
yses before accepting and pub-
lishing results. 
Despite the satisfactory use of 
RICESIM in the study, several im-
provements could be made in the 
model and data set used for analy-
sis. Correlation of random vari-
ables using farm level data would 
be more appropriate than using 
county data, as was used in this 
study. Also correlating variables 
between years would more fully 
account for interaction that may 
occur in the real world. Price, and 
perhaps yield, distributions should 
widen over time (i.e., variance 
should increase), reflecting the 
greater uncertainty one faces when 
attempting to predict what these 
parameters will be in the future. 
Other Groups 
The financial results provide sev-
eral items of interest to lending 
institutions. A lender's credit poli-
cy has a significant impact on sur-
vivability of some farm operations. 
Most farm operations, however, 
will survive or fail regardless of the 
credit policy imposed by a financial 
institution. A credit policy leverage 
ratio of 1.0 is too restrictive for farm 
managers at intermediate debt 
levels, because it probably will pre-
maturely force farm operations in-
to insolvency. A credit policy of 4. 0, 
on the other hand, is probably too 
lax because it allows farm mana-
gers in a high debt position to con-
tinue farming, even though there is 
little chance they can achieve an 
acceptable equity position. The 2.0 
leverage ratio appears to offer lend-
ers a reasonable credit policy al-
ternative; liquidating farm opera-
tions with little hope of recovery 
but permitting sufficient credit to 
allow recovery from bad years. The 
results indicate that farming in the 
Upper Gulf Coast region can be 
profitable in certain situations. De-
spite recent events in the agricul-
ture economy, lenders should not 
categorically refuse credit to all 
farmers. An above-average farm 
manager who maintains a low debt 
level on his farm operation will 
survive in agriculture. 
Landowners should take note of 
the crop rotation being followed by 
the farm manager. When farming 
under a crop-share tenure arrange-
ment, the farm manager's choice of 
a crop rotation may or may not be 
in the best interest of the landown-
er. Landowners should be aware of 
production costs and attempt to 
contain cost increases where possi-
ble, but still allow the farm mana-
ger to operate in a profit-
maximizing manner. Marten (1985) 
suggests farm managers re-
negotiate cash leases down as a 
means of "thriving" in the current 
year. Results in this study suggest 
the need to renegotiate crop share 
leases may also be necessary to 
reflect the current high cost-low 
return farming situation. The 1/2 
crop share arrangement, in par-
ticular, appears to give the land-
owner a higher return than is jus-
tified under current conditions. As 
an alternative, a 40 percent crop 
share (and cost share) arrangement 
may be more appropriate and will 
improve the probability of the farm 
manager surviving the next 5 
years. 
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of probability, the SSR 1/7 strategy 
offers a higher NPV of returns than 
does the SSR 1/2 strategy, i.e., the 
cumulative distribution of the first 
strategy lies completely to the right 
of the latter strategy. All rational 
decisionmakers would choose the 
SSR 1/7 strategy over the SR 1/7 
strategy. The SSR 1/7 strategy 
dominates the SSR 1/2 strategy in 
the first degree. 
SSD exists between F and G if 
and only if 
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xl J [G(x) - F(x)] dx~O. 
-oo for all xi EX 
That is, the cumulative area be-
tween F and G must be positive. 
An example of SSD can be found in 
Figure 7, between the SSR 1/2 
strategy and the SR 1/2 strategy. 
The SR 1/2 strategy almost domi-
nates the SSR 1/2 strategy under 
FSD criteria, but does not because 
the two distributions cross. Under 
SSD, however, the SR 1/2 strategy 
is preferred, since the cumulative 
area between the two is positive for 
this strategy. SSD implicitly as-
sumes individual aversion to risk, 
meaning that risk averse decision-
makers would choose the strategy 
that is preferred in the second de-
gree. A FSD strategy also domi-
nates in the second degree, since 
the SSD criteria are met by any 
function that is also dominated in 
the first degree. 
Stochastic dominance with re-
spect to a function is a technique 
developed by Meyer (1977a). 
Though similar to SSD, SDRF dif-
fers in that the distributions are 
ordered based on the expected util-
ity or satisfaction derived from 
each observation. Each monetary 
value is transformed into its equi-
valent utility value using an utility 
function. The utility function as-
sumed in the study is of the form 
U(x) = - e -rx 
where r is the level of aversion to 
risk assumed for the decisionmak-
er. As r increases, the decision-
maker becomes more averse to 
risk, giving more utility to 
minimizing losses rather than max-
imizing gains. An r equal to zero 
indicates risk neutrality, meaning 
the decisionmaker does not consid-
er risk when deciding which 
strategy to follow. A negative r 
Appendix B. 
Data Sets and Base Results 
I" I. I P S I M 
A GENERAL I"IRM I.EV!L POLICY SIMULATION MODEL 
DEVELOPED AND IMPLEMENTED BY 
~AMES W . RICHARDSON 
AND 
CLAIR J . NIXON 
DEPARTMENT 01" AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS 
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSrTY 
lt!LEASE OAT! I I 30 I IS 
SUMMARY 01" PROGRAM OPTIONS SELECTED IV THE USER 
RESULTS I"ROM SSR ROTATION , liBERTY COUNTY . I"INAI. ANAlYSES . 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS USED I"OR PRICES 
AND YIELDS . WHOLLY LEASED I"ARM ACREAGE, 50~ LONG TERM AND •o~ 
value indicates the decisionmaker 
is a risk taker. The r values used in 
this study ranged from - .0001 
(strongly risk taking) to + .0001 
(strongly risk averse). Under 
SDRF, distribution F is preferred to 
distribution G if and only if 
i;J [G(x)- F(x)] u'(x)dx ~0. 
subject to the constraint 
where u'(x) is the derivative of the 
utility function and r1 and r2 consti-
tute the range over which the equa-
tion holds. The greater the dif-
ference between r1 and r2 the more 
general the recommendation of 
distributional preference can be 
made. For example, when r1 and r2 
are - oo and oo respectively, the equa-
tion criteria is equivalent to FSD. 
When r1 and r2 are 0 and oo, respec-
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LIABILITIES ~OR INITIAL ~ARM 
REAl !STATE DEBT 
LOAN li~E ON OEBT 
~RACTION LAND LOAN REMAININC 
ORICINAL AMOUNT 0' THE LOAN 
CElT TO ASSET RATIO 
IN~ERMEOIAT! TERM DEBT 
LOAN ll~! ON DEBT 
~RACTION LOAN R!MAININC 
ORICINAL AMOUNT 0' THE LOAN 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
OPERATINC LOAN 
~RACTION O' YEAR LOAN IS USED 
TERMS ~OR NEW LOANS 
NO . YEARS ~OR NEW LAND LOANS 
NO . YEARS ~OR NEW MACH LOANS 
MINIMUM EQUITY RATIOS ~OR SOLVENCY 
MINIMUM LONC TERM EQUITY 
MINIMUM INTERMEDIATE TERM EQUITY 
IN,ORMATION ~OR RE~INANCINC DEBTS 
CHARCE TO RE,INANCE CASH ~LOW OE,ICITS 
NO . YEARS ~OR A LONC·TERM LOAN 
NO . YEARS ~DR INTERM·TERM lOAN 
MINIMUM DOWNPAYMENT lEVElS 
MINIMUM DOWNPAYM!NT ~OR ,ARM MACHINERY 
MINIMUM DOWNPAYMENT 'OR ,ARMlANO 
A~TER•TAX DISCOUNT RATE 
ANNUAL RATE 0' RETURN TO PROD ASSETS T•1 
CAPITAL CAIN RATE ~DR lAND IN T•1 
CASH RESERVE ~OR THE 'ARM 
MINIMUM CASH RESERVE 
IECINNINC CASH RESERVE 
CAPITAL ASSETS TO IE RECOVERED (DEPRECIATED) 
IUILDINCS PlACED INTO USE PRIOR TO 1911 
SALVACE VAlUE 
PURCHASE "RICE 
ECONOMIC (DEPRECIATION) LI~E 
RECULAR BUllCINCS PlACED INTO USE A'TER 1910 
PURCHASE PRICE 
CALENDAR YEAR PURCHASED 
SPECIAL PURPOSE IUllDINCS PlACED INTO USE A'TER 
PURCHASE PRICE 
CAlENDAR YEAR PURCHASED 
~IXEO COST S 
PROPERT • TAX RATE (STAX/SVALUE) 
TOTAL P:RSONAL PROPERTY TAX 
OTHER TAXES 
ACCOUNTANT & L!CAL ~!!S 
UNALlOCATED MAINTENANCE COSTS 
INSURANCE ON MACHINERY 
MISCELLANEOUS ~!XED COSTS 
LAND LEASE COSTS 
CASH RENT ~DR CROPLAND ($/ACRE) 
CASH RENT 'OR PASTURELAND ( $/ACRE) 
ANNUAL IN~LATION RATE 'OR 
PER ACRE CASH LEASE COST 
CAPITALIZATION RATE BETWEEN 
LAND VALUE & CROPLAND CASH lEASE COST 
~AMILY CONSUMPTION AND TAX IN~ORMAT!ON 
ACE 0' OPERATOR 
NO . 0~ TAX EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED 
MARCINAL TAX RATE ~DR STATE 
RATIO OP PERSONAL DEOUC TO NET INCOME 
DESIRED TAXABLE INCOME 
AVERACE ANNUAl O~~·~ARM INCOME 
NON·TAXAILE O,,.,ARM INCOME 
ANNUAL RETURN ON D,,.~ARM INVEST 
•tWIMUM 'AMILY liVINC EXPENSES 
MAXIMUM PAMILY liVINC EXPENSES 
10 . 0000 
2300 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0. 9 500 
0 . 5300 
12000 . 0000 
155000 . 000 
117000 . 000 
20000 . 0000 
11000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
515202.000 
0 . 0 
757202 . 000 
11100 . 0000 
221011.000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
212111 . 000 
&1&321 . 000 
0 . 11 32 
O . JIII 
O . &JOI 
1200 . 0000 
0.0 
51&00.0000 
30 . 0000 
0 . 5000 
133100 . 000 
0.&000 
22101 I . 000 
5 , 0000 
0 . 5000 
&52112 . 000 
0 . &000 
0.&220 
30 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 3:33 
0.3333 
0 . 0100 
20 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 3000 
O . JOOO 
0 . 10, 
0 . 0 
0 . 0400 
5000 . 0000 
5000 . 0000 
10500 . 0000 
105000 . 000 
30 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1910 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 003JJO 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
3200 , 0000 
5000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
&5 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0.2000 
0.0 
0 . 0 
1&000 . 0000 
0 . 1 100 
11000 , 0000 
25000 . 0000 
~s•••s SPECIPI!D CONSUMPTION PUNCTIDN USED IP THE OPTION IS ELECTED 
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INCOME TAX PAYMENT DUE IN YEAR 1 
S!~F·!MP~OYMENT TAX PAYMENT DUE IN YEA~ 1 
TAXABLE INCOME IN YEAR T·3 
TAXA~LE INCOME IN YEAR T•2 
TAXASLE INCOME IN YEAR T·1 
MAXIMUM INT!R!ST DEDUCTION IF OPTION IS USED 
RISK AVERSION COEFFICIENT 
HIREC FARM LAlOR 
NO . OF FULL TIM! EMPLOY!!$ 
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY FOR FULL·TIM! EMPLOY!! 
HOURLY WAG! RATE FOR PART·TIME LABOR 
ANNUAL INTEREST RATES 19a4 11a5 
OLO LONG•T!RM LOANS 
OLD !NTERMEOIATE·T!RM LOANS 
NEW LONG•T!RM LOANS 
NEW I NTERMEDIATE- T ERM LOANS 
REFINANCE LONG•T!RM LOANS 
REFINANCE INT!RM·T!RM LOANS 
OPERATING LOANS 
RECEIVED FOR CASH R!SERV!S 
0 . 1 175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1310 
0 . 1 4ao 
0 . 1310 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1520 
o. 11 ao 
0 . 1 175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1 170 
0 . 1490 
0 . 1170 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1540 
0 . 1113 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN SELECTED COSTS 
N!W FARM MACHINERY 
US!O F ARM MACHINERY 
FIXED COST , INS I TAX 
S!!D COSTS 
FERTILIZER I LIM! 
CHEMICAL COSTS 
FUEL & LUSE COSTS 
REPAIRS ON MACHINERY 
OTHER PROD COST 
CUS T OM COSTS 
H I RED LAlOR COSTS 
OFF·FARM INVESTMENT 
PURCHASED INP UTS FOR L I VEST 
FARMLAND VALUES 
8UILDING VALUES 
OFF • FARM STORAGE COSTS 
OTHER ANNUAL DATA FOR THE FARM 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0931 
0.0674 
0 . 0720 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0064 
0.0540 
0 . 0540 
o . 11 ao 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0 . 0200 
0 . 0 
tla4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0313 
0 . 0727 
0 . 01 10 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 1 110 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
O . OC70 
, as 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0000 
13aoo . oooo 
3.3500 
uas 11a7 
0 . 1 175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1010 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1010 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1510 
0 . 1 1 10 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0 
0 . 0450 
-0 . 0640 
0 . 0570 
0 . 0605 
0.0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0. 1 1 10 
0 . 0 
0 . 07 1 0 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0450 
11 a & 
0 . 1 175 
0. 1 soo 
0 . 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 1420 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0100 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
o . o4ao 
0 . 0410 
0 . 04ao 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0410 
19a7 
1t a a 
0 . 1 175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 1 C20 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0100 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0.0500 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0.0500 
1taa 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
N!W CAPITAL INVESTED IN FAR 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 310 . 60 323 . 90 339 . 00 356 . 20 374 . 00 
OTHER FARM INCOME 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
SELF I!MPLOVMENT TAX RATE 0.140 0 . 141 0 . 143 0 . 143 0 . 150 0 . 0 
MAXIMUM I NCOME SUSJUCT TO 
SI!LF I!MPLOPYMI!NT TAX 37201 . 00 31103 . 00 40612 . 00 42672 . 00 44&05 . 00 0 . 0 
SUMMARY OF THE OWNED MACHINERY 
TRACTOR156HP 
TRACTOR155HP 
TRACTOR165HP 
TRACTOR ISHP 
TRCTR 226HP 
TRC T R 229HP 
COMBINE 7720 
COMSINE 7 7 20 
COMS!Nf 7 720 
PCKUP 1 / 2TON 
PCKUP 1 / 2TON 
PC KUP 1 / 2TON 
DSK 22 ' 9" 
DSK 22 ' 9 " 
OSK 24 ' 4 " 
OSK 24 ' 4 • 
ROLL CU~T 
ROL L CU LT 
!IN PLANT a • 
!IN P~ANT a • 
CRAIN CART 
GRA I N CAR T 
LO PL 16X60 
LO PL 1 6X60 
L EV!! IOXES 
LEVEE P~OW 
LEVEE PUSH 
L!V!E ROLLER 
FLO CUL 31 ' 
FLO CUL 31' 
I'LO CUL 25 
8fOOER I ROW 
8EOOER a ROW 
PIPE HARROW 
PIPE HARROW 
OU•ALL 
MI SC TRUCKS 
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YEAR 
PURCHASED 
1910 . 0 
1 9 7 9 . 0 
1913 . 0 
1975 . 0 
197a . o 
1 9 a 1 . o 
1979 . 0 
19a3 . 0 
19ao . o 
19a3 . 0 
19 7 1 . 0 
1 9 7 6 . 0 
19a2 . 0 
19ao . o 
19 a 1 . o 
197a . o 
19a2 . 0 
1 9 7 9 . 0 
1976 . 0 
1912.0 
1 9 a 1 . o 
1975 . 0 
1971 . 0 
1977 . 0 
19&2 . 0 
1 9 a 1 . o 
19 a 1 . o 
197a . o 
19a2 . 0 
19 a 1 . o 
197& . 0 
1976 . 0 
1 9 7 9 . 0 
1979.0 
1 tao . o 
117a . o 
1977 . 0 
COMPLEMENT 
CURREN T ORIGINAL ESTIMATED 
MARKET PU~CHASE SALVACE 
VALUE P~ICE VALUE 
33474 . 0 3979a . o 39ao . o 
31769 . 0 33561 . 0 3357 . 0 
11700 . 0 11700 . 0 0 . 0 
7717 . 0 
34945.0 
50&17 . 0 
51909 . 0 
94000 . 0 
55aa2 . 0 
9000 . 0 
3425 . 0 
2375 . 0 
7500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
5000 . 
3500 . 
2000 . 0 
1500 . 0 
4500.0 
4500 . 0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
7376 . 0 
3000 . 0 
1000 . 0 
15C7 . 0 
700 . 0 
350 . 0 
5500 . 0 
C500.0 
2500 . 0 
1036 . 0 
1500.0 
1000 . 0 
1100 . 0 
3500 . 0 
50000 . 0 
10017 . 0 
52C75 . 0 
74521 . 0 
53116 . 0 
9&000 . 0 
51&a1 . 0 
9000 . 0 
453& . 0 
3a76 . 0 
1 1500 . 0 
1100.0 
1 1500 . 0 
!200 . 0 
4200 . 0 
3900 . 0 
&37 1 . 0 
7000 . 0 
4711 . 0 
1320 . 0 
7500 . 0 
1000.0 
7500 . 0 
1553 . 0 
2100 . 0 
350 . 0 
7900 . 0 
7100 . 0 
5100 . 0 
1 100 . 0 
3500 . 0 
1020 . 0 
1600 . 0 
1600 . 0 
10000.0 
1009 . 0 
524a . o 
7462 . 1 
5319 . 0 
0 . 0 
&1aa . o 
0 . 0 
454 . 0 
3&a . o 
0 . 0 
sao . o 
0 . 0 
920 . 0 
0 . 0 
390 . 0 
437 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
132 . 0 
7&0 . 0 
aoo . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
35 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
5&0 . 0 
1 10 . 0 
350 . 0 
102 . 0 
160 . 0 
110 . 0 
1000 . 0 
DE,.RECI· 
AT ION 
Ll F! 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
'7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
'7 . 0 
'7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
ACCUM . 
ECONOMIC RECOV!RY 
Lll'l! (O!PREC . ) 
7 . 0 30479 . 5 
7 . 0 21070 . 3 
7 . 0 9255 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
'7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
0.0 
107& . 0 
45037 . 0 
432&& . 2 
C3116 . 7 
1&100 . 0 
4S772 . 9 
1350 . 0 
3!35 . 3 
3&aa . o 
&255 . 0 
7249.0 
6670 . 0 
7 s 7 a . 1 
1 55 4. 0 
3 1 7 4 . 9 
3934 . 0 
2590 . 0 
2736 . & 
1 1 a a . o 
6590 . 5 
7200 . 0 
2775 . 0 
906 . 5 
1211 . 0 
303 . 5 
2923 . 0 
4111 . 0 
5029 . 7 
990 . 0 
2&49 . 2 
a30 . 3 
1 1 a J. . 5 
745'7 . a 
52031 . 4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MACHINERY CURRENT CDST 
REPLACEMENT REP LACE . RECOVERY 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
COO! COST "!RICO OR CLASS 
0 . 0 81700.0 5 . 0 
0 . 0 11700 . 0 5 . 0 
0 . 0 11700 . 0 5 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
19900 . 0 
14aoo . o 
14aoo . o 
94000 . 0 
14000 . 0 
94000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
15300 . 0 
15300 . 0 
1 9300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
5200 . 0 
5200 . 0 
10250 . 0 
10250 . 0 
&aoo . o 
6100 . 0 
17SOO . O 
1 7500 . 0 
1 1250 . 0 
2aoo . o 
2500 . 0 
&50 . 0 
9aoo . o 
saoo . o 
9100 . 0 
5400 . 0 
5&00 . 0 
2100 . 0 
2100 . 0 
1 1 500 . 0 
10000 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
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SUMMARY OF CROP !NT!RPR!S! COSTS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2NO SOYII!ANS 
FIRS T RIC! 
RATOON RIC! 
S!!O 
1 . 4S 
9 . 4S 
ll.IO 
0 . 0 
~!RT·LIM! CH!MICALS FU!L·LUB! 
1 4 . ll 
14. l I 
51 . 00 
l . ll 
••S/ACR!•• 
45 . 4S 12.1a 
45.45 12.61 
1'7.51 1a . lo 
2 . 50 0.0 
MONTHLY LABOR R!OU!R!M!NTS P!R ACR! , 
.JAN . 
BY CROP !NT!RPRIS! 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYIII!ANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
HOURS OF UNPAID ~AMILY LAIIOR 
0 . 240 
0 . 240 
0 . 2'7S 
0 . 0 
F!ll . MAR . APRIL 
o . 45a o . 1os o . 546 
0 . 45a 0 . 105 O . S46 
O . la'7 1 . JaO O . S11 
0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
MAY 
1. 241 
1 . 24a 
1 . '7l0 
0 . 0 
R!PAIRS OTH!R HARV!ST COST 
S/-Yl!LO UNIT 
0 . 4500 
0.4500 
6 . 1'7 
6 . 1., 
1.'71 
0 . 0 
.JUN! 
0 . 414 
0 . 4a4 
1 . 111 
0 . 0 
9.14 
'. 1 4 
'71 . 20 
5 . '7S 
.JULY 
0 . 215 
0 . 295 
1 . 2., l 
0 . 0 
AUG . 
0 . 404 
0 . 404 
0 . 1'7'7 
0 . 101 
I .2l00 
1 . 2l00 
S!PT . 
0 . 1 OS 
0 . 1 OS 
0.214 
o . ola 
OCT . 
O . S5'7 
O . SS'7 
0. 111 
0 . 61a 
NOV . 
0 . '71'7 
0 . 797 
0 . 15' 
0 . 0 
O!C . 
0 . 105 
0 . 10S 
0 . 222 
0 . 0 
AVAILAILE !ACH MONTH 400 . 00 400.00 100.00 100 . 00 '750.00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 400 . 00 
HOURS WORK!O EACH MONTH IY A 
FULL TIM! !MPLOY!! 250.00 lOO . OO l50 . 00 l50 . 00 l50 . 00 l50 . 00 liO . OO l50 . 00 lOO . OO lOO . OO 250 . 00 250 . 00 
ANNUAL M!AN OR MODAL CROP Yl!LOS 
1ST SOYI!ANS 
"14 
2l . I 9 
22 . a4 
50.0l 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
FIRST RIC! 
RATOON RICE 1 • 14 
ANNUAL MI!AN OR MODAL CROP PRICES 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
1914 
1 . 33 
1 . 33 
I . 54 
a . ll 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
F IR ST RIC! 
RATOON IIIC! 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE CROPM!X 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RIC:! 
CROP SHARE LEASING IV CROP 
ACRES 
PLANTED 
YEAR 1 
'7ll. lO 
'731 . 30 
'731 . 40 
'7l1 . 40 
Ill 5 
24 . 1 '7 
2l.l1 
56 . I 9 
1 . II 
191S 
7 . 45 
'7 . 45 
IO . OS 
l . l4 
Ill I 
24.1'7 
2l . '71 
10 . '73 
1 • 1 a 
1916 
7.92 
'7 . 12 
10 . 40 
9 . 11 
ACR!S MINIMU,_. 
HARV!ST!O FRACTION 
YfAR1 01" MIX 
194.'70 0 . 0 
194 . '70 0 . 0 
'724 . 10 0 . 0 
'724 . 10 0 . 0 
111'7 
25 . 1 '7 
24.2'7 
I 1. l4 
2 . 00 
111'7 
1 . 01 
I . 01 
10 . 13 
10 . 07 
MAXIMUM 
FRACTION 
01" MIX 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
1111 
25 . 11 
24 . '71 
II . I I 
2 . 02 
1911 
1 . 34 
1.34 
1 1 . 2 9 
10 . 50 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
LINKAGE NORMAL 
TO COUlL! FRAC. ACRES 
CROP HARVESTED 
0 . 0 0 . 95 
0 . 0 0 . 95 
0 . 0 0 . 19 
3 . 00 0 . 9 I 
LANDLORD SHARE OF R!C!IPTS I COSTS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CROP S!!O JI'I!RT I CHEMICAL I"UEL I MAC:HIN!RY OTHER 
COSTS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . a5a6 
O . IOa'7 
CUSTOM 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYIII!ANS 
FIIIST R!Cf 
RATOON RICE 
MARKI!T!NG STRATAG!!S 
1ST SOYIII!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RIC:! 
RATOON RIC! 
S!ASONAL PR I C:! INDEX 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYI!ANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
REC!IPTS 
0. 1430 
0 . 1430 
0 . 5000 
0 . 5000 
COSTS LIM! COSTS LUI! REPAIRS 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
1 . 0000 0 . 31l0 0 . 5000 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0.31l0 0 . 5000 0 . 0 0 . 0 
BEGINNING I"RACT!ON 
INVENTORY SOLO NEXT 
TAX YI!AR 
MONTH 
SOLD AJI'TI!R 
HARVEST 
10 . 000 
10 . 000 
MONTH 
SOLO IN 
N!XT YEAR 
1 . 000 241a . IOO 
23ao . ooo 
0 . 0 
'702.400 
O . lOO 
0 . 300 
0 . 0 
1 . 000 
'7 . 000 
10 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
.JAN . FEI . MAR . APRIL MAY .JUNE .JULY AUG . S!PT . 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
.1 • 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
FAC:TOIII!O MATRIX FOR CROP YI!LOS I PRlCES 
2 
CROP YIELDS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2NO SOYII!ANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
CROP PRIC!S 
1ST SOYIII!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RIC:f 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 503 
O . S03 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 515 
0 . 515 
0 . '732 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
O . l15 
0 . :u 5 
0.215 
0 . 533 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
O . lOO 
O . JOO 
0 . 030 
0 . 031 
0 . 951 
0 . 951 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0 . 4ta 
- o . 4 1 a 
0 . 1'7'7 
•0 . 101 
-o . 190 
·0 . 110 
0 . 412 
0 . 0 
·O . :Z4a 
•0 . 241 
·0 . 592 
·0 . 140 
0 . 242 
0 . 242 
0.1'71 
1 . 000 
CUMMULAT!V! DISTRIBUTIONS 01" DEVIATES AIIOUT THE MEAN (OR TR!NO), !XPR!SS!O AS A JI'RACT!ON OF M!AN 
WORK 
0 . 0'790 
0 . 0'790 
0 . 33'70 
O . l370 
OCT . NOV . O!C . 
1 . 000 1 . ooo. 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1. 000 
2 l 4 5 6 '7 I 9 10 
CROP YIELDS 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SDYIIEANS 
FIRST R IC E 
RATOON RICE 
CROP PR I CES 
1ST SDYIIEANS 
2ND SDYIII!ANS 
FIRST IIIC!: 
RATODN RIC!: 
•0 . '719 
-o . 7at 
•0 . 315 
•0. 814 
• 0 . 2'74 
• 0 . 2'74 
• 0 . 416 
·0 . 411 
·0 . 541 
•O.SJO 
·0 . 225 
-o . 317 
•0.231 
•0 . 236 
•0 . 314 
·0 . 314 
•0 . 3'7a 
•0 . 3al 
•0 . tsa 
•0 . Ill 
•O . Oil 
•0 . 0&3 
•0 . 222 
•0 . 222 
COVARIANCE MATRIX 01" N!T INCOM!S ~OR CROPS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2110 SOYII!ANS 
FIRS T RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
1 2 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0 . 258 
·0 . 214 
•0 . 11 6 
• 0 . 12 I 
•0.052 
•0 . 052 
•0 . 01'7 
•0 . 01'7 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0 . Ill 
•0 . 1'71 
•0.0'70 
•0.015 
•0 . 031 
·0 . 031 
•0.025 
·0 . 025 
•0 . 026 
·0 . 045 
•0 . 032 
•0.023 
0 . 0311 
0 . 031 
0 . 129 
0 . 129 
0 . 026 
O.Ol2 
0. 011 
0 . 024 
0 . 048 
0.04a 
0 . 171 
0 . ,., 1 
0 . 135 
0 . 152 
0 . 052 
o . o8s 
0 . 06'7 
0 . 06'7 
0 . 201 
0 . 201 
0 . 301 
O . l10 
0. 121 
0 . 1 I 6 
0 . 226 
0 . 226 
0 . 211 
0 . 211 
0 . 900 
0 . 970 
0 . 361 
0 . '792 
0 . 261 
0 . 261 
0 . 411 
0 . 419 
65 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
01 
10 
66 
SUMMARY OF POliC Y DATA, BY YEAR ANO !Y CROP 
CCC lOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2KO SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
INTEREST RATE I'OR CCC lOANS 
t NTEREST RATE I'OR I'OR lOANS 
11&4 
5.02 
5 . 02 
&. 83 
8 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
OI'I'•I'ARM STORACE COSTS I'OR CROPS UNO!R lOAN 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 30 
2NO SOYBEANS 0.30 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 50 
RATOON RICE O . SO 
11 as 
5.02 
5 . 02 
8 . 63 
8.03 
0 . 12 
0. 12 
0 . 31 
0.31 
0 . 52 
0.52 
TARC!T PRICES , 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
II' THEY ARE NOT TIED TO LOAN RATES 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 53 
1 1 . I 3 
o . o 
0 . 0 
12 . 53 
11 . I 3 
11&6 
5 . 02 
5.02 
1 . &3 
1 . 03 
0. 12 
0 . 12 
0.33 
0.33 
0.55 
0.55 
0.0 
0.0 
12.53 
1 1 • 13 
FLEXIBLE TARCET PRIC!···I'RACTION 01' TARC!T PRICE TO LOAN RAT! 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
DIRECT "I'OR" ENTRY PRICE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOOH RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0.0 
0 . 0 
o.o 
0 . 0 
0.0 
ACTUAL YIELDS LAST 5 YEARS FOR CALCULATINC FARM PROCRAM YIELDS 
1987 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
1 . 63 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 34 
0.34 
0 . 57 
0 . 57 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 53 
1 1 . I 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYBEANS 30 . 00 32.00 17 . 00 10 . 00 
2NO SOYBEANS 30 . 00 32 . 00 17 . 00 10 . 00 
I'IRST RICE 41.a6 31.13 44 . 45 41 . 61 
RATOON RICE 2 . 12 1.65 1.81 1 . 12 
ACTUAL LACCEO PRICES FOR 4 YEARS USEO FOR FlEXIBLE LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2NO SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
PROCRAM (OR BAS!) ACREACE 
\ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
NATIONAl AllOCATION I'ACTOR 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRS T RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
731.33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
731 . 33 
73 1 • J 3 
73 I. 33 
731.33 
o . o 
0 . 0 
1. 00 
1. 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1. 00 
ACREACE SET ASIDE , 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYI!EANS 
FIRST RIC! 
OIVERSION OR liMITATION (I'RACTION) 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0. 0 0 . 0 
0 . 25 0 . 35 
RATOON RICE 0.25 
SLIPPAC! RATE (FRACTION) 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 20 
RATOON RICE 0.20 
PAYMENT RATE FOR ACREACE DIVERSION 
1ST SOY8EANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOY8EANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
TRICC!R PRICE I'OR THE "FOR" 
1ST SOY8EANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
CALl PRICE FOR THE "FOR" 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2NO SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
l!NCTH OF I'ARMER OWNED RESERVE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
STORACE PAYMENT RATE FOR THE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOY8EANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
.. ,oR• 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
PRODUCTION CUARANTEE FOR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOY8EANS 13 . 65 
2ND SOY8EANS 13 . 65 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
PRICE ElECTION I'OR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOY8EANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
&. SO 
&. SO 
0 . 0 
0.0 
PREMIUM RATE PER ACRE I'OR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOY8EANS 9 . 31 
2NO SOYBEANS 9.13 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0.0 
LOAN RATE FOR PEANUTS UNDER QUOTE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
LOAN RATE FOR PEANUTS HOT UNDER QUOTA 
1ST SOY8EANS 0 . 0 
2MO SOY8EANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
0 . 35 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
71 . 1 9 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
13 . 92 
13 . 92 
0 . 0 
0.0 
7 . 73 
7 . 73 
0.0 
0.0 
11 . 21 
11 . oa 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
34 . 52 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
14 . 20 
14.20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
a . 22 
&.22 
0 . 0 
0.0 
12 . 24 
12 . 01 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
73 I. 33 
731 . 33 
73 I . 33 
731. 33 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1. 00 
1. 00 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 2S 
0.25 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3& . 41 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
14 . 49 
1 4 . 4 9 
0.0 
0 . 0 
&. 29 
1 . 29 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12. 10 
12 . 36 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
IllS& 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
a. &J 
1 . 03 
0. 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 31 
0 . 36 
0 . &0 
0.50 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 53 
11 . 13 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
&. 00 
1 . 00 
4a . 32 
1 . I 4 
731.33 
731 . 33 
73 I . 33 
731 . 33 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1. 00 
1. 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0.20 
0.0 
o . o 
3 9 . 07 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
14 . 7a 
14 . 7& 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
a . 6 2 
a . 52 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13 . 37 
I 3. I I 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
ltATOON ltlCE 0 . 0 
~AitM"S POUNOA~E QUOTE ~OR PEANUTS 
1ST SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 
2 1'- 0 SOYBEANS 0. 0 
~ ~ RST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
ACREA~E ALLOTMENT ~OR RICE 
1ST SOYIII!ANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRS T RIC! 0.0 
ltATOON RIC! 0.0 
~RACT I ON TAit~I!T PRICE FOR LOW YIELD PAYMENT 
1S 'f SOYIII!ANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 
~IRST RICE 0 . 0 
ltATOON RICE 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
FRACTION TARGET PltlCE FOR PREVENTED PLANTING PAYMENT 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1ST SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
trlRST RICE 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
ltATOON RlCI! 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
,.ltACTlON PROVEN YIELD FOit LOW YIELD PAYMENT 
1ST SOYIIEANS 0.0 0 . 0 
2NO SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0.0 
~IRS T R I CE 0. 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
trRACTlON PROVEN YIELD ,.OR PREVENTED PLANTING 
1ST SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2NO SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
~IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
PARITY PRICE 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
~IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
trRACTlON 0~ CROP ELIGIBLE ~OR MKTC CERTltriCATE 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FIRST RIC! 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
c . o 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
PAYMENT LIMITATION ,.OR 
INCOME SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
DISASTER PAYMENTS 
100000 . 00 100000.00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
100000 . 00 100000.00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
MAXIMUM NONRECOURSE CCC LOAN 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
~lRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
PI!RC!NT lASE PltOOUCTlON ELIGIIILE trOR DE~lClENCY PAYMENT 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
MAXIMUM VALUE Otr CROP ELIGIBLE ~OR O!~ICIENCY PAYMENT 
0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
~LEXIIILI! LOAN RATE ~ORMULAS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
NO. OF YEARS DROP LOW DltOP HIGH FRACTION 0~ MEAN 
1ST SOYSI!ANS 0.0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYISEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
~IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATODN RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
A 1. 0 INDICATI!S OEL!TINC THE LOW OR HlCH 
MARK!TJNC LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYISEANS 
~JRST RICE 
RATDON RICE 
MAXIMUM MKT C LOAN lASE 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0. 0 0 . 0 
0. 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0. 0 0 . 0 
0 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~ARMS LARGER THAN 0 . ACRI!S ARE NOT ELlCliSLE ~OR ANY ~ARM PROGRAM 
0.0 
~ . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~ARMS LARGER THAN 0 . ACRES ARE ONLY ELIGIISLE ~DR THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
~ARMS WITH CROP SALES GRI!ATER THAN S 0 . ARE NOT ELICliSLE ~OR ANY ~ARM PROGRAM SENEtriTS 
~ARMS WITH CROP SALES CREAT!R THAN S 0 . ARE ONLY ELIGIBLE ,.OR THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
HISTORY OF FCIC PARTICIPATION 
NUMISER OF YEARS IN THE PROGRAM 3 . 00 
NUMIIER Otr LOSS YEARS IN PROGRAM 2 . 00 
TOTAL ~ClC INSURANCE PREMIUMS PAID SY FARM 32323.50 
TOTAL ~CIC INO!MNlTY PAYMENTS RECEIVED 111513 . 00 
THE !NO 0~ ALL INPUT DATA 
1 1TOTAL D!PREC & THIS YEARS OEPREC 2162 . & 
MACHINE 1 7 . 00 33&7& . 00 39791 . 00 3910 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 39791 . 00 
&1700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 2TOTAL D!PREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC &233 . 2 
MACHINE 2 7 . 00 31769 . 00 33561 . 00 3357 . 00 
0 . 0 0 , 0 7 . 00 33561 . 00 
11700 . 00 5 . 00 0 , 0 
3TOTAL DEPREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC 19217 . 5 
MACHINE 3 7 . 00 11700 , 00 51700 . 00 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7.00 11700 . 00 
61700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 &TOTAL DEPREC & THIS YEARS OEPREC 19217 . 5 
MACHINE & 7 . 00 7717 . 00 10017 . 00 1009 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 10017 . 00 
19900 , 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 5TOTAL OEPREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC 20&07 . 5 
MACHINE 5 7 . 00 3&145 . 00 52475 . 00 52&1 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 52&75.00 
94800 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
1 ITOTAL DEPREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC 31131 . 1 
MACHIN! 7 . 00 50197.00 74628 . 00 7&62.10 
21162 . & 
9 3 1 a . 51 
2112 . &3 
1570 . 8 
5&17 . 71 
1570 . 77 
1491& . 3 
52&45 . 00 
1&914.29 
0 . 0 
1009 . 00 
0 . 00 
1190 . 0 
1437.91 
1119 . 9 I 
1155.& 
31343 . 71 
&000 . 00 
0 . 0 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2017.40 
2 . 00 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3347& . 00 
1910 . 00 
317119 . 00 
1S71 . 00 
11700 . 00 
1113 . 00 
7717 . 00 
1975 . 00 
34945 . 00 
1S71 . 00 
50197 . 00 
0 . 0 
5 . 00 
0 . 0 
1.00 
0.0 
2.00 
0 . 0 
10 . 00 
0 . 0 
7.00 
0.0 
331&1 . 92 
0 . 0 
29141 . 01 
0 . 0 
9071 . 00 
0 . 0 
47227 . 00 
0 . 0 
!12231 . &0 
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SU~~ARY 0~ PROGRAM OPTIONS SELECTED BY THE USER 
RESULTS ~ROM SSR ROTATION, LIBERTY COUNTY . ~INAL SASE SIMULATION . 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL OISTRIBUTIONS USED ~OR PRICES 
AND YIELDS . WHOLLY LEASED FARM ACREAGE, 50~ LONG TERM AND 40~ 
INTERMEDIATE DEBT, 33~ CUT OFF POINT . CROP INSURANCE , 50 G PAYMENT LIMIT . 
1/7 CROP SHARE ON SOYBEANS AND RICE . STOCHASTiC RUN, 50 ITERATIONS. 
SIMULATE THE REPRESENTATIVE ~ARM ~OR 5 YEARS 
FIRST YEAR TO BE SIMULATED IS 1!&4 . 
THE SIMULATION WILL BE DETERMINISTIC 
PRINT ALL I NPUT DATA AND ALL OUTPUT TAIL!$ 
TH! REPRESENTATIVE FARM HAS 4 CROPS AND 0 LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
PAYO~F OUTSTANDING LOANS USING SURPLUS CASH 
NO SPECIAL ~lNANCIAL BAILOUT PROGRAM IS IN E~~ECT 
ADJUST INCOME TAX SCHEDULE AFTER 1!14 FOR CHANCES IN THE CPt 
~!XED PORTION OF CROPS SOLD IN T AND CCC LOAN USED ~DR THE REMAINDER 
NO MAXIMUM ON ANNUAL INTEREST DEDUCTIONS IS IN PLACE 
THE CROP MIX WILL 8! CONSTANT OVER TIME 
DEPRECIATION ON OLD MACHINERY WILL BE CALCULATED BY THE DECLINING BALANCE METHOD 
USE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS FOR 1112 
MACHINERY PURCHASED A~TER 1950 WILL BE RECOVERED USING AN ACCELERATED SCHEDULE 
THE USER HAS ELECTED TO REDUCE BASIS FOR INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
THE FARM HAS ELECTED NOT TO TAKE FIRST YEAR EXPENSING ON PURCHASES 0~ MACHINERY 
THERE ARE 37 PIECES OF OWNED FARM MACHINERY TO BE DEPRECIATED 
OLD FARM MACHINERY WILL BE TRADED IN RATHER THAN BE SOLO 
USER HAS SPECI~IEC THE FAMILY CONSUMPTION FUNCTION ~OR REGION 
THE FARM ~AY NOT SELL CROPLAND TO AVOID INSOLVENCY 
CROPLAND WILL B! LEASED USINC A CROP SHARE SCHEME SP!CI~IEO IV THE USER 
ANNUAL INFLATION RATES FOR ~ARMLANC ARE PROVIDED BY THE USER 
THE FARM WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO CROW OVER TIME 
INFORMATION FOR 0 ALTERNATIVE FARMS IS PROVIDED BY THE USER 
AN UNLIMITED NONRECOURSE LOAN (PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM WILL BE IN E~FECT 
CO NOT PAY INTEREST ON NONRECE!MED NONRECOURSE CCC LOANS 
LOAN RATES ARE FIXED BY THE ANALYST IN ALL YEARS 
INTEREST ON FOR LOANS WILL IE CHARCEC ANNUALLY FOR 1 YEARS 
A TARGET PRICE PROGRAM WILL IE IN EFFECT AND TARGET PRICES ARE ~IX!C 
AN ALL · RISK CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM IS IN E~FECT 
A MANDATORY SET•ASICE OR VOLUNTARY DIVERSION PROGRAM WILL BE IN EFFECT 
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS ARE IN E~F!CT FOR OE~ICIENCY PAYMENTS, DIVERSION PAYMENTS & DISASTER PAYMENTS 
ALL FARMS ARE ELIGIBLE FOR ALL FARM PROCRAM BENEFITS 
RESULTS ~ROM SSR ROTATION, LIBERTY COUNTY . FINAL lASE SIMULATION . 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS USED FOR PRICES 
AND YIELDS . WHOLLY LEASED FARM ACREACE, 50~ LONG TERM AND 40~ 
INTERMEDIATE DEBT, 33~ CUT OFF POINT . CROP INSURANCE, 50 G PAYMENT LIMIT. 
1/7 CROP SHARE ON SOYBEANS AND R I CE. STOCHASTIC RUN, SO ITERATIONS . 
CROPLAND ON INITIAL FARM 
TOTAL CROPLAND ACRES OWNED 
TOTAL CROPLAND ACRES LEASED 
PASTURELANC ACRES OWNED 
PASTURELANO ACRES LEASED 
FRACTION CROPLAND THAT IS TILLABLE 
FRACTION CROPLAND THAT IS IRRIGATED 
INITIAL BALANCE SHEET FOR THE FARM 
ASSE TS 
MARKET VALUE OF CROPLAND & FARMSTEAD 
MARKET VALUE OF IUILCINGS 
TOTAL VALUE 0~ OWNED CROPLAND ~ BUILCINCS 
MARKET VALUE OF O~F·FARM INVESTMENTS 
BECINNINC CASH RESERVE 
MARKET VALUE OF OWNED PASTURELANO 
MARKET VALUE OF ALL FARM MACHINERY 
MARKET VALUE OF ALL LIVESTOCK 
TOTAL VALUE 0~ ASSETS 
LIAIILITtES 
TOTAL REAL !STATE DEBT 
TOTAL INT!RMECIATE•TERM DEIT 
INCOME TAXES CUE IN YEAR 1 
SELF EMPLOYMENT TAXES CUE IN YEAR 1 
TOTAL O!IT 
BECINNJNC NET WORTH (MARKET VALUE) 
INITIAL ~INANCIAL RATIOS ~OR THE ~ARM 
EQUITY TO ASSETS RATIO 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
LEVERAGE RATIO 
AVERAC! PER ACRE VALUE OF CROPLAND 
AVERAGE PER ACRE VALUE D~ PASTURE~AND 
LIABILITIES FOR INITIAL ~ARM 
REAL !STATE DEBT 
LOAN Lt~E ON CElT 
FRACTION LAND LOAN R!MAININC 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN 
DEIT TO ASSET RATIO 
INTERMEDIATE TERM O!IT 
LOAN LIFE ON DEBT 
FRACTION LOAN REMAINING 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN 
CElT TO ASSET RATIO 
68 OPERAT INC LOAN 
~RACTION OF YEAR LOAN IS USED 
TERMS ~OR NEW LOANS 
MO. YEARS FOR NEW LAND LOANS 
MO . YEARS ~OR NEW MACH LOANS 
10 . 0000 
2300 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 1500 
0.5300 
12000 . 0000 
155000 . 000 
157000.000 
20000 . 0000 
5000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
515202 . 000 
0 . 0 
757202 . 000 
515&00.0000 
2210&1 . 000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
292&1 1 . 000 
414321 . 000 
0 . 1132 
o . 3asl 
0 . 1301 
1200 . 0000 
0 . 0 
&5100.0000 
30 . 0000 
0 . 5000 
133100 . 000 
0.4000 
2250&1.000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 5000 
452112 . 000 
0.4000 
0 . 3920 
30.0000 
5 . 0000 
01 
02 
03 
MINIMUM INTERMEDIATE T!RM EOUITY 
INFORMATION 'OR R!FINANCINC DEBTS 
CHARCE TO R!,!NANCE CASH ~LOW DE,IC!TS 
NO . YEARS ~OR A LONC·T!RM LOAN 
NO . YEARS 'DR INTERM·T!RM LOAN 
MINIMUM OOWNPAYM!NT L!Y!LS 
MI NJ MUM OOWNPAYM!NT 'OR FARM MACHINERY 
MINIMUM OOWNPAYM!NT FOR 'ARMLAND 
A'T!R·TAX DISCOUNT RATE 
ANNUAL RAT! 0' RETURN TO PROD ASSETS T•l 
CAPITAL CAIN RATE ~OR LAND IN T•l 
CASH RESERVE FOR TH! 'ARM 
MINIMUM CASH RESERVE 
8!CINNINC CASH R!S!RVE 
CAPITAL ASSETS TO B! R!COV!R!O (DEPRECIATED) 
BUILOINCS PLACED INTO USE PRIOR TO 1111 ' 
0.3333 
0 . 0100 
20 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0.3000 
0 . 3000 
0 . 10 I I 
0 . 0 
0 . 0400 
5000 . 0000 
5000 . 0000 
SALVACE VALUE 10500 . 0000 
PURC HASE PRICE 105000 . 000 
ECONOMIC (OI!PREC!ATION) Ll,! 30 . 0000 
RECULAR 8UILCINCS PLACED INTO US! A'TI!R 1110 
PURCHASE PRICE 0 . 0 
CAL!NOAR YEAR PURCHASED 0 . 0 
SPECIA L PURPOSE IUILOINCS PLACED INTO USE A'TI!R 1110 
PURCHASE PRICE 0 . 0 
CAL!NOAR YEAR PURCHASED 0 . 0 
'IX!O COSTS 
PROPERTY TAX RATE (STAX/SVALUE) 
TOTAL PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX 
OTHER TAXES 
ACCOUNTAN T & L!CAL F!!S 
UNALLOCATED MAINTENANCE COSTS 
INSURANCE ON MACHINERY 
MISCELLANEOUS FIXED COSTS 
LANO L!AS! COSTS 
CASH RENT 'OR CROPLAND ($/ACRE) 
CASH R!NT FOR PASTURELANO ($/ACR!) 
ANNUAL INFLATION RATE FOR 
PER ACRE CASH LEAS! COST 
CAPITALIZATION RAT! I!TWEEN 
LAND VALUE I CROPLAND CASH LEASE COST 
FAMILY CONSUMPTION AND TAX IN,ORMATION 
ACE OF OPERATOR 
NO . OF TAX EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED 
MARC I NAL TAX RAT! 'OR STATE 
RA T IO OF PERSONAL DEDUC TO N!T INCOME 
O!SIR!D TAXABLE INCOME 
AVERAC! ANNUAL O'F•'ARM INCOME 
NON•TAXAILE O'F•,ARM INCOME 
MINIMUM FAMILY LIVINC EXPENSES 
MAXIMUM 'AMILY LIVINC EXPENSES 
0.003330 
0.0 
0 . 0 
3000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
3200 . 0000 
5000 . 0000 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
45.0000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 2000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
11000.0000 
0. 1100 
11000 . 0000 
25000 . 0000 
US!R"S SPECIPIED CONSUMPTION 'UNCTION USED IF TH! OPTION IS ELECTED 
CONSUMPTION a 0 . 0 + 0 . 0 • (DISPOSIBL! INCOME • o . o I 
INCOME TAX PAYMENT DU! IN YEAR I 
S!LF•!MPLOYMENT TAX PAYMENT DUE IN Y!AR I 
TAXABLE I NCOME IN Y!AR T•3 
TAXABLE INCOME IN YEAR T•2 
TAXABLE INCOME IN YEAR T•l 
MAXIMUM INTEREST DEDUCTION I' OPTION IS USED 
RISK AVERSION CO!PFICI!NT 
HIRED 'ARM LAlOR 
NO . OF FULL TIME !MPLOY!!S 
ANNUAL CROSS SALARY FOR FULL•TIM! EMPLOY!! 
HOURL Y WAC! RAT! FOR PART · TIM! LABOR 
ANNUAL INTEREST RATES 111" !tiS 
OLO LONC·T!RM LOANS 
OLD I NTERM!OIATE · T!RM LCANS 
NEW LDNC·T!RM LOANS 
NEW INTERM!DIATE · TERM LOANS 
REPINANC! LONC·TERM LOANS 
REFINANCE INTERM·TERM LOANS 
OP!R.ciTINC LO.ciNS 
RECEIVED FOR C.ciSH RESERVES 
0 . I I 75 
0 . I 500 
o . 1310 
o . 1 .-ao 
0 . 1310 
0 . 1410 
0 . I 520 
0 . 1 I 10 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0 . I I 70 
0 . 14ll0 
0 . 1170 
0 . 14 so 
0 . I 540 
0 . 1113 
ANNUAL PERC!NTACE CHANCES 
NEW FARM MACHINER Y 
IN SELECTED COSTS 
USED FARM MACHINERY 
F I XED COST , I NS I TAX 
SEEO COSTS 
PERT I LIZER & LIME 
CHEMICAL COSTS 
PUEL a LUI! COSTS 
REPAIRS ON MACHINERY 
OTHER PROD COST 
CUSTOM COSTS 
HIRED LA80R COSTS 
OF,·FARM INVESTMENT 
PURCH.ciS!O INPUTS FOR LIVI!ST 
FARMLAND VALUES 
IUILO!NC YALU!S 
OFF·F.ciRM STORACE COSTS 
OTHER ANNUAL DATA FOR THE FARM 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o5•o 
0 . 0939 
0 . 0674 
0 . 0720 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0064 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
0 . 1 I 10 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0 . 0200 
0 . 0 
1114 
0 . 0 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0313 
0 . 0727 
0 . 0&10 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0 .. 70 
0 . 0470 
0 . !ISO 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0470 
u as 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0000 
13100 . 0000 
3 . 3500 
,,.. 1117 
0 . t I 75 
0 . 1500 
o . toto 
0 . I 410 
0 . 1090 
0 . 1410 
0 . 15&0 
0 . II 10 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0 
0 . 0450 
·0 . 0640 
0 . 0570 
0 . 0105 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0.0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 1110 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0450 
1111 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0 . I 050 
0 . 1370 
0 . I 050 
0 . t 370 
0 . 14 20 
0 . t 070 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0100 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
o . o.-1o 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
o . o.-ao 
0 . 0410 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0.0200 
0 . 04&0 
, 17 
11&1 
0 . I I 75 
0 . 1500 
0 . I 050 
0 . I 370 
0 . I 050 
0 . I 370 
0 . I 420 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0100 
0.0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0.0200 
0 . 0500 
, a a 
N!W CAPITAL INVESTED IN FAR 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 310 . 60 323 . 90 331 . 00 356 . 20 37.- . 0o 
OTHER P'ARM INCOME 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
SELF EMPLOYMENT TAX RAT! 0 . 140 0.141 0 . 143 0 . 1.-3 0 . 150 
MAXIMUM INCOME SUI~UCT TO 
SELf" EMPLCPYMENT TAX 37201 . 00 31&03 . 00 40612.00 42672.00 44105 . 00 
SUMMARY OF THE OWNED MACHINERY COMPLEMENT 
CURRENT ORICINAL ESTIMATED 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
ACCUM . 
YEAR 
PURCHASED 
1110 . 0 
MARKET PURCHASE SAlVACE 
DEPREC I· 
AT ION 
Ll '! 
7.0 
7 . 0 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
VALUE PRICE VALUE ll'! (OEPREC. I 
TRACTORI511HP 33474 . 0 3179& . 0 3910 . 0 7 . 0 30479 . 5 
,,7~9 0 33568 . 0 3357 . 0 7 . 0 21070 . 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MACHINERY CURRENT COST 
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REPLACEMENT REPLACE . RECOVERY 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CODE COST PI!RIOD OR CLASS 
0 . 0 11700 . 0 5 . 0 
0 . 0 61700 . 0 5 . 0 
04 
OS 
70 
TRACTOR 15HI' 
TRCTR 221HP 
TRCTR 229 HP 
COMIIIN! 77 '2 0 
COMIIIN! 7720 
COMIIINE. 7720 
I'CKUP t /2TON 
I'CKUP 1/2TON 
I'CKUP I /2TON 
OSK 22 ' 9• 
OSK 22' I" 
OSK 24' 4" 
OSK 2' ' 4• 
ROLL CULT 
ROLL CULT 
liN I'I.ANT a • 
IN I'LAN'r a• 
CRAIN CART 
CRAIN CART 
1.0 Pl. IIXIO 
LO PL IIIXIO 
L!VI!E IIOKI!S 
LEVI!E PLOW 
LI!VI!E I'USH 
L!VI!E ROLLER 
I"LO CUL 31' 
1"1.0 CUL 31 ' 
I"LO CUI. 25 
I!ODI!R I ROW 
II!DOI!R I ROW 
I'IP! HARROW 
I'II'E HARROW 
OU•ALL 
MISC TRUCKS 
1175 . 0 
197a . o 
1 sa 1. o 
1979 . 0 
1913.0 
1110 . 0 
lla3 . 0 
197a.o 
1976.0 
1912 . 0 
1110 . 0 
11 I 1. 0 
1971.0 
1112 . 0 
1179 . 0 
1171 . 0 
11a2 . 0 
ua 1 . 0 
1175 . 0 
1971 . 0 
U77. 0 
1112 . 0 
11 a 1 . o 
11 a 1 . o 
1971 . 0 
11a2 . 0 
lla i. O 
1971 . 0 
1171 . 0 
1979 . 0 
1979 . 0 
1910 . 0 
1971 . 0 
1977 . 0 
7717 . 0 
34945 . 0 
50a97 . 0 
51909.0 
94000 . 0 
55112 . 0 
9000 . 0 
3425.0 
2375.0 
7500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
5000 . 0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
1500 . 0 
4500.0 
4500 . 0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
7371 . 0 
3000.0 
1000.0 
1547 . 0 
700.0 
350.0 
5500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
2500.0 
1031 . 0 
1500 . 0 
1000 . 0 
1100 . 0 
3500 . 0 
50000 . 0 
10017 . 0 
52475.0 
74121 . 0 
531ai . O 
!14000 . 0 
s 1 a a 1 . o 
sooo . o 
453a . o 
3176 . 0 
1 1500 . 0 
1100 . 0 
11500 . 0 
1200 . 0 
4200 . 0 
3!100 . 0 
4371.0 
7000 . 0 
4711 . 0 
1320 . 0 
7100 . 0 
aooo . o 
7500.0 
1563.0 
2100 . 0 
350 . 0 
7900 . 0 
7100 . 0 
5100 . 0 
1100 . 0 
3500 . 0 
1020 . 0 
1100 . 0 
1600 . 0 
80000 . 0 
1009 . 0 
5241 . 0 
7462 . 1 
53a9 . 0 
0 . 0 
&11& . 0 
0 . 0 
454 . 0 
3aa . o 
0 . 0 
110 . 0 
0 . 0 
120 . 0 
0 . 0 
310.0 
437 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
132 . 0 
710 . 0 
100 . 0 
o . o 
0.0 
0 . 0 
35 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
510 . 0 
110 . 0 
350 . 0 
102 . 0 
110 . 0 
aso . o 
1000 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
0 . 0 
9071 . 0 
45037 . 0 
43214 . 2 
43165.7 
14100 . 0 
45772 . 9 
1350 . 0 
3935 . 3 
3411.0 
4255 . 0 
7241 . 0 
1670 . 0 
79 7 a. 1 
1554.0 
3174 . 9 
3134 . 0 
2590 . 0 
2736.4 
1 1 11 . 0 
1590 . 1 
7200 . 0 
2775 . 0 
106 . 5 
121 a. o 
303 . 5 
2923.0 
4111.0 
5029 . 7 
990 . 0 
21'9 . 2 
a30 . 3 
1183 . 5 
7457 . 1 
52031 . 4 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
19900 . 0 
94100 . 0 
94100 . 0 
s•ooo . o 
94000 . 0 
14000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
1000 . 0 
15300.0 
15300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
5200 . 0 
5200 . 0 
10250 . 0 
1 0250 . 0 
6100 . 0 
aaoo . o 
17500 . 0 
17500 . 0 
1 1 250 . 0 
2100 . 0 
2500 . 0 
150 . 0 
1100 . 0 
1100 . 0 
laoo . o 
5400 . 0 
5400 . 0 
2100 . 0 
2100 . 0 
11500 . 0 
90000 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 , 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
INPORMATION I"OR INITIAL I"ARM 2310 . ACRES·•··························•·•···· · ························ · ···· · ··· · 
SUMMARY 01" CROI' ENTERPRISE COSTS 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I"IRST RIC! 
RATOON RICI! 
SI!ED 
1 . 45 
9 . 45 
33 . 90 
0 . 0 
I"!RT·LIME CHEMICALS I"UEL•LUIIE 
••$/ACRE•• 
U . 35 45 . 45 12 . 61 
14 . 35 45 . 45 12 . 6a 
5 1. 00 67.56 11 . 10 
3 . 31 2 . 50 0 . 0 
MONTHLY LABOR R!OUIREMENTS PI!R ACRE, 
.JAN . 
IIY CROP ENTERPRISE 
1S T SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"!RST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
HOURS 01" UNPAID I"AMILY LAIIOR 
0 . 240 
0.240 
0 . 275 
0 . 0 
I"EB . MAR . APRIL 
o . ,51 
0 . 451 
0.317 
0 . 0 
0 . 105 
0 . 1 OS 
I . 310 
0.0 
0 . 546 
0 . 546 
0. 51& 
0 . 0 
MAY 
I . 24a 
1 . 241 
1 . 730 
0.0 
REPAIRS OTHER HARVEST COS T 
$/Y I ELD UN I T 
0 . 4500 6 . 1 7 
6 . 1 7 
6 . 76 
0 . 0 
.JUNI! 
0 . 414 
0 . 414 
1 ' 1 9 1 
0 . 0 
I . 1 & 
9 . 1 4 
79 . 20 
5 . 75 
.JULY AUC . 
0 . 295 0 . 404 
0 . 295 0 . 404 
1 . 273 0 . 977 
0 . 0 0 . 1 0 1 
0 . '500 
I . 2300 
1 . 2300 
S!,.T . 
0 . 105 
0 . 1 OS 
0 . 29& 
0 . 061 
OCT . 
O . S57 
0 . 557 
0 . 11 1 
0 . 61a 
NOV , 
0 . 79 7 
0 . 79 7 
0 . 1 s 6 
0 . 0 
OI!C . 
o . I 05 
0 . 1 OS 
0 . 2 2 2 
0 . 0 
AVAILAIL! EACH MONTH •oo . oo 400 . 00 100 . 00 100.00 750 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 600 . 00 600 . 00 400 , 00 
HOURS WORKED EACH MONTH BY A 
I"ULL TIME !MPLOY!E 250.00 300 . 00 350 . 00 350.00 350 . 00 350 . 00 350 . 00 350.00 300.00 300 . 00 250 . 00 250 . 00 
ANNUAL M!AN OR MODAL CRO" YIELDS 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
ANNUAL MEAN OR MODAL CROP PRICES 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I"IRST RIC! 
RATOON RICE 
CONSTRAINTS ON THI! CROPMIX 
1914 
23 . 19 
22 . 14 
50 . 03 
1 .9. 
1914 
1 . 33 
1.33 
1.5. 
1.aa 
1115 
24 . 17 
23 . 31 
56. 19 
1 • • & 
1915 
7 .• 5 
7 . 45 
10 . 05 
1.34 
1116 
24 . 67 
23 . 71 
10 . 73 
1 . II 
1111 
7 . 9 2 
7 . 92 
10 . 40 
1.11 
ACRES MINIMUM 
1917 
25 ' 17 
24.27 
6 1 '34 
2 . 00 
11 a 7 
1 . 01 
1.01 
10 . 13 
10 . 07 
19 II 
25 . &a 
24 . 76 
s 1 '9 6 
2 . 02 
1 'a a 
1 . 34 
1 . 34 
I 1 . 2 9 
10 . 50 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
LINKACE NORMAL 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
ACRES 
PLANTED HARVESTED I"RACTION 
MAXIMUM 
I"RACTION 
01" MIX 
TO DOUBLE I"RAC. ACRES 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
CROI' SHARE LEASINC IIY CROP 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIE:ANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATODN RICE 
MARKETING STRATACI!S 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
YEAR 1 
731 . 30 
731 . 30 
731. 40 
731 . 40 
Y!ARI 01" MIX 
&9 • . 70 0 . 0 
694 . 70 0 . 0 
724 . 10 0.0 
724 . 10 0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CROP HARVESTED 
0 . 0 0 . 95 
0.0 0 . 95 
0 . 0 0 . 99 
3 . 00 0 . 99 
LANDLORD SHARE 01" RECEI~TS a COSTS 
CROP S!!D I"ERT a CH!MICAL I"UEL I MACHINERY 
RECEIPTS 
0 . 1430 
0 . 1430 
0' 1430 
0 . 1430 
COSTS LIME COSTS LUBE REPAIRS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
II!CIHNINC PRACTION 
INVENTORY SOLO NEXT 
TAX Y!AR 
4231 . 101 
4010 . 000 
0 . 0 
1204 . 200 
O . JOO 
0 . 300 
0.0 
1. 000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
MONTH 
SOLO AI"T!R 
HARVEST 
10.000 
10 . 000 
7 . 000 
10.000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MONTH 
SOLO IN 
NEXT YEAR 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
1 . 000 
1. 000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
OTHER 
COSTS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CUSTOM 
WOR K 
0 . 0790 
0 . 0790 
0 . 0790 
0 . 0790 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
06 
SEASONAL ~~ICE INDEX 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RIC! 
~AT_,ON RIC! 
JAN . 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
I . 000 
I . 000 
!'"Ell . 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
I"ACTDRI!D MATRIX I"DR C~Oft YIELDS I PRICES 
C~O~ YIELDS 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
I"IRST RIC! 
~ATDON RIC! 
CROft f>~ICES 
1ST .tOYI!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'"IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
1 2 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 503 
0 . 503 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 515 
0 . 515 
0.732 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o_ o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MAR . AP~IL 
1 . 000 
1. 000 
1 . 000 
1. 000 
0.315 
0 . 315 
0.215 
0 . 533 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1. 000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
MAY JULY AUC . 
1 . 000 
I. 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
JUNE 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1. 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 
0 . 300 
0 . 300 
0 . 030 
0 . 031 
0 . 151 
0 . 151 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
-0 . 411 
•0 . 411 
0 . 177 
-o . 101 
•0 . 110 
-o . 110 
0 . 412 
0 . 0 
•0.241 
-0 . 241 
-0 . 512 
-0 . 140 
0 . 242 
0 . 242 
0 . 171 
1 . 000 
S!PT . 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
CUMMULATIV! DISTRIIIUTIONS 01" D!VIAT!S ABOUT TH! M!AN (OR TREND) , !Xft~!SS!D AS A I"~ACTION 01'" MEAN 
OCT . 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 2 3 I I 7 I !I 10 
C~Oft YI!LOS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
I" I RS T It I C! 
RAT DON 11.1 C! 
C~Oft ft~IC!S 
1ST SOYIEANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
I"IRST ~ICE 
~ATDON RIC! 
•0 . 711 
• 0 . 711 
•0 . 311 
-o . 114 
·0 . 274 
·0 . 274 
• 0 . 4 1 6 
•0 . 411 
·0 . 541 
·0 . 530 
•0 . 225 
•0. 317 
·0.23& 
·0.231 
•0 . 314 
•0 . 314 
•0 . 371 
•0 . 311 
-o . 15& 
-0 . 111 
•0.013 
•0 . 013 
•0 . 222 
•0 . 222 
CDVARIANC! MAT~IX 01" NET INCOMES I"OR CROftS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2NO SOYII!ANS 
I"IRST ~ICE 
~ATOON RICE 
1 2 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0 . 251 
•0.214 
-o . 111 
•0 . 121 
•0 . 052 
•0 . 052 
•0.017 
•0 . 017 
4 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
-o . 133 
•0 . 171 
•0 . 070 
•0 . 015 
•0.031 
·0 . 031 
•0 . 025 
•0 . 025 
·0 . 021 
·0 . 015 
·0 . 032 
•0 , 023 
0 . 031 
0 . 031 
0 . 121 
0 . 121 
0 . 021 
0 . 032 
0 . 011 
0 . 024 
0 . 041 
0 . 041 
0 . 171 
0 . 171 
0 . 131 
0 . 1 52 
0 . 052 
0 . 011 
0 . 017 
0 . 017 
0 . 201 
0.201 
SUMMARY 01" POLICY DATA, IIY Y!AR AND IIY C~DP 
CCC LOAN RAT!S 
1ST SDYII!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST ~IC! 
RATODN RIC! 
INT!~EST RAT! I"OR CCC LOANS 
INT!~!ST ~AT! 1"0~ I"Oit LOANS 
1114 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
1 . 13 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
DI"I"·I"ARM STORACE COSTS !'"DR C~OftS UND!It LOAN 
1ST SDYII!ANS 0 . 30 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 30 
I" IRS T It I C! 0 . 50 
~ATOQN ~IC! 0 . 50 
1115 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
1 . 13 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 31 
0 . 31 
0.52 
0 . 52 
TARC!T ftRIC!S , II" THEY AR! NOT TI!D TO LOAN RAT!S 
1ST SOYII!ANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYII!ANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I"IRST RICE 12 . 53 12 . 53 
RATOON RICE 11 . 13 11 . 13 
1111 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
1 . 63 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 33 
0 . 33 
0 . 55 
0 . 55 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 53 
1 1 . I 3 
I"L!XIIIL! TARC!T P~ICE ·· ·I"~ACTIDN 01" TARC!T PRIC! · TO LOAN RAT! 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2NO SOYII!ANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
DIRECT •I"QR• !NT~Y ft~IC! 
1ST SOYIEANS 
2ND SDYI!ANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON ~ICE 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
ACTUAL YI ELDS LAST 5 Y!A~S 1'"0~ CALCULATINC !'"ARM PRDCRAM YIELDS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 30 . 00 32 . 00 17 . 00 
2NO SOYBEANS 30 . 00 32 . 00 17 . 00 
I"IRST RICE 41 . 1& 31 . 13 44 . 45 
RATDON RIC! 2.12 1.15 1.11 
ACTUAL LACC!D f>~ICES I"Oit 4 YEARS US!D I"Oit I"L!XIIILE LOAN RAT!$ 
1ST SOYIEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
IIIATOON RICE 
ft~OCRAM (OR liAS!) AC~!AC! 
1ST SDYI!ANS 
2NO SDYII!ANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
NATIONAL ALLOCATION I"ACTOR 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2NO SOYIIEANS 
I'"IRST RICE 
~ATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
73 1. 33 
731 . 33 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1. 00 
1. 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
731.33 
731.33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
I . 00 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
0.0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
ACR!ACE SET ASIDE, DIY!~SION OR LIMITATION (I'"RACTIDN) 
1ST SOYII!ANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYI!ANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
1117 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
I . & 3 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 34 
0 . 34 
0 . 57 
0 . 57 
0 . 0 
0.0 
12.53 
1 1 . '3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
10 . 00 
10 . 00 
41 . 11 
1 . 9 2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731.33 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
o . o 
0 . 0 
1111 
5 . 02 
5 . 02 
1 . 13 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 36 
0 . 31 
0 . 10 
0 . &0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12.53 
It . I 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
41 . 32 
1 . 9 4 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . 33 
731 . :u 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 301 
0 . 310 
0 . 121 
0. 1 II 
0 . 221 
0 . 221 
0 . 211 
0 . 211 
0 . !100 
0 . 170 
0 . 311 
0 . 712 
0 . 211 
0 . 211 
0 . 41!1 
0 . 411 
NOV . 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
O!C . 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
71 
10 
11 
RATOON RICE 0 . 25 
SLIPPAGE RATE (FRACTION ) 
1S T SOY BEANS 0 . 0 
2ND S OYBEANS 0 . 0 
FI~S T RICE 0 . 20 
RA T OON RICE 0 . 20 
PAYMENT RATE FOR ACREACE DIVERSION 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
TRICCER PRICE FOR THE "FOR" 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
CALL PRICE FOR THE "FOR" 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RIC!! 
RATOON RICE 
LENCTH OF FARMER OWNED RESERVE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
STORACE PAYMI!NT RATE FOR THE "FOR" 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYIII!ANS 0 . 0 
2NO SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
PROD UCTION CUARANTI!I! FOR CROP INSURANCI! 
1ST SOYBEANS 1 3 . &S 
2ND SOYBEANS 13 . 65 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
PRICE I!LECTION FOR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOYBEANS 6.50 
2ND SOYBEANS 6.50 
FIRST R I CE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0.0 
PREMIUM RATE P!R ACRE FOR CROP INSURANCE 
l~T SOYBEANS 9 . 31 
2ND SOYBEANS 9. 13 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC!! 0 . 0 
LOAN RATE FOR PI!ANUTS UNDER QUOTE 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2NO SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC!! 0 . 0 
LOAN RATE FOR PI!ANUTS NOT UNDER QUOTA 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0.0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
FARM"S POUNOACI! OUOTE FOR PEANUTS 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
ACRI!AGE ALLOTMENT FOR RICE 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0.0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
FRACTION TARCET PRICE FOR LOW YIELD PAYMENT 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.35 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0.0 
0 . 0 
71. 1. 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 3 . 9 2 
1 3 . 9 2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
7 . 73 
7 . 73 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 1 • 2! 
1 1 . 01 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
FRACTION TARCET PRICE FOR PREVENTI!O PLANTINC PAYMENT 
0.25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
34 . 52 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
14 . 20 
14 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1.22 
1 . 22 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12.24 
12 . 01 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FRACTION PROVI!N YIELD FOR LOW YIELD PAYMENT 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FRAC T ION PROVEN YIELD FOR PREVENTED PLANTINC 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
PARITY PRICE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATODN RICE 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
FRACTION OF CROP ELICIBLE FOR MKTC CERTIFICATE 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FIRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0.0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3& . 41 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
14.49 
14 . 49 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1 . 29 
1 . 29 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . ao 
12 . 36 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
39 . 07 
0 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 4 . 7 a 
1 4 . 7 a 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
a . 62 
a . a 2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13 . 37 
13 . 1, 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
PAYMENT LIMITATION FOR 
INCOME SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
DISASTER PAYMENTS 
100000 . 00 100000.00 100000.00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
100000.00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000.00 100000 . 00 
MAXIMUM NONRECOURSE CCC LOAN 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 72 R A T 0 0 N R 1 C E 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
PERCENT BASE PRODUCTION ELICIBLE FOR DEFICIENCY PAYMENT 
0 . 0 0.0 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
MAXIMUM VALUE OF CROP !LICIBL! FOR DEFICIENCY PAYMENT 
0 . 0 0 . 0 o.o 0 . 0 0 . 0 
~L!XIILE LOAN RAT! ~ORMULAS 
NO . 0~ YEARS DROP LOW ORO, HI~H ~RACTION 0~ M!AN 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYB!:ANS 0 . 0 0.0 
~IRS T RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
ltATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
A 1 . o INDICATES DELETIN~ THE LDW OR HI~H 
MARK!TIN~ LOAN RATES 
!Sl SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBI!:ANS 
~IRST RICE 
R.ATOON RICE 
MAXIMUM MKT~ LOAN BASE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
SCALE ~ARM 'ROGRAM I!NE~ITS TO ~ARM SIZE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~ARMS LARCER THAN 0 . ACRES ARE NOT ELI~IBL! ~OR ANY ~ARM ,ROCRAM 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
~ARMS LARGER THAN 0 . ACRES ARE ONLY ELI~IILE ~OR THE CROP INSURANCE PROCRAM 
~ARMS WITH CROP SALES ~REATER THAN S 0 . ARE NOT ELIGIBLE ~OR ANY ~ARM PROGRAM I!N!~ITS 
~ARMS WITH CROP SALES GREATER THAN S 0 . ARE ONLY ELI~IILE ~OR THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
HISTORY 0~ ~CIC PARTICIPATION 
NUMBER 0~ YEARS IN THE PROGRAM 3 . 00 
NUMBER 0~ LOSS YEARS IN ,ROCRAM 2.00 
TOTAL ~CIC INSURANCE PREMIUMS PAID IV ~ARM 32323 . 50 
TOTAL ~ClC INDEMNITY PAYMENTS R!CEIV!D 111513 . 00 
TH! !ND D~ ALL · INPUT DATA 
1 !TOTAL D!PREC a THIS YEARS D!PR!C 2112 . 4 
MACHINE 7 . 00 33474 . 00 39711 . 00 3910 . 00 
0 . 0 0.0 7 . 00 39711 . 00 
11700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 2TDTAL D!PR!C a THIS YEARS DEPR!C 4233 . 2 
MACHINE 2 7. . 00 31719 . 00 33511 . 00 3357 . 00 
0 . 0 0.0 7 . 00 33511 . 00 
11700 . 00 5.00 0 . 0 
1 3TOTAL D!PREC a THIS YEARS D!PR!C 19217 . 5 
MACHI~! 3 7 . 00 11700 . 00 11700 . 00 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 11700 . 00 
61700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 4TOTAL D!PR!C a THIS YEARS O!PREC 19217 . 5 
MACHIN! 4 7 . 00 7717.00 10017 . 00 1001 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 '1.00 100a7 . 00 
11900 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
5TOTAL O!PR!C I THIS YEARS D!PR!C 20407 . 5 
MACHINE 5 7 . 00 34145 . 00 52475.00 524a . OO 
0.0 0 . 0 7 . 00 5247S.OO 
94100 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
ITOTAL D!PREC I THIS YEARS D!PREC 31SJ1 . 1 
MACHINE I 7 . 00 50at7 . 00 74121 . 00 7462 . 10 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 74&21 . 00 
14100.00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 7TOTAL D!PR!C I THIS YEARS DEPR!C 41493 . 7 
MACHIN! 7 7 . 00 51109 . 00 53111 . 00 53at . OO 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 531a& . OO 
14000 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 &TOTAL D!PREC I THIS YEARS O!,R!C 14322 . 3 
MACHIN! I 7 . 00 94000 . 00 94000 . 00 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 14000 . 00 
94000 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
1 !TOTAL D!PREC I THIS YEARS D!PR!C 5&924 . 1 
MACHINE I 7 . 00 55112 . 00 5111 1 . 00 611& . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . oo & 1 a a 1 • oo 
14000 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 10TDTAL DEPR!C I THIS YEARS D!P~EC 
MACHINE 10 7 . 00 1000 . 00 9000 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
1000 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
1 11TOTAL DEPREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 11 7 . 00 3425 . 00 4531 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
1000 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
1 12TOTAL OEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 12 7 . 00 2375 . 00 3a7& . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
9000 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 13TOTAL DEPREC & THIS YEARS D!PREC 
MACHINE 13 7 . 00 7500 . 00 11500 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
15300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 !&TOTAL D!PREC & THIS YEARS D!PREC 
MACHINE 14 7 . 00 4500 . 00 9aOO . OO 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
15300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
15TOTAL OEPR!C & THIS YEARS D!PR!C 
MACHINE 15 7 . 00 5000 . 00 11500 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
11300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 !ITOTAL D!PR!C & THIS YEARS D!PR!C 
MACHINE 11 7 . 00 3500 . 00 9200 . 00 
o . o 0 . 0 7 . 00 
19300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 17TOTAL O!PREC & THIS YEARS D!PR!C 
MACHIN! 17 7 . 00 2000 . 00 4200.00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
5200 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
1 !&TOTAL OEPREC & THIS YEARS D!PREC 
MACHINE 1a 7 . 00 1500 . 00 3900 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
5200 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 19TOTAL D!PREC & THIS YEARS D!PREC 
MACHINE 19 7 . 00 4500.00 4371 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
10250 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
20TDTAL OEPREC & THIS YEARS DEPR!C 
MACHINE 20 7 . 00 4500 . 00 7000.00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
10250 . 00 5.00 0.0 
1 21TOTAL D!PREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 21 7 . 00 3500 . 00 4711.00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
1100 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 22TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS O!PREC 
MACHINE 22 7 . 00 2000 . 00 1320 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
laoo . oo 5 . 00 0 . 0 
23TOTAL D!PREC & THIS YEARS DEPREC 
71 1 10 . 2 
0.0 
9000 . 00 
71251 . 1 
72 1 1 & . 9 
311 . 00 
3176 . 00 
7411& . 9 
0 . 0 
11500 . 00 
110 . 00 
1100 . 00 
71295 . 7 
0 . 0 
11500 . 00 
71597 . 5 
920 . 00 
9200 . 00 
79733.7 
0 . 0 
4200 . 00 
79940 . 9 
390 . 00 
3900 . 00 
79940 . 9 
437 . 00 
4371 . 00 
&20&2 . 4 
0 . 0 
7000 . 00 
12&41 . 6 
0 . 0 
4711 . 00 
a214a.6 
132 . 00 
1320 . 00 
12&97 . 9 
2162.4 
13 1 a . s 1 
21&2 . 43 
1570 . 1 
5417 . 71 
1570 . 77 
141a4 . 3 
52445 . 00 
1&1a4 . 21 
0 . 0 
1001 . 00 
0.00 
1 ItO . 0 
1437 . 1& 
1 1 as . 1 a 
1155.4 
31343 . 76 
1155 . 3& 
2al2.1 
10019 . 2& 
2112 . 15 
22121 . I 
79900 . 00 
22121.57 
4102 . 3 
1 61 oa . 13 
4102 . 32 
2115.7 
7550 . 00 
2115 . 71 
141 . 7 
102. 69 
14a . 59 
0 . 0 
311 . 00 
0 . 00 
:Z070 . 0 
2070 . 00 
72& . 9 
2551 . 02 
721 . a6 
1310 . 0 
•13o.oo 
13ao . oo 
301 . 9 
1221 . 16 
301.a& 
756 . 0 
2646 . 00 
756 . 00 
207 . 2 
725 . 1 4 
201. 1 a 
0 . 0 
437 . 00 
0 . 00 
1210 . 0 
4410 . 00 
1250 . 00 
516 . 2 
19a1 . S6 
5 66 . 1 6 
0 . 0 
132 . 00 
0 . 00 
249 . 4 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2017 . 40 
2 . 00 
4000.00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
775 . 20 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
&74.20 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
264.00 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
Q . O 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
33474 . 00 
11&0 . 00 
31719 . 00 
1171.00 
11700 . 00 
1113 . 00 
7717 . 00 
1175.00 
50117 . 00 
1111.00 
51101.00 
1171.00 
14000 . 00 
19a3.00 
S5al2.00 
19ao . oo 
1000 . 00 
1913 . 00 
3425.00 
1171 . 00 
2375 . 00 
117& . 00 
7500 . 00 
19a2 . 00 
4500 . 00 
11&0 . 00 
5000 . 00 
1111 . 00 
3500 . 00 
1171 . 00 
2000 . 0C 
1112 . 00 
1500 . 00 
1979.00 
•5oo . oo 
1!176.00 
4500 . 00 
1912 . 00 
3500 . 00 
19a 1. 00 
2000 . 00 
1175 . 00 
0.0 
s . oo 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
10 . 00 
0 . 0 
7 . 00 
0 . 0 
4 . 00 
0.0 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
5 . 00 
0.0 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
7 . 00 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
3.00 
0 . 0 
5 . 00 
0 . 0 
4 . 00 
0.0 
7 . 00 
0 . 0 
3 . 00 
0 . 0 
6 . 00 
0 . 0 
9.00 
0 . 0 
3 . 00 
0 . 0 
4 . 00 
0 . 0 
10.00 
33141 . 92 
0 . 0 
21141 . 01 
0 . 0 
24231 . 21 
0 . 0 
1071 . 00 
0 . 0 
47227 . 00 
0 . 0 
52239 . 110 
0 . 0 
41721 . 31 
0 . 0 
31921 . 56 
0 . 0 
50375 . 11 
0 . 0 
3535 . 71 
0 . 0 
34al . 00 . 
0 . 0 
1325 . 00 
0.0 
7977 . 14 
0 . 0 
ao5o . oo 
0 . 0 
a2ao . oo 
0 . 0 
2310 . 00 
0 . 0 
33a2 . 04 
0 . 0 
3134 . 00 
0 . 0 
3150 . 00 
0 . 0 
3302 . 50 
0 . 0 
1 1 a a. oo 
0 . 0 
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SUMMARY 01" PROGRAM OPTIONS SELECTED BY THE USER 
RESULTS FROM SR ROTATION, LIBERTY COUNTY . FINAL ANALYSIS . 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS USED I"DR PRICES 
s I 30 I aa 
AND YIELDS . WHOLLY LEASED I"ARM ACREAGE , 50~ LONG TERM AND 40~ 
INTERMEDIATE DEBT . SUPERIOR MANAGEMENT . CROP INSURANCE. 50 G PAYMENT LIMIT . 
1/7 CROP SHARE ON SOYBEANS, 1/2 ON RICE . STOCHASTIC RUN, S YRS, SO ITERATIONS . 
SIMULATE THE REPRESENTATIVE I"ARM I"DR 5 YEARS 
I"IRST YEAR TO BE SIMULATED IS 19&4 . 
THE SIMULATION WILL BE DETERMINISTIC 
PRINT ALL INPUT DATA AND ALL OUTPUT TABLES 
THE REPRESENTATIVE FARM HAS 4 CROPS AND 0 LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
PAYOI"F DUTSTANOINC LOANS USING SURPLUS CASH 
NO SPECIAL I"INANCIAL BAILOUT PROGRAM IS IN EI"I"ECT 
ADJUST INCOME TAX SCHEDULE AFTER 1914 FOR CHANCES IN THE CPI 
FIXED PORTION 01" CROPS SOLD IN T AND CCC LOAN USED FOR THE REMAINDER 
NO MAXIMUM ON ANNUAL INTEREST DEDUCTIONS IS IN PLACE 
THE CROP MIX WILL BE CONSTANT OVER TIME 
DEPRECIATION ON OLD MACHINERY WILL BE CALCULATED BY THE DECLINING BALANCE METHOD 
USE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS I"OR 1912 
MACHINERY PURCHASED AFTER 19&0 WILL BE RECOVERED USING AN ACCELERATED SCHEDULE 
THE USER HAS ELECTED TO REDUCE BASIS I"OR INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
THE I"ARM HAS ELECTED NOT TO TAKE I"IRST YEAR EXPENSING ON PURCHASES 01" MACHINERY 
THERE ARE J7 PIECES 01" OWNED FARM MACHINERY TO BE DEPRECIATED 
OLD FARM MACHINERY WILL BE TRADED IN RATHER THAN BE SOLO 
USER HAS SPECII"IEO THE I"AMILY CONSUMPTION FUNCTION I"OR REGION 
THE I"ARM MAY NOT SELL CROPLAND TO AVOID INSOLVENCY 
CROPLAND WILL BE LEASED USING A CROP SHARE SCHEME SPECII"IED BY THE USER 
ANNUAL INI"LATION RATES FOR I"ARMLANO ARE PROVIDED BY THE USER 
THE I"ARM WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO CROW OVER TIME 
INI"DRMATIDN I"OR 0 ALTERNATIVE I"ARMS IS PROVIDED BY THE USER 
AN UNLIMITED NONRECOURSE LOAN (PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM WILL BE IN EI"I"ECT 
DO NOT PAY INTEREST ON NONRED!EMEO NONRECOURSE CCC LOANS 
LOAN RATES ARE FIXED BY THE ANALYST IN ALL YEARS 
INTEREST ON FOR LOANS WILL BE CHARGED ANNUALLY FOR 1 YEARS 
A TARGET PRICE PROGRAM WILL BE IN EI"I"ECT AND TARGET PRICES ARE I"IXED 
AN ALL•RISK CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM IS IN EI"I"ECT 
A MANDATORY S!T·ASIDE OR VOLUNTARY DIVERSION PROGRAM WILL BE IN EI"I"ECT 
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS ARE IN EI"FECT I"OR OEI"ICIENCY PAYMENTS, DIVERSION PAYMENTS I DISASTER PAYMENTS 
ALL I"ARMS ARE ELICIBLE I"OR ALL FARM PROCRAM BENEI"ITS 
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~ESULTS 'ROM SR ROTATION , LIBERTY COUNTY . 'INAL ANALYSIS . 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS USED 'OR PRICES 
AND YIELDS. WHOLLY LEASED FARM ACREAGE, SO~ LONG TERM AND 40X 
I NTERMEDIATE DEBT . SUPERIOR MANAGEMENT . CROP INSURANCE, SO G PAYMENT LIMIT. 
1/7 CROP SHARE ON SOYBEANS, 1/2 ON IUCE . STOCHASTIC RUN, S YRS, 50 ITERATIONS. 
C~OPLANO ON INITIAL 'ARM 
TOTAL CROPLAND ACRES OWNED 
TOTAL CROPLAND ACRES LEASED 
PASTURELANO ACRES OWNED 
PASTURELANO ACRES LEASED 
'RACT!ON CRD~LAND THAT IS TILLABLE 
'RACTION CROPLAND THAT IS IRRIGATED 
INITIAL BALANCE SHEET 'OR THE 'ARM 
ASSETS 
MARKET VALUE 0' CROPLAND & 'ARMSTEAD 
MARKET VALUE D' BUILDINGS 
TOTAL VALUE OF OWNED CROPLAND & BUILDINGS 
MARKET VALUE 0' O,,.,ARM INVESTMENTS 
5ECINNING CASH RESERVE 
MARKET VALUE OF OWNED PASTURELANO 
MARKET VALUE OF ALL 'ARM MACHINERY 
MARKET VALUE 0' ALL LIVESTOCK 
TOTAL VALUE 0' ASSETS 
LIABILITIES 
TOTAL REAL !STATE DEBT 
TOTAL INT!RMEDlATE·TERM D!IT 
INCOME TAXES DU! IN YEAR I 
SELF EMPLOYMENT TAX!S OU! IN Y!AR I 
TOTAL D!IT 
BEGINNING NET WORTH (MARKET VALUE) 
INITIAL FINANCIAL RATIOS 'OR TH! FARM 
!OUITY TO ASSETS RATIO 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
LEV!RACE RATIO 
AV!RACE PER ACRE VALUE OF CROPLAND 
AV!RACE P!R ACRE VALUE OF PASTURELAND 
LIABILITIES FOR INITIAL FARM 
REAL !STATE DEBT 
LOAN LI'! ON DEBT 
'RACTION LAND LOAN REMAINING 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT 0' THE LOAN 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
IN~!RMEDIATE T!RM D!IT 
LOAN LIFE ON D!IT 
FRACTION LOAN REMAINING 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT 0' THE LOAN 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
OPERATING LOAN 
'RACTION 0' YEAR LOAN IS USED 
TERMS ,OR N!W LOANS 
NO . YEARS 'OR NEW LAND LOANS 
NO. YEARS FOR N!W MACH LOANS 
MINIMUM !OU!TY RATIOS 'OR SOLVENCY 
MINIMUM LDNC TERM EOUITY 
MINIMUM INT!RM!OIATE TERM EOUITY 
INFORMATION FOR REFINANCING DEBTS 
CHARGE TO REFINANCE CASH FLOW DEFICITS 
NO . YEARS 'OR A LONG•TERM LOAN 
NO. YEARS FOR INTERM•T!RM LOAN 
MINIMUM DOWNPAYM!NT L!V!LS 
MINIMUM DOWNPAYMENT FOR FARM MACHINERY 
MINIMUM DQWNPAYMENT FOR FARMLAND 
AFTER•TAX DISCOUNT RATE 
ANNUAL RATE OF RETURN TO PROD ASSETS T•l 
CAPITAL CAIN RATE FOR LAND IN T·l 
CASH RESERVE FOR TH! FARM 
MINIMUM CASH RESERVE 
BEGINNING CASH RESERVE 
CAPITAL ASSETS TO I! R!COVER!O (DEPRECIATED) 
BUILDINGS PLACED INTO USE PRIOR TO ISII 
SALVAGE VALUE 
PURCHASE PRICE 
ECONOMIC (DEPRECIATION) LIFE 
REGULAR IUILCINCS PLACED INTO USE AFTER ISIO 
PURCHASE PRICE 
CALENDAR YEAR PURCHASED 
SPECIAL PURPOSE IUILDINCS PLACED INTO USE AFTER 
PURCHASE PRICE 
CALENDAR YEAR PURCHASED 
FIXED COSTS 
PROPERTY TAX RATE (STAX/SVALUE) 
TOTAL PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX 
OTHER TAXES 
ACCOUNTANT & LECAL FEES 
UNALLOCATED MAINTENANCE COSTS 
INSURANCE ON MACHINERY 
MISCELLANEOUS FIXED COSTS 
LAND LEAS! COSTS 
CASH RENT FOR CROPLAND (S/ACRE) 
CASH RENT FOR PASTURELAND ($/ACRE) 
ANNUAL INFLATION RATE FOR 
PER ACRE CASH LEASE COST 
CAPITALIZATION RATE BETWEEN 
LAND VALUE & CROPLAND CASH LEASE COST 
'AMILY CONSUMPTION AND TAX IN,ORMATIDN 
ACE 0' OPERATOR 
NO . 0' TAX EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED 
MARGINAL TAX RATE FOR STATE 
RATIO 0' PERSONAL OEOUC TO NET INCOME 
DESIRED TAXABLE INCOME 
AV!RACE ANNUAL OFF•,ARM INCOME 
NON•TAXAILE OFF·FARM INCOME 
ANNUAL RETURN ON OFF•,ARM INVEST 
MINIMUM FAMILY LIVING EXPENSES 
MAXIMUM FAMILY LIVING EXPENSES 
. 10.0000 
2300 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 1500 
0.5300 
12000.0000 
155000.000 
167000 . 000 
20000 . 0000 
5000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
115202 . 000 
0 . 0 
717202 . 000 
11100 . 0000 
221011.000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
292111 . 000 
414321 . 000 
0 . 1132 
0 . 31111 
o . 113 o a 
1200 . 0000 
0 . 0 
11100 . 0000 
30 . 0000 
0 . 5000 
133100.000 
0 . 4000 
221011.000 
5.0000 
0 . 5000 
452112 . 000 
0 . 4000 
0 .3 110 
30.0000 
5 . 0000 
0.3333 
0 . 3333 
0.0100 
20 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0.3000 
0.3000 
0 . 10 II 
0 . 0 
0.0400 
5000 . 0000 
5000.0000 
10500 . 0000 
105000 . 000 
30 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1180 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 003330 
0 . 0 
0.0 
3000.0000 
0 . 0 
3200 . 0000 
5000.0000 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
45 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 2000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
111000 . 0000 
0 . 1100 
11000.0000 
25000 . 0000 
US!~•s SPECJ,IED CONSUMPTION 'UNCTION USED I' THE OPTION l~ ELECTED 
02 
03 
75 
INCOME TAX PAYMENT DUE IN YEAR 1 
S!LF·!MPLOYMENT TAX PAYMENT DUE IN YEAR 1 
TAX ABLE INCOME IN YEAR T·3 
TAX~BLE INCOME IN YEAR T·2 
TAXABLE ! NCOM! IN YEAR T·1 
MAXIMUM INTEREST OEOUCTION IF OPTION IS USED 
RISK AVERSION CO!~FICI!NT 
MIRED FARM LAlOR 
NO . OF FULL TIM! EMPLOYEES 
ANNUAL GROSS SALARY FOR FULL-TIM! EMPLOYEE 
HOURLY WAGE RATE FOR PART·TIM! LAlOR 
ANNUAL INTEREST RATES 1la4 1ta5 
OLD LONG•TERM LOANS 
OLD INTERMEDIATE-TERM LOANS 
NEW LONG·T!RM LOANS 
NEW INT!RMEDIATE·T!RM LOANS 
REFINANCE LONG·T!RM LOANS 
REFINANCE INTERM•T!RM LOANS 
DPI!RATING LOANS 
RECEIVED FOR CASH RESERVES 
0. 1 175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1310 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1310 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1520 
0 . 1180 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0. 1170 
0 . 14 90 
0 . 1170 
0. 1490 
0. 1540 
0 . 1113 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES 
NEW FARM MACHINI!RY 
IN SELECTED COSTS 
USED FARM MACHINERY 
FIXED COST , INS & TAX 
SEED COS T S 
FERTILIZER & LIM! 
CHEMICAL COSTS 
FUEL & LUBE COSTS 
REPAIRS ON MACHINERY 
OTHER PROD COST 
CUSTOM COSTS 
HIRED LABOR COSTS 
OFF·FARM INVESTMENT 
PURCHASED INPUTS FOR LIVEST 
FARMLAND VALUES 
BUILDING VALUES 
OFF•FARM STORAGE COSTS 
OTHER ANNUAL DATA FOR THE FARM 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0540 
0 . 1 14 5 
0 . 0744 
0 . 0113 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0064 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
o . 1 1 ao 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0 
11a4 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0204 
0.0659 
0.0915 
0 , 0470 
0 , 0470 
0 , 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 1190 
0 . 0 
0.0710 
·0 . 0200 
0.0470 
uas 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3 . 0000 
13100 . 0000 
3 . 3500 
11a6 1917 
0. 1175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1010 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1010 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1510 
0 . 11 10 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0 
0 . 0450 
-o . 1201 
0 . 0631 
0.0615 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 , 0450 
0 . 1 1 10 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0 . 0200 
0 . 0450 
tt a 1 
0 . 1 175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1050 
0 . 1370 
0. 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 1420 
0 . 1070 
o . o4ao 
0 . 0100 
o . o4ao 
0 . 04aO 
0 , 0410 
o . o•ao 
0.04aO 
0 . 04aO 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0.0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0410 
1917 
19aa 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1050 
·o . 137o 
0 . 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 14 20 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0100 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0.0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0 . 0200 
0 . 0500 
uaa 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
NEW CAPITAL INVESTED IN FAR 
CONS~MER PRICE INDEX 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
310 . 10 323 . 10 339 . 00 356 . 20 374 . 00 
OTHER FARM INCOME 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
SELF EMPLOYMENT TAX RATE 0 . 140 0.141 0 . 143 0 . 143 0 . 150 0 . 0 
MAXIMUM INCOME SUBJUCT TO 
SELF EMPLDPYMENT TAX 37201 . 00 3&ao3 . 00 40112 . 00 42672 . 00 44105 . 00 0 . 0 
SUMMARY OF THE OWNED MACHINERY COMPLEMENT 
CURRENT ORIGINAL ESTIMATED 
TRACTOR151HP 
TRACTOR156HP 
TRACTOR165HP 
TRACTOR 15HP 
TRCTR 226HP 
TRCTR 2 21HP 
COMBINE 7720 
CDMIIINE 7720 
CDMIIINE 7720 
PCKUP 1 /2TON 
PCKUP 1 / 2 T ON 
PCKUP 1/ 2TON 
OSK 22 ' 9 " 
OSK 2 2' 9" 
OSK 24 ' 4 " 
OSK 24 ' 4" 
ROLL CUL T 
ROLL CULT 
!IN PLANT a • 
liN PLAN T a • 
GRA I N CART 
GRAIN CART 
LD PL 16X60 
LO PL 16XIO 
LEVEE IOX!S 
LEV!! PLOW 
LfVEE PUSH 
LEVEE ROLLER 
FLO CUL 31 ' 
FLO CUL 31 ' 
FLO CUL 25 
BEODER I ROW 
II!OOER a ROW 
P I P! HARROW 
PIP! HARROW 
OU·ALL 
MISC TRUCKS 
76 
YEAR MARKET 
PURCHASED VALUE 
19&0 . 0 33474 . 0 
1979 . 0 3 1 76li . O 
1913 . 0 1 1 700 . 0 
1175 . 0 
19 71 . 0 
19 a 1 . o 
1 9 79 . 0 
1 91 J . 0 
19&0 . 0 
1 9 a 3. o 
1 91 a . o 
1976 . 0 
1 912 . 0 
19ao . o 
1 9 a 1 • o 
1971 . 0 
1912 . 0 
19 79 . 0 
1976.0 
1 9a2 . 0 
1 9 a 1 . o 
1975 . 0 
197a . o 
1977 . 0 
19a2 . 0 
19a1 . 0 
1 9a 1 . 0 
1 9 7 a . o 
1912 . 0 
19 a 1. o 
197a.O 
1 9 7 6 . 0 
1 9 79 . 0 
1 9 7 9 . 0 
1910 . 0 
197a . o 
1177.0 
7717 . 0 
34945 . 0 
50197 . 0 
51909 . 0 
94000 . 0 
55112 . 0 
9000 , 0 
3425 . 0 
2:!75 , 0 
7SOO . O 
4500 . 0 
5000 . 0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
1500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
7:!76 . 0 
3000 . 0 
1000 . 0 
1547 . 0 
700 . 0 
350 . 0 
5SOO . O 
4500 . 0 
2500 . 0 
1036 . 0 
1500 . 0 
1000 . 0 
1 100 . 0 
3500 . 0 
50000 . 0 
PURCHASE 
PRICE 
39791 . 0 
3:156a . o 
61700 . 0 
10017 . 0 
52475 . 0 
74621 . 0 
53116 . 0 
94000 . 0 
6 1 a 11 . o 
9000 . 0 
4531 . 0 
3176 . 0 
11500 . 0 
9800 , 0 
1 1500 . 0 
9200 . 0 
4200 , 0 
3900 . 0 
4 J71 . 0 
7000 . 0 
4718.0 
1320 . 0 
7600 . 0 
aooo . o 
7500 . 0 
1563 . 0 
2100 . 0 
350 . 0 
7900 . 0 
7100 . 0 
5aoc . o 
1100 . 0 
3500 . 
1020 . 
1800 . 0 
1600.0. 
60000 . 0 
SALVAGE 
VALUE 
3910 . 0 
3357 . 0 
0 . 0 
1001 . 0 
524a . o 
7462.8 
5351 . 0 
0 . 0 
11 a a . o 
0.0 
454 . 0 
Jaa . o 
0 . 0 
980 . 0 
0 . 0 
920 . 0 
0 . 0 
390 . 0 
4J7 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1J2 . 0 
760 . 0 
100 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
35 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
5ao . o 
1 10 . 0 
350 . 0 
102 . 0 
160 . 0 
a60 . 0 
1000.0 
OEPREC I · 
AT ION 
L IF 1!: ' 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
'7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
ACCUM . 
ECONOMIC RfCOVI!:RY 
LIP"! (OEPREC .) 
7.0 304'79 , 5 
7 . 0 28070 . 3 
7 . 0 1255 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
'7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
0 , 0 
907a . o 
41037 . 0 
43284 . 2 
43866 . 7 
14100 . 0 
45772.9 
1:150 . 0 
39JS . J 
34aa . o 
4255 . 0 
7249 . 0 
6670 . 0 
7978 . 1 
15 54 . 0 
3174 . 9 
39:!4 . 0 
2590 . 0 
2736 . 4 
11 a a . o 
659 0 . 6 
7200 . 0 
2775 . 0 
9 0 6 . 5 
1218 . 0 
JOJ . 5 
292::1 . 0 
41 1 a . o 
5029 . 7 
990 . 0 
2149 . 2 
830.J 
1 113 . 5 
7457 . 8 
52031 . 4 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MACHINERY CURR!NT COST 
REPLACEMEN T R!P L ACE . RECOVER Y 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CODE C OS T PER I OD OR CLASS 
0 . 0 11700 . 0 5 . 0 
0 . 0 6 1 700 . 0 5 , 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
o . o 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 , 0 
0.0 
2 . 0 
11700 . 0 
19tOO , O 
14100 . 0 
94aoo . o 
9400 0 . 0 
9400 0 . 0 
94000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
15300 . 0 
15300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
5 2 00 . 0 
5 2 00 . 0 
10250 . 0 
10250 . 0 
6100 . 0 
1aoo . o 
17500 . 0 
17500 . 0 
11250 . 0 
2800 . 0 
2500 . 0 
650 . 0 
9100 . 0 
9100 . 0 
9100 . 0 
5400 . 0 
5400 . 0 
2100 . 0 
2100 . 0 
11500 . 0 
10000 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
05 
IN~ORMATION ~OR INITIAl ~ARM 23 10 . ACRES··································································· · ·· 
SUMM~RY 0~ CRO, !NT!RPRIS! COSTS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
~IRST RiC! 
RATOON RIC! 
SE!O 
0 . 0 
1 . 45 
33 . I 0 
0 . 0 
~!RT•liM! CHEMICALS ~UEl•lUIIE 
0 . 0 
14.311 
51 . 00 
3 . 31 
··S/ACR!•• 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
45 . 45 12 . 61 
17 . 56 11 . 60 
2.50 0.0 
MONTHLY LAIIOR REOUIR!MENTS PER ACRE. IIY CRO, !HT!R,RISE 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
~ I RST R I CE 
RATOON RICE 
HOURS 0~ UNPAID ~AMilY lABOR 
JAN . ~Ell . MAR . APRil 
0 . 240 0 : 451 0 . 105 0 . 546 
0 . 240 0 . 451 0 . 105 0 . 546 
0.275 0 . 317 1 . 310 0 . $1& 
o.o 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 
MAY 
1. 241 
1. 241 
1 . 730 
0 . 0 
REPAIRS OTHER HARY!ST COST 
S/YIElD UNIT 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
' . 17 
6 . 71 
0.0 
JUNE 
0 . 414 
0 . 414 
1 . 1 I 1 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
9 . 14 
79.20 
5 . 75 
JUlY 
0 . 215 
0 . 215 
1 . 273 
0 . 0 
AUC. 
0 . "404 
0 . 404 
0 . 177 
0 . 101 
0 . 4$00 
1 . 2300 
1 . 2300 
SI!!PT . 
0 . 1 OS 
0 . I OS 
0.214 
0 . 011 
OCT . 
0 . 557 
0 . 557 
0 . 111 
0 . 111 
HOY . 
0 . 797 
0 . 797 
0 . 1 s 6 
0 . 0 
DI!C . 
0 . 105 
0 . 105 
0 . 222 
0 . 0 
AVAilABLE EACH MONTH 400 . 00 400.00 100 . 00 100.00 750 . 00 . 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 400 . 00 
HOURS WORKED I!ACH MONTH IY A 
~ULl TIME I!MPlOYI!E 250 . 00 300 . 00 350 . 00 310 . 00 350 . 00 3$0 . 00 350 . 00 350 . 00 300 . 00 300 . 00 250 . 00 250 . 00 
ANNUAL M!~H OR MODAl CROP YIELDS 
1ST SOYBEANS 
1114 
0 . 0 
23 . II 
4 '-, 7 
1 . 14 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
~IRST IIIC£ 
RATOON RIC! 
ANNUAL MEAN OR MODAL CROP PRICI!S 
1ST SOYIEANS 
1114 
0 . 0 
1 . 33 
1 . 25 
1 . 62 
2ND SOYBEANS 
'iRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE CROPMIX 
1ST SOYI!ANS 
2ND SOYIII!ANS 
I'IRST RIC! 
RATOON RICE 
CROP SHARE lEASING IIY CROP 
ACII:!S 
PLAHT!C 
YEAII: 1 
0 . 0 
1017 . 00 
1017 . 00 
1017 . 00 
1116 
0 . 0 
24 . 17 
52.31 
I . I I 
1115 
0 . 0 
7 . 4$ 
1 . 71 
I . 1 o 
1111 
0.0 
24 . 17 
56.04 
1 . II 
1116 
0 . 0 
7 . 12 
10 . 14 
1 . 43 
ACRES MINIMUM 
HARVESTED ~RACTION 
Y!AR1 0~ MIX 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
1042 . 40 0 . 0 
1016 . 40 0 . 0 
1016.30 0 . 0 
1117 
0.0 
25 . 17 
56 . 111 
2 . 00 
1117 
0 . 0 
a . o1 
10 . 511 
1.12 
MAXIMUM 
~RACTION 
0~ MIX 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1111 
0 . 0 
25 . 61 
57 . 1 a 
2 . 02 
1111 
0 . 0 
1 . 34 
11 . 02 
10 . 25 
LINKAGE 
TO COUIIlE 
CROP 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
3 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
NORMAL 
~RAC . ACRES 
HARVESTI!C 
0 . 0 
0 . 15 
0 . 91 
0 . 11 
lANDLORD SHARE 0~ RI!CEIPTS a COSTS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CROP 
'!.!C!IPTS 
SEED ~I!RT I CHEMICAL ~U!L a MACHIN!RY OTH!R 
COSTS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 1516 
0 . 1017 
CUSTOM 
COSTS LIME COSTS lUll! REPAIRS 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
~IRST RICE 
RATCON RICE 
MARKETING STRATACI!S 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I' !lltST R I Cl! 
RATOON RIC! 
SEASONAL PRICE INDEX 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
~IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . U30 
0 . 5000 
0 . 5000 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 31130 
0 . 31130 
IIECINNINC ~RACTION 
INVENTORY SOlO NEXT 
MONTH 
SOlO A~TI!R 
HARV!ST 
0.0 
10 . 000 
7 . 000 
10 . 000 
0 . 0 
3704 . 000 
0 . 0 
1053 . 500 
JAN . 
1. 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
TAX YEAR 
0 . 0 
0 . 300 
0 . 0 
1 . 000 
~EI . 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
MAR . APRIL 
I . 000 I . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1. 000 
I . 000 I. 000 
I'ACTORI!C MATRIX ~011: CROP YIElDS a ,RICES 
CROP YIELDS 
1ST SOYIII!ANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
~IRST R IC E 
RATOON RIC! 
CROP PRICES 
1S T SOYII EANS 
lNO SOYI E ANS 
~IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
1 2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 503 
0 . 503 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 515 
0 . 515 
0 . 732 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.395 
0. :us 
0 . 215 
0 . 533 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 5000 
0 . 5000 
MONTH 
SOLO IN 
N!XT YEAR 
0 . 0 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MAY JUNE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
AUG . 
I . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
I. 000 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
I . 000 
JULY 
1 . 000 
1. 000 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
I. 000 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
I . 000 
0.300 
0 . 300 
0 . 030 
0 . 031 
0 . 951 
0 . 951 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0 . 411 
•0 . 411 
0. 177 
•0 . 101 
-o . 110 
-o. 110 
0 . 412 
0 . 0 
•0.241 
•0 . 241 
•0 . 592 
•0 . 140 
0 . 242 
0 . 242 
0 . 171 
1 . 000 
SEPT . 
I . 000 
I. 000 
1. 000 
I . 000 
CUMMUlATIVE OISTRIIIUTIONS 0~ O!VIAT!S AIOUT TH! MEAN (OR TR!NO), EXPRESSED AS A ~RACTION 0~ MEAN 
WORK 
0 . 0 
0 . 0790 
0 . 3370 
0 . 3370 
OCT . 
I . 000 
1. 000 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
I 2 3 5 7 I 10 
CROP YIELDS 
1ST SDYI!ANS 
2ND SCYIIEANS 
~lAST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
CROP PRICES 
1ST SDYIIEANS 
2ND SDYIIEANS 
~lAST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
•0 . 71 1 
•0 . 719 
·0 . 427 
• 0 . 614 
•0 . 274 
·0 . 274 
•0 . 416 
•0 . 41& 
•0 . 530 
•0 . 541 
·0 . 215 
• 0 . 3, 7 
•0 . 231 
·0 . 235 
·0 . 314 
·0 . 314 
·0 . 311 
•0 . 371 
•0 . 110 
• 0 . !Ill 
•0 . 013 
·0 . 013 
•0 . 222 
•0 . 222 
COYAR!ANC! MATRIX 0~ NET INCOMES ~DR CROPS 
1ST SOYII!ANS 
2ND SOYII!ANS 
~IRST RIC! 
RATOON RIC! 
1 2 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
·0 . 214 
•0 . 251 
•0 . 121 
•0 . 12 & 
·0 . 052 
•0 . 052 
•0 . 0117 
•0 . 017 
4 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
• 0 . 171 
•0 . , 33 
• 0.077 
•0 . 015 
•0 . 031 
·0 . 031 
•0 . 025 
•0.025 
·0 . 015 
·0 . 026 
•0 . 042 
-0 . 023 
0 . 031 
0 . 031 
0 . 121 
0. 121 
0.032 
0 . 02S 
·0 . 004 
0 . 024 
0 . 041 
0 . 041 
0 . 1 71 
0 . 171 
0 . 152 
0 . 135 
0 . 034 
0 . 015 
0 . 087 
0 . 067 
0 . 208 
0 . 206 
0 . 310 
0 . 301 
0. 12, 
0. 1 II 
0 . 225 
0 . 22& 
0. 211 
0. 211 
0 . 970 
0 . 900 
0 . 361 
0 . 712 
0 . 261 
0 . 2111 
0 . 419 
0 . • ,. 
NOV . 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
I . 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
I. 000 
DEC . 
I. 000 
1 . 000 
1 . 000 
I . 000 
77 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
06 
10 
SUMMARY 01' POLICY DATA, IIY YEAR AND IIY CROP 
CCC LOAN RAT!S 
1ST SOYSEANS 
2ND SOYSEANS 
I' XRS T RICE 
RATOON RICE 
INTEREST RATE I'OR CCC LOANS 
INTER!ST RATE I'OR I'OR LOANS 
1114 
0.0 
5 . 02 
1.33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
1115 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
1 . 33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
OI'I'·I'AR~ STORACE COSTS I'OR CROPS UND!R LOAN 
1ST SOYSEANS 
2ND !50Yl1EANS 
I'IRST RIC:!: 
RATOON RIC:!: 
TARCET PRIC:I:S, 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 30 
0.30 
0 . so 
0.50 
0.31 
0.31 
0.52 
0.52 
II' THI:Y ARI: NOT TI!O TO LOAN RATI:S 
0.0 0.0 
o . o 
12.23 
1 1 . 13 
0 . 0 
12.23 
1 1 • 13 
1116 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
1.33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 33 
0 . 33 
0 . 55 
0 . 55 
0 . 0 
0.0 
12 . 23 
1 1 . 13 
I'L!XIIIL! TARCET PRIC!···I'RACTION 01' TARC!T PRICE TO LOAN RAT! 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 
RATOON RIC:!: 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
DIRECT "I'OR" ENTRY PRICE 
1ST SOYIII!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1117 
0 . 0 
5.02 
1 . 33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0.34 
0.34 
0 . 57 
0 . 57 
0.0 
0.0 
12.23 
1 1 . • 3 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
ACTUAL YIELDS LAST 5 YEARS I'OR CALCULATING I'ARM PROGRAM YIELDS 
1ST SOYIIE~NS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 30 . 00 32.00 17 . 00 
I'IRST RICE 41 . 16 31.13 44 . 45 
RATOON RICE 2.12 1 . 65 1 .61 
ACTUAL LACGED PRICES !"OR 4 YEARS USED I'OR I"L!XIIILE LOAN RAT!$ 
0 . 0 
10 . 00 
49 . 61 
1 . , 2 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I"IRST RICE 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 0.0 
PROGRAM (DR liAS!) ACREAGE 
1S_T SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
NATIONAL ALLOCATION !"ACTOR 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC:! 
0 . 0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1017 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
0.0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1017 . 00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1. 00 
1. 00 
0.0 
1017 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
ACREAGE SET ASIDE , DlVERSION OR LIMITATION (I'RAC:TION) 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0.0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0.0 
I"IRST RICE 0 . 25 0 . 35 
RATOON RICE 
SLIPPAGE RATE (I'RAC:TION) 
1ST SOYSI:ANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
PAYMENT RATE !"OR AC:R!ACI: DIVI:RSION 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOOII RICE 
TRICCER PRICE I'OR THE "I"OR" 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2110 SOYIIEAHS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
CALL PRICE !"OR THE "I'DR" 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEAHS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC:I! 
LENGTH OF !"ARMER OWNED RESERVE 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOOH RICE 
STORACE PAYMENT RATE I'OR THE "I'OR" 
0.25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYIIEANS 0.0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATODN RICE 0 . 0 
PRODUCTION GUARANTEE I'OR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SDYIIEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 13 . 15 
I"IRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC!: 0 . 0 
PRICE ELECTION FOR CROP INSURANC:I: 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0.0 
6 . 50 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
PR!MIUM RATE PER ACRE I'OR CROP 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
INSURANCE 
0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
LOAII RATE I"OR PEANUTS UNDER OUOTE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
78 :~~s~D~~~:Ns 
RATOON RICE 
I. 13 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
LOAN RATE I"OR PEANUTS NOT UNDER QUOTA 
1ST SOYBEANS 0.0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0.0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 
0 . 35 
0 . 0 
o.o 
0 . 20 
0.20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
7 1 . 1 9 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13 . 92 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
7.73 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
1 1 . 01 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0.20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
33 . '2 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
14 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
&.22 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
12 . 01 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1017 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1. 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.25 
0.25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0.20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
35 . 06 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . ~ 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 4 . 4' 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 29 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 36 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1111 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
&.33 
&.03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 31 
0 . 36 
0 . 60 
0 . 60 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 23 
1 1 . 9 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
6 . 00 
41 . 32 
1 . 94 
0 . 0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3 6 . 56 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
14 . 71 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
&. 62 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13 . 11 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
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'ARM"$ POUNOAGE QUOTE ~OR PEANUTS 
1ST SOYSEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYSEANS 0 . 0 
~IRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
ACREAGE ALLOTMENT ~OR RIC! 
1ST SOYS!ANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYSEANS 0 . 0 
PIRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC! 0 . 0 
~RACTION TARGET PRICE ~OR LOW YI!LD PAYM!NT 
1ST Sf.IYS!AN$ 
2ND SOYSI!AN$ 
~IRST RIC! 
lllATOON RIC! 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~RACTION TARGI!T PRICI! ~OR PR!Y!NT!D PLANTING PAYMENT 
1ST SOYSEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYS!ANS 0.0 0 . 0 
~IRST RIC! 
RATOON RIC! 
0 . 0 
0.0 
FRACTION PROV!N YIELD POR LOW YI!LD PAYM!NT 
0.0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYS!ANS 0 . 0 0.0 
2ND SOYS!ANS 0.0 0 . 0 
'IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
'RACTION PROVEN YII!LC ~OR PR!V!NT!D PLANTING 
1ST SOYSI!ANS 0.0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYSEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
'IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC! 0 . 0 0 . 0 
PARITY PRICE 
1ST SOYSEANS 
2ND SOYSI!ANS 
~IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~RACTION 0~ CROP ELIGIBLE ~OR MKTG CERTI~ICATE 
1ST SOYSEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYSEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
PIRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC! 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o.o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . {' 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
PAYMENT LIMITATION ~OR 
INCOME SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
DISASTER PAYMENTS 
100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
MAXIMUM NONRECOURSE CCC LOAN 
1ST SOYSEANS 
2ND SOYSEANS 
'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
MAXIMUM VALUE 0' CROP ELIGIBLE ~OR CE,lCl!NCY PAYMI!NT 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
'LEXIILE LOAN RATE PCRMULAS 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o.o 
NO . 0' Y!ARS DROP LOW DROP HIGH ~RACTION OF M!AN 
1ST SOYSEANS 0.0 
2ND SOYSI!ANS 0 . 0 
'IRST RICE 0.0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
A 1 . o INDICATES D!LETING THE LDW OR HIGH 
MARKETING LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYSEANS 
2ND SOYSEANS 
'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
' MAXIMUM MKTC LOAN SASE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
SCALE 'ARM PROGRAM B!NI!,ITS TO ~ARM SIZE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~ARMS LARC!R THAN 0 . ACR!S ARE NOT I!LICISLE 'OR ANY ~ARM PROGRAM 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . ACRES ARE ONLY !LICIBL! ~OR TH! CROP INSURANC! PROGRAM 
'ARMS WITH CROP SAL!S GREAT!R THAN S 
~ARMS WITH CROP SALES GREAT!R THAN $ 0 . ARE ONLY !LIGISLE 'OR THE CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM 
HISTORY 0' 'CIC PARTICIPATION 
NUMI!R 0' YEARS IN THE PROGRAM 3 . 00 
NUMSER OF LOSS YEARS IN PROGRAM 2 . 00 
TOTAL 'CIC IND!MNITY PAYM!NTS RECEIVED 13131 . 37 
THE !NO 0' ALL INPUT DATA 
1 ITDTAL D!PRI!C I THIS YEARS D!PREC 2162 . 4 2162 . 4 
MACHINE 7 . 00 33474 . 00 39791 . 00 3910 . 00 9311 . 51 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 39791.00 25&2 . 43 
11700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
I 2TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS D!PREC 4233 . 2 
MACHIN! 2 7 . 00 31759.00 33561 . 00 3357 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 33511 . 00 
11700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 lTOTAL D!PREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 19217 . 5 
MACHINE 3 7 . 00 11700 . 00 11700 . 00 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 61700 . 00 
61700 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 4TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 19217 . 5 
MACHINE 7 . 00 7717 . 00 10017 . 00 1009 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 10017 . 00 
19100 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
STDTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS D!PREC 20407.5 
MACHINE 5 7 . 00 34945 . 00 52475 . 00 5241 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 52475 . 00 
94100 . 00 5.00 0 . 0 
1 ITDTAL O!PR!C I THIS YEARS DEPREC 31531 . 1 
MACHINE I 7 . 00 50197 . 00 74121 . 00 7462 . 10 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 7462& . 00 
1570 . 1 
5497 . 71 
1570 . 77 
14914 . 3 
52445 . 00 
14914 . 29 
0 . 0 
1009 . 00 
0.00 
1190 . 0 
1437 . 91 
1119 . 9& 
1!155 . 4 
31343 . 71 
1955 . 31 
aooo . oo 
0 . 0 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
2017 . 40 
2.00 
4000.00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 3347& . 00 
0 . 0 1910 . 00 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
31711 . 00 
1171.00 
11700 . 00 
1113 . 00 
7717.00 
1175 . 00 
34945.00 
197& . 00 
50197 . 00 
1911 00 
o . e 
5 . 00 
0 . 0 
6 . 00 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
10 . 00 
0.0 
7 . 00 
0 . 0 
a . oo 
9071 . 00 
0 . 0 
47227 . 00 
0 . 0 
52239 . 10 
0 . 0 
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SUMMARY OF PROGRAM OPTIONS SELECTED BY THE USER 
RESULTS FROM SR ROTATION, LIBERTY COUNTY . FINAL ANALYSIS. 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS USED FOR PRICES 
AND YIELDS . WHOLLY LEASED FARM ACREAGE, SO~ LONG TERM AND 40~ 
INTERMEDIATE DEBT . SUPERIOR MANAGEMENT . CROP INSURANCE, 50 G PAYMENT LIMIT . 
1/7 CROP SHARE ON SOYBEANS AND RICE . STOCHASTIC RUN, 5 YRS, SO ITERATIONS . 
SIMULATE THE REPRESENTATIVE FARM FOR S YEARS 
FIRST YEAR TO BE SIMULATED IS 1964 . 
THE SIMULATION WILL BE DETERMINISTIC 
PRINT ALL INPUT DATA AND ALL OUTPUT TABLES 
THE REPRESENTATIVE FARM HAS 4 CROPS ANO 0 LIVESTOCK ENTERPRISES 
PAYOFF OUTSTANDING LOANS USING SURPLUS CASH 
NO SPECIAL FINANCIAL BAILOUT PROGRAM IS IN EFFECT 
ADJUST INCOME TAX SCHEDULE AFTER 1984 FOR CHANGES IN THE CPI 
FIXED PORTION OF CROPS SOLD IN T AND CCC LOAN USED FOR THE REMAINDER 
NO MAXIMUM ON ANNUAL INTEREST DEDUCTIONS IS IN PLACE 
THE CROP MIX WILL BE CONSTANT OVER TIME 
DEPRECIATION ON OLD MACHINERY WILL BE CALCULATED BY THE DECLINING BALANCE METHOD 
USE THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROVISIONS FOR 1982 
MACHINERY PURCHASED AFTER 1980 WILL BE RECOVERED USING AN ACCELERATED SCHEDULE 
THE USER HAS ELECTED TO REDUCE BASIS FOR INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT 
THE FARM HAS ELECTED NOT TO TAKE FIRST YEAR EXPENSING ON PURCHASES OF MACHINERY 
THERE ARE 37 PIECES OF DWHEO FARM MACHINERY TO BE DEPRECIATED 
OLO FARM MACHINERY WILL BE TRACED IN RATHER THAN BE SOLO 
USER HAS SPECIFIED THE FAMILY CONSUMPTION FUNCTION FOR REGION 
THE FARM MAY NOT SELL CROPLAND TO AVOID INSOLVENCY 
CROPLAND WILL BE LEASED USING A CROP SHARE SCHEME SPECIFIED BY THE USER 
ANNUAL INFLATION RATES 'DR 'ARMLANO ARE PROVIDED BY THE USER 
THE 'ARM WILL HOT BE ALLOWED TO CROW OVER TIME 
IN,ORMATIDN 'DR 0 ALTERNATIVE 'ARMS IS PROVIDED BY THE USER 
AN UNLIMITED NONRECOURSE LOAN (PRICE SUPPORT PROGRAM WILL BE IH !PFECT 
DO NOT PAY INTEREST ON NDNREO!EMED NONRECOURSE CCC LOANS 
LOAN RATES ARE FIXED BY THE ANALYST IN ALL YEARS 
INTEREST ON 'DR LOANS WILL I! CHARGED ANNUALLY FOR 1 YEARS 
A TARGET PRICE PROGRAM WILL BE IN !''!CT AND TARGET PRICES ARE FIXED 
AN ALL • RISK CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM IS IN EFFECT 
A MANDATORY SET·ASIDE OR VOLUNTARY DIVERSION PROGRAM WILL BE IN EFFECT 
PAYMENT LIMITATIONS ARE IN EFFECT FOR DEF I CIENCY PAYMENTS, DIVERSION PAYMENTS a DISASTER PAYMENTS 
ALL FARMS ARE ELIGIBLE FOR ALL 'ARM PROGRAM IENE,ITS 
RESULTS 'ROM SR ROTATION, LIBERTY COUNTY . FINAL ANALYSIS . 
MULTIVARIATE EMPIRICAL DISTRIBUTIONS USED POR PRICES 
AND YIELDS . WHOLLY LEASED FARM ACREAGE, 50~ LDNC TERM AND 40~ 
INTERMEDIATE DEBT . SUPERIOR MANAGEMENT . CROP INSURANCE, SO G PAYMENT LIMIT. 
1/7 CROP SHARE ON SOYBEANS AND RICE . STOCHASTIC RUN, 5 YRS, SO ITERATIONS . 
CROPLAND ON INITIAL FARM 
TOTAL CROPLAND ACRES OWNED 
TOTAL CROPLAND ACRES LEASED 
PASTURELAND ACRES OWNED 
PASTURELANO ACRES LEASED 
FRACTION CROPLAND THAT IS TILLAILE 
FRACTION CROPLAND THAT IS IRRIG~TEO 
INITIAL BALANCE SHEET 'DR THE FARM 
ASSETS 
MARKET VALUE 0' CROPLAND a FARMSTEAD 
MARKET VALUE OF BUILDINGS 
TOTAL VALUE OF OWNED CROPLAND a BUILDINGS 
MARKET VALUE OF OPF·PARM INVESTMENTS 
BECINNINC CASH RESERVE 
MARKET VALUE OF OWNED PASTURELANO 
MARKET VALUE 0' ALL FARM MACHINERY 
MARKET VALUE 0' ALL LIVESTOCK 
TOTAL VALUE OF ASSETS 
LIABILITIES 
TOTAL REAL ESTATE DEBT 
TOTAL INTERMEOIATE•TERM DEBT 
INCOME TAXES DUE IN YEAR 1 
SELF E~PLOYMENT TAXES CUE IN YEAR 1 
TOTAL DEBT 
BEGINNING NET WORTH (MARKET VALUE) 
INITIAL FINANCIAL RATIOS FOR THE FARM 
EQUITY TO ASSETS RATIO 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
LEVERAGE RATIO 
AVERAGE PER ACRE VALUE OP CROPLAND 
AVERAGE PER ACRE VALUE OF PASTURELANO 
LIABILITIES 'OR INITIAL FARM 
REAL ESTATE DEBT 
LOAN LIFE ON DEBT 
'RACTION LAND LOAN R!MAININC 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
INTERMEDIATE TERM DEBT 
LOAN liFE ON DEBT 
FRACTION lOAN REMAINING 
ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF THE LOAN 
DEBT TO ASSET RATIO 
80 OPERATING LOAN 
FRACTION OF YEAR LOAN IS USED 
TERMS FOR HEW LOANS 
NO. YEARS FOR HEW LAND LOANS 
NO . YEARS FOR HEW MACH LOANS 
10 . 0000 
2300 . 0000 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 9500 
0.5300 
12000 . 0000 
155000 , 000 
167000 . 000 
20000 . 0000 
5000 , 0000 
0 . 0 
515202.000 
0 . 0 
757202 . 000 
16800 . 0000 
22&081 . 000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2S2681 . 000 
414321.000 
0 . 1132 
o.38&6 
0.&306 
1200 . 0000 
0 . 0 
111800 . 0000 
30 . 0000 
0 . 5000 
133100 . 000 
0 . 4000 
221061.000 
5 . 0000 
0.5000 
452162.000 
0 . 4000 
0.31190 
30.0000 
5 . 0000 
0 1 
02 
OJ 
MINIMUM INTE~MEOIATE TERM EOUITY 
INFORMATION POR REFINANCING DEBTS 
CHARCE TO REFINANCE CASH PLOW DEFICITS 
NO YEARS POR A LONC•TERM LOAN 
NO . YEARS POR !NTERM·T!RM LOAN 
MINIMUM OOWNPAYM!NT LEVELS 
MINIMUM OOWNPAYMENT POR PARM MACHINERY 
MINIMUM DOWNPAYM!NT POR PA~MLAND 
APT!R• TAX DISCOUNT RAT! 
ANNUAL RATE OP RETURN TD PROD ASSETS T•1 
CAPITAL CAIN RATE POR LAND IN T·1 
CASH R2S!RV! PDR THE PARM 
MINIMUM CASH RESERVE 
BECINNINC CASH RESERVE 
CAPITAL ASSETS TO BE ~!COVERED (DEPRECIATED) 
BU!LD!NCS PLACED INTO USE PRIOR TD 1il1 
SALYACE VALUE 
PURCHASE PRICE 
ECONOMIC (DEPRECIATION) LIP! 
R!CULA~ BUILCINCS PLACED INTO US! APTER 1110 
PURCHASE PRICE 
CALENDAR YEAR PU~CHASED 
0.3333 
0.0100 
20.0000 
5.0000 
O.JOOO 
0 . ]000 
0 . 1011 
0.0 
0.0400 
5000 . 0000 
1000 . 0000 
10500 . 0000 
105000.000 
30.0000 
0.0 
0.0 
SPECIAL PURPOSE IUILOINCS PLACED INTO US! APTER 1110 
PURCHASE PRICE 0.0 
0.0 CALENDAR Y!AR PURCHASED 
FIXED COSTS 
PROPERTY TAX RATE (STAX/SVALUE) 
TOTAL PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX 
OTHER TAXES 
ACCOUNTANT & L!CAL PEES 
UNALLOCATED MAINTENANCE COSTS 
INSURANCE ON MACHINERY 
MISCELLANEOUS FIXED COSTS 
LAND LEAS! COSTS 
CASH RENT POR CROPLAND ($/ACRE) 
CASH RENT POR PASTURELANO ($/ACRE) 
ANNUAL INFLATION RAT! POR 
PER ACRE CASH LEASE COST 
CAPITALIZATION RATE BETWEEN 
LAND VALUE I CROPLAND CASH LEASE COST 
PAMILY CONSUMPTION AND TAX INPORMATION 
ACE OP OPERATOR 
NO . OP TAX EXEMPTIONS CLAIMED 
MARGINAL TAX RAT! POR STATE 
RATIO OP PERSONAL DEDUC TO NET INCOME 
DESIRED TAXABLE INCOME 
AV!RAC! ANNUAL OPP•PARM INCOME 
NON•TAXABLE OPP•PAR~ INCOME 
ANNUAL RETURN ON OPP•PARM INVEST 
MINIMUM FAMILY LIVINC EXP!NS!S 
MAXIMUM PAMILY LIVINC EXPENSES 
0 . 003330 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
]000 . 0000 
0 . 0 
3200.0000 
5000.0000 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
45 . 0000 
5 . 0000 
0 . 0 
0 . 2000 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
11000 . 0000 
0. 1100 
11000 . 0000 
25000.0000 
USER"$ SPECIPIEO CONSUMPTION PUNCTION USED !P TH! OPTION IS !L!CT!D 
CONSUMPTION a 0 . 0 • 0 . 0 • (DISPOSIIIL! INCOME • 0.0 ) 
INCOME TAX PAYMENT DU! IN YEAR 1 
S!LP•EMPLOYMENT TAX PAYMENT DUE IN YEAR 1 
TAXABLE INCOME IN YEAR T·3 
TAXABLE INCDM! IN YEAR T•2 
TAXABLE INCOME IN YEAR T•1 
MAXIMUM INTEREST DEDUCTION !P OPTION IS USED 
RISK AVERSION COEPPICI!NT 
HIRED FARM LABOR 
NO . OP PULL TIM! EMPLOY!!$ 
ANNUAL CROSS SALARY FOR FULL·TIM! EMPLOY!! 
HOURLY WACE RATE POR PART•TIM! LAlOR 
ANNUAL INTEREST RATES 1914 1115 
OLD LDNC·TERM LOANS 
OLD INT!RMEDIATE·TERM LOANS 
NEW LONC·TERM LOANS 
NEW INT!RMEOIATE•T!RM LOANS 
REFINANCE LDNC•TERM LOANS 
REPINANCE INT!RM•T!RM LOANS 
OPERATING LOANS 
RECEIVED POR CASH RESERVES 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1 J 10 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1] 10 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1520 
0 . 1110 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0 . 1170 
0 . 14 90 
0 . 1170 
0 . 14 90 
0 . 1540 
0 . 11 ll 
ANNUAL PERC!NTACE CHANCES IN SELECTED COSTS 
NEW FARM MACHINERY 0 . 0 0 . 0470 
USED FARM MACHINERY 0 . 0 0 . 0 
FIXED COST, INS I TAX 0 . 0540 0.0470 
SEED COSTS 0 . 1145 0 . 0204 
P!RTILIZ!R & LIME 
CHEMICAL COSTS 
PU!L I LUBE COSTS 
REPAIRS ON MACHINERY 
OTHER PROD COST 
CUSTOM COSTS 
HIRED LABOR COSTS 
OPP·PARM INVESTMENT 
PURCHASED INPUTS POR LIVEST 
PARMLAND VALUES 
BUILDING VALUES 
OPP•FARM STORACE COSTS 
OTHER ANNUAL DATA POR THE FARM 
NEW CAPITAL INVESTED IN PAR 
CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
OTHER FARM INCOME 
S!LP EMPLOYMENT TAX RAT! 
MAXIMUM INCOME SUBJUCT TO 
SELF EMPLOPYMENT TAX 
TltACTOR151HP 
TRACT.,P1'I'I~D 
YEAR 
PURCHASE!: 
11110 . 0 
1'1"?9 0 
0 . 0744 
0 . 0113 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
0.0064 
0 . 0540 
0 . 0540 
0 . 1110 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0 . 0200 
0 . 0 
1114 
0.0 
]10 . 10 
0 . 0 
0 . 140 
0.0851 
0 . 0915 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0 . 0470 
0.0470 
0 . 1190 
0.0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0470 
1915 
0 . 0 
323 . 90 
0.0 
0 . 141 
37209.00 ]1103.00 
COMPLEMENT 
CURRENT ORIGINAL 
MARKET PURCHASE 
VALUE PRICE 
33474 . 0 39791.0 
]1769 . 0 ]]5~& 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3 . 0000 
13100 . 0000 
3 . 3500 
1111 1117 
0 . 1 175 
0 . I 500 
0 . 1010 
0 . 1410 
0 . 1010 
0. 1410 
0 . I 5 &0 
0 . I 110 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0 
0.0450 
-o . 1201 
0.0&31 
0 . 0115 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0 . 0450 
0.0450 
0.0450 
0 . 1 I 10 
0.0 
0.0710 
•0 . 0200 
0.0450 
111 I 
0 . 0 
339 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 143 
40512 . 00 
ESTIMATED 
SALVAC! 
VALUE 
3910 . 0 
:1::!1~"? 0 
0 . 1175 
0 . 1500 
0. 1050 
0 . 1370 
0 . 1050 
0. I 370 
0. 1420 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0480 
0 . 0100 
0.0410 
0.0410 
0.0410 
0 . 0410 
0.0410 
0.0410 
0.0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . 0410 
0 . I 070 
0.0 
0 . 0710 
•0 . 0200 
0 . 0480 
1987 
0 . 0 
356 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 143 
42672 . 00 
O!PR!CI-
ATION 
LIP! 
7 . 0 
7 0 
I I I I 
0 . 1 175 
0 . I 500 
0 . 1050 
0. 1370 
0. 1050 
0. 1370 
0 . 1420 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0100 
0.0500 
0 . 0500 
0.0500 
0.0500 
0 . 0500 
0.0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 0500 
0 . 1070 
0 . 0 
0 . 0710 
·0 . 0200 
0 . 0500 
19BI 
0.0 
374 . 00 
0 . 0 
0. I 50 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
9.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
44105 . 00 0.0 
ACCUM. 
ECONOMIC RECOVERY 
LII'! (OEPR!C . ) 
7.0 30479.5 
7 o 711n"?o . 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
MACHIN!RY CURRENT COST 
81 
R!PLACEM!NT REPLAC!. ~!COV!RY 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
CODE COST PERIOD OR CLASS 
0 . 0 11700 . 0 5 . 0 
0 0 ~1700 0 5 . 0 
OS 
TRACTOR 65HP 
TRCTR 226HP 
TRCTR 229HP 
COMIIINI! 7720 
COMII ! NE 7720 
COMB ( NI! 7720 
PCKUP 1/2TON 
PCKUP 1/2TON 
PCKUP 1/2TON 
CSK 22 ' 9" 
CSK 22' 9" 
OS K 2 4' 41 • 
CSK 24' 4" 
ROLL CUlT 
ROLL CULT 
liN Pl..ii.NT I' 
liN PLANT a• 
CRAIN CART 
CRAIN CART 
LD PL 1 1xao 
LO PL 1SX60 
LI!V!I! IIOXES 
L!VEE PLOW 
LI!VEE PUSH 
LEVEE ROLLI!R 
I"LO CUl 31 ' 
I"LC CUL 31' 
I"LD CUl 25 
IIEOCI!R a ROW 
BECCER a ROW 
PIF>E HARROW 
PIP! HARROW 
CU•ALL 
MISC: TRUCKS 
19 75 . 0 
1 91 a . o 
1 sa 1 • o 
1979 . 0 
1983 . 0 
11ao . o 
1983.0 
197a . o 
1 9 7 6 . 0 
19a2 . 0 
19ao . o 
11 a 1 . o 
197a . o 
1112.0 
19 7 9. 0 
1971 . 0 
19a2 . 0 
Ita 1. 0 
1975 . 0 
197a . o 
1177 . 0 
19 a2 . 0 
1 sa 1. 0 
19 a 1 . o 
197a . o 
1182 . 0 
19 a 1 . o 
1978.0 
1971 . 0 
1179.0 
1179 . 0 
1980 . 0 
191 a . o 
1177 . 0 
7717 . 0 
34!145 . 0 
50a97 . 0 
51909 . 0 
94000 . 0 
55aa2 . 0 
9000 . 0 
3425 . 0 
2375 . 0 
7500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
5000.0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
1500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
4500 . 0 
3500 . 0 
2000 . 0 
7376.0 
3000 . 0 
1000 . 0 
1547 . 0 
700 . 0 
350 . 0 
5500 . 0 
4100 . 0 
2500 . 0 
1036.0 
1500 . 0 
1000 . 0 
1100.0 
:1500 . 0 
50000.0 
100a7 . 0 
52475 . 0 
74621 . 0 
53aa6 . 0 
14000 . 0 
61all .0 
9000 . 0 
453a . o 
3876 . 0 
11500 . 0 
laoo . o 
1 1100 . 0 
9200 . 0 
4200 . 0 
3100 . 0 
437 1 • 0 
7000 . 0 
4718 . 0 
1320 . 0 
7100 . 0 
1000 . 0 
7500.0 
1563 . 0 
2100 . 0 
350 . 0 
7100 . 0 
7100 . 0 
5aoo . o 
1100 . 0 
3500 . 0 
1020 . 0 
1100 . 0 
aiOO.O 
10000 . 0 
1009.0 
524a . o 
7462 . 1 
53a9.0 
0 . 0 
11111 . 0 
0 . 0 
454 . 0 
3a& . O 
o . o 
lao . o 
0 . 0 
920 . 0 
0 . 0 
390 . 0 
437 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
132 . 0 
7110 . 0 
100 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
35 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
510 . 0 
1 10.0 
350 . 0 
102 . 0 
180 . 0 
160 . 0 
1000 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0• 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7.0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
7 . 0 
0 . 0 
1071 . 0 
46037 . 0 
43214.2 
4311& . 7 
14 100 . 0 
45772 . 9 
1350 . 0 
3935 . 3 
3411 . 0 
4255 . 0 
7249 . 0 
1170 . 0 
7971 . 1 
1554 . 0 
3174 . 9 
3934 . 0 
2590 . 0 
2736 . 4 
11 a a . o 
1590 . 6 
7200 . 0 
2775 . 0 
906 . 5 
1211 . 0 
303 . 5 
2923 . 0 
411 a . o 
5021 . 7 
990 . 0 
2149 . 2 
130 . 3 
1 113 . s 
7457 . 1 
52031 . 4 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
2 . 0 
2.0 
2 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 0 
19900 . 0 
94aoo . o 
94100 . 0 
94000 . 0 
94000 . 0 
94000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
9000 . 0 
1000 . 0 
15300 . 0 
15300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
19300 . 0 
5200 . 0 
5200 . 0 
10250 . 0 
1 0250 . 0 
5aoo . o 
1100 . 0 
17500 . 0 
17500 . 0 
1 1250 . 0 
2100 . 0 
2500 . 0 
&50.0 
9800.0 
9800 . 0 
9100 . 0 
5400 . 0 
5400 . 0 
2100 . 0 
2100 . 0 
11500 . 0 
90000 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5.0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
s . o 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
5 . 0 
!NI"ORMATIOH I"OR INITIAl I"ARM 2310 . ACRES• •••••·••••····· ·····•···•••••••••••••••·•••••••••· ······· • · ••• • •••••• 
SUMMARY 01" CROP ENTERPRISE COSTS 
1ST SOYIIEAHS 
2NO SOYBEANS 
FIRST RIC:! 
RATOON RIC:! 
SEED 
0 . 0 
' . 4 5 
33 . 90 
0.0 
I'I!RT·LIM! CHEMICALS I'UEL·LUBE 
··5/AC:RE·· 
0 . 0 
1 4. 3 6 
51 . 00 
3.31 
0 . 0 
45 . 45 
17 . 5& 
2.50 
0 . 0 
12 . 5a 
1 a . ao 
0 . 0 
MONTHLY LABOR REOUIREMENTS PER ACRE, 
.JAN . 
IIV CROP ENT!RPRlSE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
HOURS OF UNPAID FAMILY LABOR 
0.240 
0 . 240 
0 . 275 
0 . 0 
I"I!B . MAR . APRIL 
0 . 4SI 
o . 4sa 
0 . 3a7 
0 . 0 
0 . lOS 
0 . I OS 
1 . 310 
0 . 0 
0 . 546 
0 . 546 
0 . 515 
0 . 0 
MAY 
1 . 241 
1 . 2 4 a 
1 . 730 
0 . 0 
REPAIRS OTHER HARVEST COST 
S/ Y I!LC UNIT 
0 . 0 
6 . I 7 
6 . 71 
0 . 0 
.JUNE 
0 . 4a4 
0 . 414 
1 . I 9 1 
0 . 0 
0.0 
9 . 1 4 
79 . 20 
5 . 75 
.JULY 
0 . 29S 
0 . 295 
I . 273 
0 . 0 
AUC . 
0 . 404 
0 . 404 
0 . 1177 
0 . I 0 1 
0 . 0 
0 . 4500 
1 . 2300 
I . 2300 
S!I"T . 
0 . I OS 
0 . 1 OS 
0 . 294 
0 . 061 
OCT . 
0 . 55 7 
0 . 557 
0 . 1 1 1 
0 . 6al 
NOV . 
0 . 797 
0 . 797 
0 . I 56 
0 . 0 
DEC: . 
0 . 105 
0 . I OS 
0 . 222 
0 . 0 
AVAILABLE I!ACH MONTH 400.00 400 . 00 100 . 00 aoO . OO 750 . 00 900 . 00 100.00 aoO . OO 600 . 00 100 . 00 100 . 00 400.00 
HOURS WORKED !ACH MONTH BY A 
I'UlL TIM! EMI"LDVEE 250.00 300 . 00 350 . 00 3SO . OO 350 . 00 350 . 00 350 . 00 350 . 00 300 . 00 300 . 00 250 . 00 250 . 00 
ANNUAL M!AN DR MODAL CROP YIELDS 
1ST SOYBEANS 
19a4 
0 . 0 
23.19 
4' . 17 
I . 14 
:z"NO SOYBEANS 
FIRST RIC! 
RATOON RICE 
ANNUAL MI!AN OR MODAL C:ROI" PRICI!S 
1ST SOYBEANS 
1114 
o . o 
I . J J 
1 . :za 
a . l2 
2ND SOYBI!ANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATDON RICE 
CONSTRAINTS ON TH! CROPMIX 
1ST SO YIIEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
CROP SHARE LI!ASINC IIY CROP 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
AC:R!S 
PLANTED 
YEAR 1 
0 . 0 
1017.00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
CROP 
RECEIPTS 
0 . 0 
0 . 1430 
0 . I 430 
0 . 1430 
19 as 
0.0 
24 . 17 
52 . 31 
1 . 9 6 
19liS 
0 . 0 
7 . 4S 
9 . 71 
' . 10 
11 a 6 
0 . 0 
24 . 67 
56 . 04 
1 • 'a 
ts8 6 
0.0 
7 . 12 
10 . I 4 
1.43 
1187 
0 . 0 
25 . I 7 
56 . 6 1 
2 . 00 
19a7 
0 . 0 
1 . 01 
10 . 56 
J . a2 
1911 
0 . 0 
25.61 
57 . 1 1 
2 . 02 
11aa 
0 . 0 
I . J4 
I I . 0 2 
10 . 25 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
ACRES MIN !MUM 
HARY!ST!C I'RACTION 
MAXIMUM 
FRACTION 
OF Ml X 
LlNKACE 
TO CDUBl! 
NORMAL 
I"RAC . ACRES 
Y!ARI 01" MIX 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
1042 . 40 0 . 0 
10a6 . 40 0 . 0 
toa& . 30 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
CROP 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
3 . 00 
HARYI!STEC 
0 . 0 
0 . 95 
0 . 99 
0 . 99 
LANCLDRO SHARE OF R!C:!IPTS I COSTS 
S!ED FERT I CHEMICAL I"UEL I MACHINERY 
COSTS LIME COSTS LUBE REPAIRS 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
DTH!R 
CDS TS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
82 MARKETINC STRATACIES BECINNINC I'RACTIDN MONTH 
INVENTORY SOlO NEXT SOLO AFT!R 
MONTH 
SOlO IN 
NEXT YEAR 
0 . 0 1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
FIRST RIC! 
IUTODN R I C:E 
0.0 
6349 . 199 
0.0 
11105 . 000 
TAX YEAR HARVEST 
0 . 0 
0 . 300 
0 . 0 
1 . 000 
0 . 0 
10 . 000 
7.000 
10 . 000 
1 . 000 
I. 000 
1 . ooo 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
CUSTOM 
WORK 
0 . 0 
0 . 0790 
0 . 0710 
0 . 0790 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
01 
SEASONAL 'RICE INDEX 
JAN . I"!B . MAR . A'RIL MAY JUNE JULY AUC . S!,T . OCT . NOV . DEC . 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRS T RICE 
RA "(OON RICE 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 1 . 000 
I"ACTCREO MATRIX I"CR CRC, YIELDS & PRICES 
2 
CRO, Y IELDS 
1ST SOY!!ANS 
2NO SOY!!ANS 
I"IRS T ~ICE 
RATCCN RICE 
CRD' ,RICES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RIC:! 
IUTCON It I C! 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 503 
0 . 503 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 515 
0 . 515 
0 . 732 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.395 
0 . 315 
0.215 
0 . 533 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.300 
0 . 300 
0 . 030 
0.031 
0 . 151 
0 . 951 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0.411 
•0 . 411 
0. 177 
•0 . 101 
•0. 110 
•0 . 1 !10 
0 . • 12 
0 . 0 
•0 . 241 
·0 . 24& 
•0 . 592 
·0 . 140 
0.242 
0 . 242 
0 . 171 
1. 000 
CUMMULATTVE DISTRIBUTIONS 01" DEVIATES ABOUT THE MEAN (OR TREND), EXPRESSED AS A I"RACTICN 01" MEAN 
1 2 3 5 I 7 I t 10 
CRC, YIELDS 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATCCN RIC! 
CII.D' ,RICES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATCON RICE 
·0 . 711 
•0 . 711 
•0 . 427 
• 0 . 114 
•0 . 274 
·0 . 274 
•0 . 411 
•0 . 411 
•0 . 530 
•0 . 541 
·0 . 211 
•0. 317 
•0 . 231 
·0 . 23& 
•0 . 39" 
•0.394 
·0 . 311 
•0 . 371 
•0 . 180 
•O . 11 I 
•0 . 013 
•0 . 013 
•0 . 222 
•0 . 222 
COVAR I ANCE MATRIX 01" N!T INCOMES I"CR CRO,S 
1S T SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I"IRST RIC:! 
RATCON RIC! 
1 2 3 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
·0 . 214 
•0 . 251 
·0 . 12 1 
•O . 121 
•0 . 052 
•0 . 052 
•0 . 067 
•0 . 017 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
•0 . 171 
•0 . 133 
·0 . 077 
•0 . 015 
·0 . 031 
•0 . 031 
•0 . 025 
•0 . 025 
•0 . 015 
•0 . 021 
•0 . 042 
·0 . 023 
0 . 03& 
0 . 031 
0 . 125 
0 . 121 
0 . 032 
0 . 021 
•0 . 004 
0.024 
0 . 0&1 
0 . 041 
0 . 171 
0 . 171 
0 . 152 
0 . 135 
0 . 034 
0 . 015 
0 . 017 
0 . 017 
0 . 20& 
0.20& 
SUMMARY 01' 'OLICY DATA , BY YEAR ANO BY C:RC' 
CCC: LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2NO SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
INTEREST RATE 1"011. CCC: LOANS 
INTEREST RATE I"OR 1"011. LOANS 
1114 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
&.33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
CI'I' • I"ARM STORACE COSTS I"OR CRO,S UNDER LOAN 
1ST SOYBEANS O . JO 
2NO SOYBEANS 0 . 30 
I"IRS T RICE 0 . 50 
RATOON RIC:! 0 . 50 
IllS 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
&. 33 
&. OJ 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
O . J1 
0 . 31 
0 . 52 
0 . 52 
TARCET 'RICES . II" THEY ARE NOT TIED TO LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I"IRST RICE 12 . 2J 12 . 2J 
RATOON RICE 11 . 9J 11 . 13 
1111 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
&.3J 
&. OJ 
0 . 1 2 
0 . 12 
0.3J 
0 . 33 
0 . 55 
0 . 55 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 23 
1 1 . 9 3 
I'LEXIILE TARCET PRIC:E···I"RACTICN 01" TARCET ,RICE TO LOAN RATE 
1S T SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . ~ 0 . 0 
I'IRS T RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATCON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 0.0 
DIREC T "1"011." ENTRY PRICE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I' I RST RIC:!! 
RATCCN RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
1187 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
&. 33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 3. 
0 . 3. 
0 . 57 
0 . 57 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 23 
1 1 • I J 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
ACTUAL YIELDS LAST 5 YEARS I'OR CALCULATING I'ARM ,ROGRAM YIELDS 
1S T SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 30 . 00 32 . 00 17 . 00 10 . 00 
I'IRST RICE 41 . &6 3& . &3 44 . "5 49 . 61 
RAT 0 0 N It ICE 2 . 1 2 1 . & 5 1 . I a 1 . I 2 
ACTUAL LACCEO 'RICES 1'011. 4 YEARS US!O I"OR I"L!XIIILE LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I"IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
,RCGRAM (OR lASE) ACREAGE 
1ST SO YBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I' I RS T RICE 
RATOON RICE 
NATIONAL ALLOCATION I"ACTOR 
1ST SOY!EANS 
2ND SOY!EANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0.0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1. 00 
0 . 0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
10117 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1 .00 
0 . 0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
1. 00 
ACREACE SET ASIDE , 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
DIVERSION OR LIMITATION (I"RACTICN) 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0.0 
0 . 0 
I . 00 
1 . 00 
0.0 
0 . 0 
, II 
0 . 0 
5 . 02 
1 . 33 
1 . 03 
0 . 12 
0 . 12 
0 . 36 
0 . 31 
0 . 50 
0 . 10 
0 . 0 
0.0 
12 . 23 
1 1 . 13 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
& . 00 
41 . 32 
1 ·'" 
0.0 
10!17 . 00 
1097 . 00 
1097 . 00 
0 . 0 
o . o 
1 . 00 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 310 
0 . 301 
0 . 121 
0 . 1 II 
0 . 221 
0 . 226 
0 . 211 
0.211 
0 . 170 
0 . 900 
0 . 311 
0 . 7!12 
0 . 211 
0 . 211 
0 . "19 
0. 419 
83 
10 
1 1 
RATOON RICE 
S~IPPACE RATE (~RACTION) 
1ST SOYI!I!.ANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATC>ON RICE 
PAYMENT RATE I'OR ACREAGE DIVERSION 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYIII!.AHS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATODN RICE 
TRICCER PRICE ~OR THE ·~OR" 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIII!.ANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RICI!. 
CALL PRICE I"OR THI!. ·~OR" 
1ST SOYIIEANS 
2ND SDYIII!.ANS 
I"IRST RICE 
RATOON RIC! 
LENGTH 01" ~ARMER OWNED RESERVE 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
STORACE PAYMENT RATE I'OR THE "I'OR" 
0 . 25 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0.20 
o.o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
o . o 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 
l'tRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATDON RICE 0.0 
PRODUCTION GUARANTEE ~OR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 13 . 15 
I"IRST RICE 0.0 
RATDON RICE 0 . 0 
PRICE ELECTION ~OR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SDYBI!.ANS 1 . 50 
I'IRST RICE 0.0 
RATODN RICE 0.0 
PREMIUM RATE PER ACRI!. ~DR CROP INSURANCE 
1ST SOYBEANS 0.0 
2ND SOYIIEANS t . 1l 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RIC! 0.0 
LOAN RAT I!. I'OR PEANUTS UNDER OUOTE 
1ST S OY BEANS 0.0 
2ND SO YBEANS 0.0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 
LOAN RATE I"DR PEANUTS NOT UNDER QUOTA 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 
I'IRST RICE Q , Q 
RATOON RICE 0.0 
I'ARM"S POUNDAGE QUOTE ~OR PEANUTS 
1ST SOYBE ANS 0 . 0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 
I"IRS T RICE 0 . 0 
RATDDN RICE 0 . 0 
ACREAGE ALLOTMENT I'DR RICE 
1S T SOYIIEANS 
2ND SOYIIEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
~RACTIDN TARGET PRICE I'OR LOW YIELD PAYMENT 
Q . 3S 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0.20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
71 . IS 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13 . 92 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
7.73 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
11 . oa 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 , 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1S T SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0.0 0 . 0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 0.0 
RATDON RICE 0.0 0 . 0 
~RACTIDN TARGET PRICE I'DR PREVENTED PLANTING PAYMENT 
0 . 25 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
33 . 12 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
14 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 22 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 01 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYI!EANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 0.0 0 . 0 
RATDON RICE 0.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I'RACTION PROVEN YII!.LD I'OR ~OW YIELD PAYMENT 
1ST SDYB!ANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
I'RACTION PROVEN YII!.LD ~OR PREVENTED PLANTING 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0.0 
2ND SOYI!I!.ANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
~IRST RICE 0 . 0 0.0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 o . o 
PARITY PRIC! 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYI!EANS 
I'IRST RICE 
RATOON RICE 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
~RACTION OF CROP ELIGIBLE I'OR MKTC CERTII'ICATE 
1S T SOYI!EANS 0 . 0 0.0 
2ND SOYIIEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
I'IRST RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0.20 
0.0 
0 . 0 
35 . 01 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
o . o 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 4 . 4 9 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0.0 
1 . 29 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
12 . 36 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 25 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 20 
0 . 20 
0.0 
0 . 0 
3& . 51 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
14 . 71 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
1 . 82 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
13 . 11 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
PAYMENT LIMITATION FOR 
INCOME SUPPORT PAYMENTS 
DISASTER PAYMENTS 
100000 . 00 100000.00 100000 , 00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
100000 . 00 100000.00 100000.00 100000 . 00 100000 . 00 
MAXIMUM NONRECOURSE CCC LOAN 
1ST SOYBEANS 
:ZNO SOYIIEAN5 
84 :!~~~,/! 7~E 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 , 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
PERCENT BASE PRODUCTION ELICJI!LE FOR DEI'ICIENCY PAYMENT 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
MAXIMUM VALUE 01' CROP ELICI8LE I'OR DI!.~ICIENCY PAYMENT 
0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
'LeXIIL! LOAN RAT! ,ORMULAS 
NO . D' YEARS ORO~ LOW 
1ST SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
2ND SOYBEANS 0 . 0 0 . 0 
'IR~T RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
RATOON RICE 0 . 0 0 . 0 
A 1.0 INDICATES DELETING THE LOW OR HIGH 
MARK!TtNG LOAN RATES 
1ST SOYBEANS 
2ND SOYBEANS 
,IRST RIC! 
~ATOON RICE 
MAXIMUM MKTG LOAN lASE 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
DROP HIGH ,RACTION 0' MEAN 
0 . 0 0. 0 
0 . 0 0. 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
o . o 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
,ARMS LARGER THAN 0 . ACRES ARE ~OT ELICIIL! 'OR ANY 'ARM ~ROGRAM 
,ARMS LARGER THAN 0 . ACRES ARE ONLY ELIGIBLE 'OR THE CRO~ INSURANCE ~ROGRAM 
,ARMS WITH CRO~ SALES GREATER THAN S 0 . ARE NOT !LIGIILE 'OR ANY 'ARM ~ROGRAM IENE,ITS 
'ARMS WITH CRO~ SALES GREATER THAN S 0 . ARE ONLY ELICIILE 'OR THE CRO~ INSURANCE PROGRAM 
NUMBER 0' YEARS IN THE ~RDGRAM 3.00 
NUMBER 0' LOSS YEARS IN ~ROGRAM 2 . 00 
TOTAL 'CIC INDEMNITY ~AYMENTS RECEIVED 1313a . 37 
THE END 0, ALL IN~UT DATA 
1 !TOTAL DE~REC a 
MACHINE 1 7 . 00 
0 . 0 
11700 . 00 
1 2TOTAL DEPREC a 
MACH I NE 2 7 . 00 
0.0 
11700 . 00 
1 3TDTAL DEPREC a 
MACHIN~ 3 7 . 00 
THIS YEARS DEPREC %112 . 4 
33474.00 31711 . 00 3110 . 00 
0 . 0 7 . 00 31711 . 00 
5 . 00 0 . 0 
THIS YEARS DEPREC 4233 . 2 
31711 . 00 JJSia . oo 33S7 . 00 
0 . 0 7 , 00 33511 . 00 
5 . 00 0 . 0 
THIS YEARS DEPREC 11217.5 
11700 . 00 11700 . 00 0 . 0 
o . o 0 . 0 7 . 00 11700 . 00 
11700 . 00 5 , 00 0 . 0 
1 4TDTAL DE~REC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 11217 . 5 
MACHINE 7.00 7717.00 10017 . 00 1009 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 10017 . 00 
11100 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 5TOTAL DE~REC a THIS YEARS DEPREC %0407 . 5 
MACHINE 5 7 . 00 34145 . 00 12475 . 00 5241 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 52475 . 00 
14100 , 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 &TOTAL DEPREC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 31131 . 1 
MACHIN! I 7 . 00 50&17 . 00 74121 . 00 7412 . 10 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 74121 . 00 
14100 , 00 5 . 00 o . o 
1 7TOTAL DEPREC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 41413 . 7 
MACHIN! 7 7 . 00 11101 . 00 5311& . 00 5311 . 00 
0 . ~ 0 . 0 7 . 00 5311&.00 
14000 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 &TOTAL D!PREC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHIN! I 7 . 00 14000 . 00 14000 . 00 0 . 0 
0 , 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 14000 . 00 
14000 . 00 5.00 0 . 0 
1 ITOTAL DEPREC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 9 7 . 00 55&12 . 00 111a1 . 00 
11124 . • 
1111 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 11 II 1 . 00 
14000 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 10TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 71110 . 2 
MACHINE 1 0 7 . 00 1000 . 00 1000 . 00· 0.0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 1000 . 00 
1000 . 00 5.00 0 . 0 
1 11TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 11 7 . 00 3425 . 00 453& . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7.00 
1000 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 12TOTAL DEPREC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHIN! 12 7 . 00 2375 . 00 3176 . 00 
0. 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
1000 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
7125& . 1 
454 , 00 
4531.00 
72 1 1 5 . I 
31a . oo 
3171 . 00 
1 1JTOTAL D!PR!C a THIS YEARS DEPREC 74111 . 9 
MACHINE 13 7 . 00 7500 . 00 11500 . 00 0 , 0 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 1 1500 . 00 
15300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
14TOTAL DEPREC a THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 14 7 . 00 4500 , 00 9100 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
11300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
74115 . 7 
110 . 00 
1100.00 
15TOTAL D!PREC a THIS YEARS DEPR!C 71215 . ~ 
MACHINE 15 • 7 . 00 5000 . 00 11500 . 00 0 . 0 
0 , 0 0 . 0 7.00 11500 . 00 
11300 . 00 5 . 00 0.0 
1ITOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS D!PREC 
MACHINE 11 7 . 00 3500 . 00 1200 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
11300 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 1 7TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 17 7 . 00 2000 . 00 4200 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
5200 . 00 5 . 00 o . o 
1 !&TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 11 7 . 00 1500 . 00 3900 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
5200 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 19TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS DEPREC 
MACHINE 11 7 . 00 4100 . 00 4371 . 00 
0 , 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
10250 . 00 5 . 00 0 , 0 
1 20TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS D!PREC 
MACHINE 20 7 . 00 4500 . 00 7000 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
10250 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
1 21TOTAL DI!PREC I THIS Y!ARS DEPREC 
MACH I NE 21 7.00 3500 . 00 4711 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
1100 . 00 5 . 00 0 . 0 
22TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS OEPREC 
MACH I NE 22 7 . 00 2000 . 00 1320 . 00 
0 . 0 0 . 0 7 . 00 
1100 . 00 5.00 0 . 0 
23TOTAL DEPREC I THIS YEARS D!PREC 
'71517 . 5 
120 . 00 
1200 . 00 
'7t733 . 7 
0 . 0 
4200 . 00 
71940 . 9 
310 . 00 
31oo . oo 
71140 . 1 
437 . 00 
43'71 . 00 
12012 . 4 
0 . 0 
7000 . 00 
12141 . 5 
0 . 0 
4T11 . 00 
12141 . 6 
132 . 00 
1320 . 00 
12197 . 9 
2162 . 4 
1316 . 51 
2162 . 43 
1570 . 1 
5497 . 71 
1570 . 77 
141&4 . 3 
52445 . 00 
14114 . 21 
0.0 
1001 . 00 
0 . 00 
1110 . 0 
1437 . 11 
1 1 II. 9 I 
1155 . 4 
31343 . 71 
1155 . 31 
2112.1 
1001 I . 21 
2112 . 15 
22121 . 1 
71100 . 00 
22121 . 57 
4102 . 3 
11101 . 13 
4102 . 32 
2115 . 7 
7150 . 00 
21 as . 71 
141 . 7 
102 . 18 
141 . 61 
0 . 0 
311 . 00 
0 . 00 
2070 . 0 
7245 . 00 
2070 . 00 
721 . 1 
255 1. 02 
721 . 1& 
1310 . 0 
•a3o . oo 
1310 . 00 
301 . 9 
1221 . a 6 
301.16 
75 I. 0 
2546 . 00 
756 . 00 
207.2 
725 . 14 
207 . 11 
0 . 0 
437 . 00 
0.00 
1 260 . 0 
4410.00 
1210 . 00 
556 . 2 
1 91 1 • 5 & 
515.16 
0 . 0 
132 . 00 
0 . 00 
241 . 4 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2017 . 40 
2 . 00 
4000 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
775 . 20 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
174 . 20 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
214 . 00 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0 . 0 
0.0 
0 . 0 
33474 . 00 
1t&O . OO 
31711 . 00 
1171.00 
11700 . 00 
1Sa3 . 00 
7717 . 00 
1175 . 00 
34145 . 00 
117a . oo 
50197 . 00 
1911 . 00 
51101 . 00 
1171 . 00 
0.0 14000 . 00 
0,0 1113 . 00 
0 . 0 55112 . 00 
o. o 1110 . oo 
0.0 1000 . 00 
0 . 0 1113 . 00 
0 . 0 3425 . 00 
0 . 0 1!171 . 00 
0 . 0 2375 . 00 
0 . 0 117 5 . 00 
0 . 0 '7500 . 00 
0.0 1112 . 00 
0 . 0 4500 . 00 
0 . 0 1110 . 00 
0 . 0 5000.00 
0 . 0 11&1 . 00 
0 . 0 3500 . 00 
0 . 0 1171.00 
0.0 2000 . 00 
0 . 0 11&2 . 00 
0.0 1500 . 00 
o . o 1171 . 00 
0 . 0 4500 . 00 
0 . 0 1171 . 00 
0.0 4500 . 00 
0 . 0 1112 . 00 
0 . 0 3500 . 00 
0 . 0 11&1 . 00 
0 . 0 2000.00 
0 . 0 1175.00 
0 . 0 
5 . 00 
0 . 0 
1.00 
o.o 
2.00 
0 . 0 
10 . 00 
0 . 0 
7 . 00 
0.0 
4 . 00 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
5 . 00 
0 . 0 
2 . 00 
0 . 0 
7 . 00 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
3.00 
0 . 0 
5 . 00 
0 . 0 
4 , 00 
0 . 0 
7 . 00 
0 . 0 
3 . 00 
0 . 0 
1 . 00 
0 . 0 
9 . 00 
0 . 0 
3.00 
0 . 0 
4 . 00 
0 . 0 
tO . OO 
33141 . 12 
0 . 0 
21141 . 01 
0 . 0 
2'231 . 21 
0 . 0 
1071 . 00 
0 . 0 
47227 . 00 
0 . 0 
52231 . 10 
0 . 0 
41729 . 31 
0 . 0 
31121 . 51 
0 . 0 
50375 . , 
0 . 0 
3535.71 
0 . 0 
4014 . 00 
0 . 0 
341& . 00 
0 . 0 
&325 . 00 
0 . 0 
7977 . 14 
0 . 0 
&050 . 00 
0 . 0 
1210 . 00 
0 . 0 
2310 . 00 
0 . 0 
33&2 . 04 
0 . 0 
3934 . 00 
0 . 0 
3150.00 
0.0 
3302 . 10 
0 . 0 
111& . 00 
0 . 0 
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Appendix C. 
Plots of Probability Distribution Functions 
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Yield distribution for ratoon rice 
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Yield distribution for rice following 2 years of soybeans 
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